The Mayor & Burgesses of the London Borough of Enfield v Charles Snell & Ors

An interim injunction which requires a defendant to leave or move from land may be mandatory in substance and may provide the claimant with nearly all the final relief sought. The court must therefore assess the strength of the claimant’s case to a higher standard than the usual serious-question threshold.

A riparian owner of both banks of a non-tidal river owns the river bed and has rights of access and egress. Permanent or materially stationed boats may constitute trespass or nuisance. Where occupation engages Article 8, the court must assess proportionality, including available alternative accommodation and statutory homelessness procedures. Equality Act duties may require reasonable adjustments in arrangements for alternative accommodation.

The claimant local authority sought interim and final injunctions against boat-dwellers and a person occupying a structure on land connected with its Meridian Water regeneration project. The claim relied principally on trespass and nuisance. The claimant also sought relief against persons unknown, but did not pursue it at this hearing.

The application had previously been adjourned by a Deputy High Court Judge because of concerns about notice, service and the evidence concerning alleged financial exposure. At the resumed hearing, the court considered service, the strength of the property-based claim, the effect of the proposed mandatory relief, and the defendants’ Article 8 and Equality Act arguments.

1. Nature of the relief and applicable threshold. The proposed order would require the relevant defendants to leave the affected area or move their boats. It was therefore mandatory in substance and would substantially provide the final relief sought. The court accordingly assessed the strength of the claimant’s case by a higher standard than the ordinary serious-question threshold identified in American Cyanamid v Ethicon Limited [1975] UKHL 1; [1975] AC 396.
2. Strength of the property claim. The claimant had a very strong, if not unanswerable, case. As riparian owner of both banks of the relevant non-tidal river, it owned the river bed and had rights of access and egress. Permanent mooring obstructing access was an actionable nuisance, and unauthorised attachment or material stationing of a boat constituted trespass. The claimant therefore had standing both as local authority and as property owner, applying Ackerman v London Borough of Richmond [2017] EWHC 84 (Admin), RB Kingston-upon-Thames v Salzer [2022] EWHC 3081 and Richmond LBC v Trotman [2024] EWHC 9 (KB).
3. Article 8. The Snells’ boat and Mr Wujek’s structure were their homes, so the proposed order engaged Article 8. Applying Manchester City Council v Pinnock [2011] UKSC 45; [2011] 2 AC 104, the interference was justified and proportionate. The claimant was vindicating substantial property and public interests, alternative moorings or accommodation had been explored, and the statutory homelessness regime provided a fair mechanism for assessing the defendants’ needs.
4. Equality Act considerations. The evidence raised a possible disability affecting the Snells and Mr Wujek. The court assumed for present purposes that the reasonable-adjustment duty could be engaged. Following Akerman-Livingston v Aster Communities Limited [2015] UKSC 15; [2015] AC 1399, those duties were additional to, and distinct from, Article 8. Their principal relevance was to arrangements for alternative accommodation, rather than to the claimant’s property claim itself.
5. The injunction was granted against the four defendants then remaining within its scope. Occupation was required to cease by 12 June 2024. Costs were ordered in the case, and a further hearing was listed.