Pamela Wesson v Cambridgeshire County Council

On an application for summary judgment concerning a statutory challenge to a traffic regulation order, the court must distinguish between a genuinely realistic claim and a fanciful one, while avoiding a mini-trial. Where the statutory scheme permits quashing for procedural non-compliance only if the applicant’s interests were substantially prejudiced, substantial prejudice is relevant at the summary judgment stage, not merely to remedy.

A deficient statement of reasons may nevertheless fail to justify quashing where the objector participated fully and identifies no further objection that would have been made. The position may differ where reasons for the final decision are required and uncertainty about the decision-making process may have impaired the objector’s understanding. Material issues concerning an alleged mistake of fact, irrelevant considerations, equality duties, or apparent bias should generally proceed to substantive determination where the evidence gives them a realistic prospect of success.

The claimant challenged the Cambridge (Mill Road) (Bus Gate) Order 2023 under paragraph 35 of Schedule 9 to the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984. The order restricted vehicular use of Mill Road Bridge, subject to specified exemptions.

The defendant applied for summary judgment or strike out. The claimant pursued challenges based on inadequate reasons for proposing and making the order, an alleged mistake concerning exemptions for Blue Badge holders and carers, an irrelevant consideration relating to funding, breach of the public sector equality duty, and apparent bias or predetermination. Grounds concerning consultation and the public sector equality duty pleaded under Ground 4(a) were withdrawn, while the remaining equality challenge was treated as Ground 4.

The central issue was whether any of the grounds had no realistic prospect of success and whether there was any compelling reason for the issues to proceed to trial.

1. Applicable threshold. The court treated the summary judgment application as the appropriate starting point. The question was whether each ground had a realistic, rather than fanciful, prospect of success. The court had to avoid a mini-trial, and the instruction to grasp the nettle on legal points did not require definitive determination of nuanced issues where fuller argument or factual assessment might assist.
2. Ground 1. The deposited statement of reasons merely identified three statutory purposes and did not explain how they applied to the proposed closure. The claimant therefore had a realistic prospect of establishing non-compliance with paragraph 2(d) of Schedule 2 to the Local Authorities’ Traffic Orders (Procedure) (England and Wales) Regulations 1996. However, paragraph 36(1)(b) of the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984 made substantial prejudice relevant to the ability to succeed in quashing the order. On the particular evidence, the claimant and the association had participated fully and identified no further representations that would have been made. Summary judgment was therefore entered for the defendant on Ground 1, without endorsing the adequacy of the statement of reasons.
3. Ground 2. The claimant had a realistic prospect of establishing that Regulation 17(3) required more than a link to a collection of documents and that the reasons for the final decision had to be formally identified. The clarification concerning Blue Badge holders and carers, its subsequent correction, and the funding references raised a realistic prospect of substantial prejudice. Summary judgment and strike out were refused.
4. Grounds 3 and 5. Comments made during committee debate require caution, but there was no absolute rule preventing the court from considering them. The chair’s clarification immediately before the vote, its lack of correction at the time, and the later correction in the minutes gave the alleged mistake of fact a realistic prospect of success. The officer’s comments about possible funding were potentially different from councillors’ debate contributions because they could represent advice to the committee. Summary judgment and strike out were refused.
5. Ground 4. The public sector equality duty is concerned with process, not achieving a particular outcome, and the authority generally determines the weight to be given to relevant matters subject to rationality review. Nevertheless, if the committee acted on a mistaken understanding of the exemptions, there was a realistic prospect that its equality assessment was materially defective. Summary judgment and strike out were refused.
6. Ground 7. The court could scrutinise the evidence on an application of this kind, while avoiding a mini-trial. Given the narrow 8–7 vote and the evidence concerning the councillors’ roles, declarations, accounts and statements connected with the residents’ association, the allegation of apparent bias or predetermination had a realistic prospect of success. Summary judgment and strike out were refused.
7. Grounds 4(b) and 6 were no longer pursued. Ground 1 was dismissed; Grounds 2, 3, 4 and 7 remained for substantive determination.

First-instance decision. The judgment records earlier interlocutory orders in the same proceedings, including [2023] EWHC 2801 (Admin), but no appeal from them.