Adam (formerly known as Michael Merrill) v Cheshire East Council

An injunction restraining a breach of planning control may be enforced against the individual named in it; the individual need not be the landowner. A human being is a person for planning purposes: the Interpretation Act 1978 definition, which includes bodies corporate or unincorporate, extends rather than limits ordinary meaning. Registered proprietorship establishes ownership for purposes of the law of England and Wales. Religious belief does not exempt a person from planning law or excuse deliberate non-compliance. In contempt proceedings, breaches must be proved to the criminal standard and identified with precision. Sentencing requires assessment of culpability and harm, the custody threshold, the least committal term, and whether imprisonment should be suspended.

The appellant and his wife lived on agricultural land containing unauthorised buildings and other development. The High Court made an injunction on 3 October 2022 under section 187B of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990, requiring specified demolition, removal and cessation of residential use. After finding three substantial breaches, the High Court sentenced the appellant to 12 months’ imprisonment suspended for 12 months and ordered him to pay costs of £17,409.34. The appellant appealed against the sentence and sought to challenge the contempt finding, arguing that he was not a person, did not own the land, was protected by his faith, and could not comply because the plan lacked red edging. The central issues were whether those arguments undermined the injunction, the contempt finding or the sentence.

Appeal dismissed on all grounds.

1. In contempt proceedings potentially affecting liberty, the breaches and their dates must be identified rigorously and proved to the criminal standard. The High Court properly confined the case to three accurately pleaded substantial breaches.
2. An injunction under section 187B of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 need not be made against the owner of the land. It may require the person against whom it is made to perform specified acts for the purpose of restraining an actual or apprehended breach of planning control.
3. The appellant’s argument that he was not a person was unsustainable. The definition in Schedule 1 to the Interpretation Act 1978 extends the ordinary meaning of person to bodies corporate or unincorporate; it does not exclude human beings. The Court applied the approach in Re AB (A Child) (Habeas Corpus) [2024] EWCA Civ 105.
4. The appellant was the registered proprietor of the land. His title registration therefore established him as owner or proprietor for purposes of the law of England and Wales. His faith was entitled to respect, but was irrelevant to whether he was subject to planning law or bound by the injunction.
5. The omission of red edging from the plan was unfortunate but not fatal. The judge had considered the issue and was entitled, having heard the appellant and understood the history, to find that he knew what the injunction required and intentionally chose to defy it. The Court would not go behind that finding of fact.
6. The sentencing approach was correct: first assess seriousness by culpability and harm and decide whether the custody threshold is crossed; next impose the least period of committal properly reflecting the contempt; and finally consider suspension. The appellant’s breaches were serious and flagrant, the custody threshold was crossed, and the 12-month concurrent term, suspended to allow staged compliance, was proportionate and just. The family impact had been taken into account.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): appeal dismissed on all grounds; the Court upheld the contempt-related sentence and the High Court’s findings relevant to enforcement.
• High Court (King’s Bench Division), Manchester District Registry: an injunction was made on 3 October 2022 under section 187B of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990. Following findings of three breaches, the appellant was sentenced to 12 months’ imprisonment suspended for 12 months and ordered to pay costs.