Patrick Michael Eraut v Nicholas George Brian Cheyney

This is a trial of preliminary issues in a libel claim concerning an email sent by the defendant to the claimant and others on 31 October 2022 (repeated 16 November 2022). The court applied established principles on meaning and the fact/opinion distinction (including Koutsogiannis v Random House and Millett v Corbyn) and concluded that the natural and ordinary meaning of the email was that the claimant was guilty of wrongdoing (malpractice) in his capacity as a director of the company and that the misconduct was so serious that his removal from office was required. The judge treated both imputations as statements of fact rather than mere opinion. The court held that the claimant’s pleaded meaning was defamatory at common law. Material grounds included the formality and context of the email (subject line, "STRICTLY PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL", "Special Notice", BCC recipients, references to notifying Companies House and surrendering shares), the use of the word "malpractice", and the presentation of termination as inevitable.

This was a first-instance trial of preliminary issues in a libel claim filed 25 October 2023. The claimant and defendant are neighbours and co-directors/shareholders in Lewes Old Racecourse Management Company Limited. The dispute concerned an email of 31 October 2022 (sent again on 16 November 2022) with the subject "Termination of your appointment as director of the Lewes Old Racecourse Management Company Limited" and wording including a notice of a special meeting and reference to termination of the claimant’s appointment "by reason of loss of confidence due to malpractice".

The court was asked to determine three preliminary issues ordered by Master Dagnall on 17 May 2024: (i) the nature and ordinary meaning of the statement complained of; (ii) whether the statement is, or includes, statements of fact or opinion; and (iii) whether the meaning is defamatory at common law. The defendant did not file a formal defence but provided further information contending the email merely called for consideration of confidence and potential removal and that the words were a mixed statement of fact and opinion.

The judge applied the principles on meaning and on fact versus opinion drawn from the authorities cited in the judgment (notably Koutsogiannis, Millett and Thornton). He considered contextual features: the subject line, the "STRICTLY PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL" marking, the description as "Special Notice" of a "special meeting", BCC recipients, the formal wording "by order of the board" and signatures, and statements that Companies House would be notified and that shares must be surrendered. Those features supported a finding that the email presented termination as the inevitable and already-determined outcome. The judge found the word "malpractice" conveyed wrongdoing and that both the imputation of malpractice and the imputation that removal was required were statements of fact. It was conceded that the claimant’s pleaded meaning was defamatory, and the judge entered judgment on the three preliminary issues accordingly. The judgment does not state the specific remedy sought or other relief.

Judgment on the three preliminary issues was given. The court held that the natural and ordinary meaning of the email was that the claimant was guilty of wrongdoing (malpractice) in his capacity as a director and that the wrongdoing was so serious that his removal was required. Both parts of that meaning were statements of fact. The claimant’s pleaded meaning was defamatory at common law. The court’s rationale was founded on the email’s language and context (formality, confidentiality markings, BCC recipients, reference to Companies House and surrender of shares) and the ordinary meaning of the word "malpractice".