Dwaine Campbell, R (on the application of) v London Borough of Ealing

Section 23 of the Care Act 2014 preserves the priority of the housing schemes under the Housing Act 1996. A local authority cannot use Care Act powers or duties to provide or fund ordinary accommodation where the authority is required to comply with the Part VI allocation scheme or to make provision under Part VII. The relevant Housing Act requirement is not limited to an immediate duty to provide a property. It includes the statutory duties to operate the allocation scheme, give reasonable preference and allocate accommodation according to that scheme. Housing needs identified through social care must therefore be addressed within the applicable housing scheme. Where section 23 excludes a Care Act accommodation duty, ending temporary accommodation funding is not, on that ground, irrational or improper.

The appellant, a disabled man with assessed care and support needs, had lived for several years in temporary bed and breakfast accommodation funded by the respondent’s adult social services department. The funding was withdrawn after the respondent concluded that his housing needs should be pursued through the allocation and homelessness schemes under the Housing Act 1996.

The Administrative Court dismissed his judicial review claim: [2023] EWHC 10 (Admin). Permission to appeal was granted on whether section 23 of the Care Act 2014 prevented accommodation funding under that Act and whether the withdrawal decision was irrational or taken for an improper purpose. Permission was refused on an Equality Act ground. The central issue was the statutory boundary between adult social care and housing provision.

Appeal dismissed. Grounds 1 and 2 failed. Permission had been refused on Ground 3, concerning alleged victimisation under the Equality Act 2010.

1. The court followed R (Idolo) v Bromley LBC [2020] EWHC 860 (Admin); [2021] HLR 17. Section 23 of the Care Act 2014 gives a measure of priority to the general housing scheme. Rehousing needs, even when identified through a Care Act assessment, cannot shortcut the balanced priorities established under the Housing Act 1996. That reasoning was not confined to applicants already living in council accommodation.
2. The phrase in section 23 referring to anything which a local authority is required to do under the Housing Act is not limited to a present duty to provide a property immediately. Under Part VI, sections 159, 166A(1), 166A(3) and 166A(14) require the authority to operate an allocation scheme, give reasonable preference to specified categories and allocate accommodation only in accordance with that scheme. The absence of an actual offer, or delay caused by housing scarcity, does not permit a parallel Care Act route.
3. The same boundary applies under Part VII where the authority is required to make provision for a homeless applicant who is eligible for assistance. The appellant’s construction would disrupt statutory priorities, risk queue-jumping and place housing functions upon social care departments. R v Bristol CC ex p Penfold (1998) 1 CCLR 315 and R v Islington LBC ex p Batantu (2001) 33 HLR 76 concerned the differently worded, superseded National Assistance Act 1948 and did not govern the section 23 issue.
4. Since section 23 meant that Ealing had no Care Act duty or power to provide or fund the accommodation, the decision to cease funding was not irrational or taken for an improper purpose. Males LJ agreed and emphasised the queue-jumping consequences of the appellant’s interpretation. Dingemans LJ agreed with both judgments.

Procedural history

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division) — Appeal dismissed on Grounds 1 and 2. Permission to appeal was refused on Ground 3.
2. Administrative Court — Upper Tribunal Judge O’Connor, sitting as a deputy High Court judge, dismissed the judicial review claim concerning withdrawal of accommodation funding: [2023] EWHC 10 (Admin).