University Of Bristol v Dr Robert Abrahart (Administrator of the estate of Natasha Abrahart, deceased)

In further and higher education, the duty to make reasonable adjustments is anticipatory. It arises from the provision, criterion or practice, its substantial disadvantage to disabled students, and the relevant matter in issue. The institution need not know of the individual’s disability before the duty arises, although knowledge may be relevant to whether a proposed adjustment was reasonable.

A competence standard cannot be adjusted, but the method by which competence is assessed may be adjusted. Oral assessment is not itself a competence standard merely because communication is valuable to a professional. Where the institution knows that a student cannot engage with its procedures because of disability, insistence on further evidence or formal processes may be unreasonable.

The claimant, administrator of Natasha Abrahart’s estate, succeeded in the Bristol County Court in claims that the University had breached sections 15, 19 and 20 of the Equality Act 2010. The County Court awarded damages of £50,000 for discrimination-related loss and dismissed the negligence claim for want of a relevant duty of care.

The University appealed the discrimination findings. The claimant cross-appealed on negligence. The central issues included whether oral assessments were competence standards, whether the University had sufficient knowledge, whether reasonable adjustments were required, and whether the indirect-discrimination finding was adequately reasoned.

1. Appeal dismissed. The County Court’s findings under sections 15, 19 and 20 of the Equality Act 2010 stood, subject to substituting a finding that the section 15 breach concerned unfavourable treatment on or after 13 February 2018. The cross-appeal on negligence was not determined.
2. The duty to make reasonable adjustments in further and higher education is governed by section 20(3) and Schedule 13 to the Equality Act 2010. For provision of education, the duty is anticipatory and does not depend on actual or constructive knowledge of the particular claimant’s disability. The claimant need not identify the adjustment. Knowledge remains relevant to the objective question whether a particular step was reasonable.
3. The relevant PCP was the requirement for oral assessment through laboratory interviews and a conference presentation. The evidence supported the finding that the assessments measured knowledge and understanding rather than oral communication competence. They were methods of assessment, not competence standards. The exclusion in Schedule 13 did not therefore prevent adjustments to their format, venue or means of communication.
4. The proposed adjustments were not inherently unreasonable. They had a real prospect of avoiding or reducing the substantial disadvantage. The University’s procedures and academic regulations could not displace the statutory duty. On the facts, the University knew that the student had serious mental-health difficulties connected with oral assessments and that she could not effectively engage with the processes intended to obtain further evidence. Waiting for a Disability Support Summary while continuing to mark her down and impose penalties was a permissible basis for finding a breach.
5. The Judge’s section 15 reasoning was inadequately expressed as to the date of knowledge and did not clearly distinguish actual from constructive knowledge. Nevertheless, by 13 February 2018 the University knew or ought to have known that the impairment could well last for at least 12 months. The section 15 claim therefore remained available for relevant treatment occurring on or after that date.
6. The County Court had dealt with justification under section 15 sufficiently in the circumstances. The finding under section 19 was based on an inadequate failure to distinguish the individual assessment under sections 15 and 20 from the wider, group-focused proportionality assessment under section 19. However, the University’s arguments had not adequately addressed that distinct issue, so Ground 6 failed.
7. The confidentiality ground failed. The Judge was entitled to consider that consent to disclosure could have been sought and that the seriousness of the situation called for information to be brought to the attention of relevant staff. The Court declined to express a final view on the common-law duty of care, because the issue was insufficiently argued and unnecessary to the result.

• High Court (King’s Bench Division): appeal from the Bristol County Court dismissed. The County Court’s discrimination findings and order stood, subject to the section 15 temporal qualification.
• Bristol County Court: the University was found to have breached sections 15, 19 and 20 of the Equality Act 2010; damages of £50,000 were awarded. The negligence claim was dismissed.