Alexander James Warren Wynne, R (on the application of) v Vale of White Horse District Council

[2024] EWHC 1008 (Admin)

Case details

Case citations
[2024] EWHC 1008 (Admin)
Court
High Court (Planning Court)
Judgment date
30 April 2024
Judgment text

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Subjects
Administrative Planning judicial review Public sector equality duty
Keywords
planning permission judicial review officer’s report planning judgment irrationality community facilities public sector equality duty equivalent or better provision planning conditions
Outcome
application dismissed
Judicial consideration

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Summary

In a planning judicial review, the court will not substitute its own planning judgment for that of the decision-maker. Whether replacement community facilities are equivalent or improved, suitable, or beneficial overall is ordinarily a qualitative planning judgment reviewable only for irrationality or legal error.

An officer’s report must be read fairly and as a whole. It need not address every submission in detail, provided it does not materially mislead the committee on a matter capable of affecting the decision. The public sector equality duty requires rigorous and conscientious consideration of the statutory criteria and adequate information, but does not require a particular outcome or dictate the weight to be given to equality considerations.

Factual background

The claimant sought permission to bring judicial review proceedings against the defendant council’s grant of planning permission for demolition of a former scout hut and sports pavilion and their replacement by a single community and sports pavilion.

The claimant, chair of trustees of the former user, challenged the decision on irrationality, alleged misleading advice, failure to comply with the public sector equality duty, misinterpretation of national and local planning policies, and failure to secure minimum scouting provision by condition or planning obligation. Permission had previously been refused on the papers. The issue on renewal was whether any ground was arguable.

Held

  1. Permission refused. Each ground was unarguable.
  2. The court accepted that the Scout Group’s former use of the site could be considered, but the council was not legally required to secure continuation of that use at its previous or future level. The Scout Group had left the site, had no legal entitlement to use it, and the existing hut could not be used without refurbishment.
  3. The officer’s report, read fairly and as a whole, recognised the Scout Group’s concerns, including its need for dedicated space, suitable times, safeguarding arrangements, storage and drying facilities. The conclusion that an equivalent level of meeting space could be provided, while also delivering improved facilities for the wider community, was a planning judgment. Disagreement with that judgment did not establish irrationality.
  4. The committee was not materially misled by reference to 2018 usage figures. The question asked at the meeting concerned historical use of the hut, and the officer’s answer was reasonable in the circumstances. Members also had the claimant’s detailed representations and schedules, covering past, current and future operations.
  5. The council had complied with section 149 of the Equality Act 2010. The report showed a proper, conscientious and rigorous focus on age-related equality implications, and the council was entitled to balance those matters against wider community benefits and other planning considerations.
  6. The interpretation and application of Policy SI1, Policy CP08 and paragraph 99 of the NPPF involved evaluative planning judgments. The council was entitled to assess equivalence and improvement by reference to the wider community, rather than requiring replication of the former Scout Hut or the Scout Group’s precise operations. No irrationality or failure to apply the policies was shown.
  7. The decision not to impose a community-use condition or planning obligation was also a matter of planning judgment. There was no agreement or existing activity requiring protection, and no arguable legal duty to secure a particular level of scouting use.
  8. The court declined to rely on section 31(3C) and (3D) of the Senior Courts Act 1981, but this did not affect the conclusion that the grounds were unarguable.

The court’s approach to earlier authorities

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Appellate history

Permission to bring the judicial review claim was refused on the papers by a Deputy Judge of the High Court on 18 October 2023. The present judgment concerned the claimant’s renewed application for permission. Permission was again refused.

Key cases cited

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Cases citing this case

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