Patrick Michael Eraut v Nicholas George Brian Cheyney

In determining the meaning of allegedly defamatory words, the court must assess the publication as a whole from the perspective of the hypothetical reasonable reader, taking account of context and mode of publication. The court is not confined to the meanings advanced by the parties, but must avoid strained or unduly suspicious interpretations.

Whether words convey fact or opinion is a matter of substance and context, not grammar. A statement which appears to express judgment may nevertheless be factual where it conveys that specified conduct occurred or that a consequence was required. A meaning is defamatory where it satisfies both the consensus requirement and the threshold of seriousness.

The claimant brought a libel claim arising from an email sent by the defendant to him and other shareholders in a management company. The email gave notice of a proposed resolution to terminate the claimant’s appointment as a director for alleged malpractice.

The court was directed to determine three preliminary issues: the natural and ordinary meaning of the words, whether the meaning conveyed fact or opinion, and whether it was defamatory at common law. The defendant contended that the email conveyed only that the claimant had failed to comply with his duties and that the board should consider his continued appointment.

1. Meaning. Applying the principles in Koutsogiannis v Random House Group Ltd [2019] EWHC 48 (QB), the natural and ordinary meaning was that the claimant was guilty of wrongdoing in his capacity as a director and that the wrongdoing was so serious that his removal was required. The email’s formal and confidential presentation, its reference to malpractice, and its presentation of termination as inevitable supported that meaning.
2. The email was not merely inviting consideration of whether confidence had been lost or whether the claimant should remain a director. It notified recipients that termination was intended and would be formalised.
3. Fact or opinion. The allegation that the claimant was guilty of malpractice or wrongdoing was a statement of fact. Although the seriousness of the conduct might arguably involve judgment, the absence of particulars, the use of malpractice, and the apparent inevitability of removal meant that the statement that removal was required was also factual. The distinction was approached as one of substance and context, consistently with Millett v Corbyn [2021] EWCA Civ 567.
4. Defamatory meaning. The claimant’s pleaded meaning was conceded to be defamatory. Judgment was therefore given on all three preliminary issues accordingly.