Janet Maureen Jaffe v Tingdene Marinas Limited

A site is a “protected site” for the purposes of the Mobile Homes Act 1983 where planning permission exists for a caravan to be stationed on the relevant land and the relevant permission is not expressed to be for holiday use only. Planning permission is interpreted by the natural and ordinary meaning of its words in their legal and factual context. A grant may contain a functional limitation defining the permitted use, even without an express condition. A certificate of lawfulness under section 191 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 which certifies an existing residential use can supersede a holiday-use limitation in the original permission and operate as a grant of planning permission for that residential use. A caravan supported on a float over water may still be stationed on land for these purposes.

Ms Jaffe occupied a Willerby caravan, resting on a float moored to a pontoon at Hartford Marina, as her sole residence. Tingdene, the freehold owner, served her with notice to quit. She sought protection under the Mobile Homes Act 1983, which depends on the agreement relating to a mobile home stationed on a protected site.

The First-tier Tribunal found that the statutory protection applied. The Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber) dismissed Tingdene’s appeal: [2022] UKUT 16 (LC). Tingdene appealed on whether the land was a protected site. Permission was refused on a separate argument concerning whether the agreement entitled Ms Jaffe to station the caravan itself. The central issues were the scope of the 1998 planning permission and the effect of a 2014 certificate of lawful use.

1. Appeal dismissed. The land was a “protected site” and Ms Jaffe was entitled to the protection of the Mobile Homes Act 1983.
2. The statutory definition of a caravan site was satisfied. In light of the unchallenged findings, Ms Jaffe’s statutory caravan was stationed on Tingdene’s land for human habitation. The float did not alter that conclusion. The land was therefore land for which a site licence was required under the Caravan Sites and Control of Development Act 1960.
3. The inquiry under section 1(2) of the Caravan Sites Act 1968 was two-stage: first, whether planning permission existed for a caravan to be stationed on the relevant land; and secondly, whether the relevant planning permission was expressed to be for holiday use only. The requirement for planning permission followed Balthasar v Mullane, [1986] 51 P&C R 107.
4. Planning permission is construed by the natural and ordinary meaning of its words, viewed in their particular legal and factual context and in the light of common sense. The grant defines the scope of the permitted use. Conditions qualify or limit that use, but a narrow functional use in the grant may exclude wider uses by necessary implication. The distinction between the scope of a grant and conditions was applied from Winchester City Council v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government, [2015] EWCA Civ 563.
5. The 1998 permission for “15 houseboats” necessarily permitted the floats and caravans to be stationed in the configuration described. It was artificial to treat the houseboats as indivisible units. The fact that the permission related to land covered by water was immaterial.
6. The 2014 certificate of lawful use certified the existing use of Houseboat 8 West Pontoon for occupation as a sole residence. Under section 191(1)(a) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990, that certified the lawfulness of an existing use of land, rather than merely certifying that a condition was unenforceable under section 191(1)(c). By section 191(7), the certificate had effect as a grant of planning permission under section 3(3) of the Caravan Sites and Control of Development Act 1960. It therefore superseded the holiday-use restriction in the 1998 permission for site-licensing purposes.
7. The certificate was the relevant permission for determining protected-site status. Holiday and residential uses were mutually inconsistent, so the original holiday-use limitation could not remain operative for Ms Jaffe’s pitch.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division) dismissed Tingdene’s appeal.
• Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber) dismissed Tingdene’s appeal from the First-tier Tribunal: [2022] UKUT 16 (LC).