Janet Maureen Jaffe v Tingdene Marinas Limited

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appellant's challenge to the Upper Tribunal's conclusion that the pitch occupied by Ms Jaffe is a "protected site" for the purposes of the Mobile Homes Act 1983. The court applied ordinary principles of statutory and planning‑permission construction to conclude that the 1998 permission for "houseboats" at the Marina encompassed the stationing of statutory caravans on floats attached to pontoons, and that the 2014 certificate of lawful use under section 191 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 operated, by virtue of section 191(7), as the relevant planning permission for site‑licensing purposes. The court rejected the respondent's contention that the caravan ceased to be a "caravan" because it sat on a float and accepted the Upper Tribunal's analysis distinguishing the scope of a grant from conditions that limit manner or times of use.

Background and parties:

• Ms Jaffe lived in a Willerby caravan stationed on a float (marketed as a "Hartford houseboat") moored at No.8 West Pontoon at Hartford Marina, owned by Tingdene Marinas Ltd.
• Tingdene served notice to quit; Ms Jaffe sought protection under the Mobile Homes Act 1983 asserting her agreement entitled her to station a mobile home on a protected site and to occupy it as her sole residence.

Procedural history:

• The First‑tier Tribunal found that the Act applied to Ms Jaffe. The Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber, Judge Elizabeth Cooke) dismissed Tingdene's appeal ([2022] UKUT 16 (LC)). Tingdene obtained permission to appeal to this court on a single ground challenging the UT's conclusion that the land is a "protected site"; permission was refused on a separate ground regarding the nature of the licence agreement.

Relief sought / nature of the proceedings:

• On appeal Tingdene sought to overturn the UT's holding that the site was a "protected site" under the Mobile Homes Act 1983, arguing (i) the 1998 planning permission only permitted "houseboats" as indivisible units and not caravans, and (ii) the 2014 certificate of lawful use was limited to curing a breach of condition (a s191(1)(c) matter) rather than operating as a deemed planning permission under s191(1)(a) and s191(7).

Issues framed by the court:

1. Whether the 1998 planning permission for "houseboats" permitted the stationing of caravans (as defined by statute) on the land (including water covered by the land) when those caravans sat on floats.
2. Whether the 2014 certificate of lawful use was granted under section 191(1)(a) (lawful existing use) or only under section 191(1)(c) (lawful breach of condition), and the effect of the certificate for site‑licensing purposes (including s191(7)).

Court's reasoning:

• The court applied conventional principles of interpreting planning permissions: the natural and ordinary meaning of the grant, read in context, determines the scope of the permitted use; limitations on manner or timing are to be expressed in conditions where that is intended.
• The description "houseboats" in the 1998 permission was a functional description of what existed on the Marina; it encompassed statutory caravans sited on floats that made habitation on water possible. The caravan remained a statutory "caravan" despite being supported by a float, and the permission therefore operated as a caravan site (albeit on water).
• Section 191(1)(a) was the appropriate statutory vehicle for the Certificate: the planning authority certified the lawfulness of the existing residential use (occupation as a sole residence) and, by s191(7), that certificate had effect as a grant of planning permission for the purposes of the Caravan Sites and Control of Development Act 1960. The Certificate therefore superseded the 1998 limitation to holiday use for the relevant pitch.
• The UT had not erred in law and its conclusions were upheld.

Subsidiary findings: the court accepted the UT's finding that the caravan was not attached to the float and that the presence of the float did not alter the caravan's statutory character; it rejected the appellant's argument that the Certificate merely rendered condition 1 unenforceable without altering the scope of the permission.

This is an appeal from the Upper Tribunal. The appeal is dismissed. The Court of Appeal held that (i) the 1998 planning permission for "houseboats" at the Marina, properly construed in context, encompassed the stationing of statutory caravans on floats and therefore the site qualified as a "caravan site"; and (ii) the 2014 certificate of lawful use was issued under section 191(1)(a) and, by virtue of section 191(7), operates as the relevant planning permission for site licensing purposes, removing the holiday‑use limitation for the pitch. The Upper Tribunal did not err in law.

Appeal to the Court of Appeal (Civil Division) from the Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber) (Judge Elizabeth Cooke) [2022] UKUT 16 (LC); prior decision at First‑tier Tribunal (Lands Chamber) in favour of Jaffe. Permission to appeal to this court was granted by Stuart‑Smith LJ. Final decision reported as [2024] EWCA Civ 751.