Jian Guo v Alison Kinder & Ors

Under Civil Procedure Rules 1998 Practice Direction 7A, paragraph 6.1, a claim is treated as brought on an earlier date only where the claim form eventually issued is the claim form actually received by the court office on that date. Material differences in the parties or substantive claim prevent that condition being met.

Receipt requires actual delivery through a means permitted by the Rules. An unsolicited email attachment, where email filing was permitted only with fee remission and no such certificate accompanied it, was not delivery to the court office. The court’s inherent jurisdiction, if it survives alongside the Practice Direction, cannot cure a claimant’s own failure to complete the required filing steps.

The appellant alleged that the respondents, her former solicitors, had negligently advised her about a lease and its assignment. Her causes of action arose no later than August 2015.

In August 2021, shortly before expiry of the limitation period, she attempted to file proceedings electronically and also emailed an attached draft claim form to a court enquiries office. The court later accepted a revised claim form dated 25 August 2021. Deputy District Judge Stringer entered summary judgment for the respondents on limitation grounds. His Honour Judge Dodd dismissed the appellant’s first appeal.

Permission for this second appeal was confined to the effect of Practice Direction 7A and e-filing. The central issue was whether the later-issued claim form should be treated as filed on 4 August 2021, either under the Practice Direction or through inherent jurisdiction.

1. Appeal dismissed. The claim form issued on 25 August 2021 could not be treated as having been brought on 4 August 2021. The appellant’s claim was therefore statute-barred.

2. Practice Direction 7A, paragraph 6.1 to the Civil Procedure Rules 1998 assists only where the claim form as issued was received by the court office earlier. The decision in Chelfat did not assist: there, the substantive parties and claim were unchanged and only the address for service differed. Here the forms differed materially, including the parties, amount claimed, court heading, allegations and relief. The issued form was not the form received on 4 August.

3. Nor had a claim form been received or delivered on 4 August. The appellant’s email asked whether she could file by email, and the attached document was not filed through CE-File or by one of the alternatives specified by the enquiries officer. Email filing was available only with a fee remission certificate, which was absent. Payment of a fee did not convert the attachment into a properly delivered claim form.

4. The authorities on inherent jurisdiction concern a court-office error after a litigant has done all that is required to deliver a valid claim form. Assuming that jurisdiction survives the Practice Direction, its conditions were not met: the appellant had not completed the necessary filing steps, and the court office had made no relevant error. It was unnecessary to decide whether the jurisdiction survives, whether this court could exercise it, or whether it could apply to a later claim form following an earlier failed attempt. The request for clarification of the ambiguous court heading was, in any event, not arbitrary.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division) — On a second appeal limited to Practice Direction 7A and e-filing, the court dismissed the appeal: [2024] EWCA Civ 762.
• Preston County Court — His Honour Judge Dodd dismissed the appellant’s appeal from Deputy District Judge Stringer, who had entered summary judgment for the respondents because the claims were statute-barred.