Pamela Wesson v Cambridgeshire County Council

The claim was a statutory challenge under paragraph 35 of Schedule 9 to the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984 seeking to impugn the Cambridge (Mill Road) (Bus Gate) Order 2023. The court applied the summary judgment test (CPR Part 24) and relevant principles on strike out, having regard also to the procedural requirements in the Local Authorities’ Traffic Orders (Procedure) (England and Wales) Regulations 1996 and the public sector equality duty in section 149 of the Equality Act 2010.

The judge found a realistic prospect that the statement of reasons for proposing the Order and the post‑making notification of reasons (Regulation 17(3)) were deficient in substance or form, and that issues of interpretation (notably the definition of "Authorised Vehicle" and the Blue Badge exemption), possible mistake of fact in committee debate, the public sector equality duty and reliance on funding raised realistic prospects of success. However, the judge granted summary judgment for the defendant on the Claimant’s Ground 1 (alleged failure to give adequate reasons for proposing the Order) because, although the statement of reasons appeared limited, the claimant had not shown she was substantially prejudiced by that defect as required by paragraph 36(1)(b) of Schedule 9 RTRA 1984.

The claimant, a local resident and chair of an unincorporated residents' association, challenged the County Council’s permanent traffic regulation order closing Mill Road Bridge to most private vehicles. The permanent Order followed an earlier experimental order and a public consultation. The Order prohibited vehicular use of the bridge except for buses, taxis, bicycles and "Authorised Vehicles" and authorised physical works to the highway. The claimant advanced multiple grounds under paragraph 35, Schedule 9 RTRA 1984, including alleged failures to give adequate reasons for the proposal and for the decision, a mistake of fact concerning an exemption for carers of Blue Badge holders, breach of the public sector equality duty (s.149 Equality Act 2010), reliance on irrelevant funding considerations and apparent bias/predetermination by two councillors.

Nature of the application and relief sought:

• The defendant applied for summary judgment dismissing, or alternatively for striking out, all or parts of the claimant’s statutory claim. The claimant had also sought interim relief and a protective costs order earlier in the proceedings.

Issues framed by the court:

• Whether the deposited Statement of Reasons when the proposal was advertised complied with regulation 2(d) of Schedule 2 to the 1996 Regulations and whether any failure resulted in substantial prejudice under paragraph 36(1)(b) Schedule 9 RTRA 1984;
• Whether the defendant complied with Regulation 17(3) (notification to objectors of reasons for the decision) and whether that caused substantial prejudice;
• Whether the Committee’s decision involved a material mistake of fact in light of a Chair’s clarification about Blue Badge/carer exemptions, and whether officers’ references to funding were an improper irrelevant consideration;
• Whether the County Council complied with the public sector equality duty (s.149 Equality Act 2010) in respect of disabled persons and Blue Badge holders; and
• Whether statements and associations of two councillors gave rise to apparent bias or predetermination.

Court’s reasoning and outcome on the principal issues:

• On the adequacy of the Statement of Reasons for the proposal (Schedule 2 paragraph 2(d) / Ground 1) the judge accepted there was a realistic prospect that the statement was deficient because it merely recited statutory purposes without explaining how they applied to the specific proposal. Despite that, paragraph 36(1)(b) requires substantial prejudice before an order can be quashed for breach of a relevant requirement; the claimant had participated fully in the consultation and produced no evidence that she had been impeded or would have said anything different had fuller reasons been provided. For that reason the court granted summary judgment for the defendant on Ground 1.
• On Regulation 17(3) (Ground 2) the court found a realistic prospect that merely linking objectors to committee documents (the officer’s report) could be insufficient and that the claimant might show substantial prejudice, especially given confusion in the committee debate and subsequent correction of the minutes; summary judgment and strike out were refused on that ground.
• On the alleged mistake of fact about Blue Badge/carer exemptions (Ground 3) and on the issue of possible improper consideration of funding (Ground 5), the court held there were realistic prospects based on what was said in committee (including officer comments on funding) and the Chair’s clarification, so summary disposal was inappropriate.
• On the PSED challenge (Ground 4(a)) the court considered the Equality Impact Assessment indicated the authority had turned its mind to equality issues but concluded the claim could not be summarily dismissed because its fate was tied to the outcome of the factual questions addressed under Grounds 2 and 3.
• On apparent bias/predetermination (Ground 7) there was a realistic prospect that the claimant could show an appearance of bias in respect of one councillor’s role in a local residents’ association and related statements; the application to dismiss or strike out that ground was refused.

The judgment records procedural observations on the risks of attempting summary disposal of complex statutory challenges and notes interpretative difficulties in the Order (notably the definition of "Authorised Vehicle"). The operative effect was that the defendant’s summary application succeeded only in relation to Ground 1; the remaining grounds proceed for fuller resolution.

The defendant’s application for summary judgment/strike out was allowed in part and refused in part. The court granted summary judgment for the defendant on Ground 1 (failure to provide adequate reasons for proposing the Order) because the claimant could not show substantial prejudice required by paragraph 36(1)(b) Schedule 9 RTRA 1984. The court refused summary judgment or strike out in respect of Grounds 2 (reasons for making the Order / Regulation 17(3)), 3 (alleged mistake of fact about Blue Badge/carer exemptions), 4(a) (alleged PSED breach), 5 (alleged irrelevant consideration of funding) and 7 (apparent bias/predetermination), holding that each raised realistic prospects of success and required fuller hearing; Grounds 4(b) and 6 were not pursued by the claimant.