RR, R (on the application of) v The London Borough of Enfield

A housing allocation scheme may place applicants in different priority categories, provided its meaning complies with the statutory scheme and is not unlawful. A scheme may exclude medium and low health-and-wellbeing points for applicants owed the main homelessness duty, while still permitting a genuinely high health-and-wellbeing case to fall within the relevant reasonable-preference group. Article 14 is unavailable unless the housing allocation decision falls within the ambit of Article 8. Equality Act claims require evidence of disadvantage and, for indirect discrimination, a causal link between the provision, criterion or practice and the disadvantage. A public authority must make sufficient inquiry and have due regard to equality aims, including by monitoring relevant equality data where necessary. A breach of that duty does not require relief where the decision would inevitably have been the same.

The claimant, who was homeless and living in temporary accommodation with his wife and children, challenged Enfield’s Part 6 housing allocation scheme. His wife had serious physical and neurological disabilities, and the family had been awarded 200 points as a household owed the main homelessness duty. The scheme excluded medium and low health-and-wellbeing points for applicants in the homelessness cohort.

The claimant alleged that Enfield had misinterpreted its scheme, unlawfully fettered its discretion, breached Articles 8 and 14 of the ECHR, contravened the Equality Act 2010 through failure to make reasonable adjustments and indirect discrimination, and breached the public sector equality duty. The court also considered whether the scheme required Enfield to monitor equality data.

1. Interpretation of the allocation scheme. The scheme prohibited additional health-and-wellbeing points for applicants awarded homelessness points. It did not prohibit an applicant from falling within the high health-and-wellbeing reasonable-preference group. However, a household owed the main Part 7 duty could not satisfy the scheme’s high-priority criteria because suitable accommodation was assumed to be available under Part 7. The scheme therefore awarded the claimant 200 points lawfully. Grounds 1 and 2 failed.
2. The court should not generally determine how a local authority accords housing priorities. That is a matter requiring social and political judgment, local knowledge and expertise. Judicial intervention remains appropriate where the scheme fails to comply with statutory requirements or is plainly irrational.
3. Convention rights. The operation of the allocation scheme did not fall within the ambit of Article 8. Article 14 therefore could not be engaged. Article 8 might nevertheless apply to the suitability of accommodation provided under Part 7 or to a statutory appeal concerning that accommodation. Ground 4 failed.
4. Equality Act claims. The claimant did not establish a prima facie disadvantage for the purposes of the reasonable-adjustments claim or indirect discrimination. The relevant practice applied equally to disabled and non-disabled homeless households, and no statistical or other evidence established a particular disadvantage or causal link. The proposed adjustment would also contradict the lawful structure of the allocation scheme. Grounds 5 and 6 failed.
5. Public sector equality duty. Enfield had failed to make sufficient inquiry by failing to monitor and record statistics concerning the allocation of housing to disabled households. Ground 7 therefore succeeded to that limited extent. Applying section 31(2A) of the Senior Courts Act 1981, the court concluded that the decision would not have been substantially different had the duty been complied with. No remedy was available, and the judicial review challenge was dismissed.

This was a first-instance judicial review. Permission was granted on the papers after amended grounds were filed. The claim was heard in the High Court Administrative Court; no appeal decision is stated.