Jonathan Bishop v The Student Loans Company Limited

Where a claimant seeks a mandatory order against a public body exercising a public-law duty, the judicial review procedure must be used. This remains so where the claim also seeks declarations, injunctions or damages. The court should not grant interim injunctive relief in Part 7 proceedings where doing so would circumvent the judicial review procedure or its time limits.

On an interim injunction application, the court applies the American Cyanamid principles. The applicant must establish a serious issue to be tried and show that the balance of the risk of injustice supports relief. A delegated decision-maker required to assess a grant application and determine an appropriate sum is not obliged simply to implement a needs assessment.

The claimant, a disabled postgraduate student, sought interim injunctions requiring the Student Loans Company, acting for the Welsh Ministers, to fund support workers, taxi journeys and support recommended in needs assessments. The claimant also sought damages and final declaratory and injunctive relief.

The claim was issued under Part 7. The defendant contended that the mandatory relief could only be sought by judicial review under the Civil Procedure Rules 1998. It also disputed the merits, relying on the claimant’s control of a proposed support provider, the absence of current-year evidence and the availability of internal appeal rights.

The central issues were whether interim relief could properly be granted in the Part 7 proceedings and, alternatively, whether the claimant had established the requirements for an interim injunction.

1. Procedure. The substantive claims for mandatory relief were required to be brought by judicial review. Rule 54.2 of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998 requires that procedure for claims seeking mandatory, prohibiting or quashing orders. Under r.54.3(1), a claim seeking a declaration or injunction in addition to a remedy within r.54.2 must also use judicial review. Damages may be included in judicial review proceedings under r.54.3(2), provided they are not the sole remedy.
2. The claim was a direct challenge to decisions made in the exercise of a delegated public-law duty, rather than a private-law claim enforcing an existing decision. The court therefore considered it neither just nor convenient to grant interim relief in Part 7 proceedings, since that would circumvent the judicial review permission and time-limit requirements.
3. Interim relief. The applications engaged s.37(1) of the Senior Courts Act 1981 and the principles in American Cyanamid Co. v Ethicon Ltd [1975] A.C. 396: whether there was a serious issue to be tried, whether damages were adequate and where the balance of the risk of injustice lay. The distinction between mandatory and prohibitory relief was not determinative. The practical features of mandatory relief might nevertheless create a greater risk of irremediable prejudice.
4. Even if Part 7 were available, no serious issue to be tried had been shown. The delegated statutory scheme required the Student Loans Company to assess applications, apply relevant policies and determine an amount it considered appropriate within the statutory limits. It was not required automatically to implement a needs assessment. The claimant had produced no application, needs assessment or decision for the 2024/25 academic year.
5. The evidence did not make it properly arguable that the Student Loans Company acted unlawfully in refusing to fund workers employed through CEARSW. The available company records showed that the claimant was the only natural-person director, controlled the corporate officers and was identified in the company’s accounts as its ultimate controlling party. The decision-maker was entitled to assess that evidence and apply the conflict policy. Continuity of support could also be pursued through alternative contracting arrangements.
6. The taxi application likewise lacked current-year evidence and sought an order requiring unknown expenditure. Failure to use internal appeal procedures was not itself an abuse of process, but it was relevant to the discretionary balance. The absence of a cross-undertaking in damages also weighed against relief.
7. The applications for interim relief were dismissed and certified as totally without merit. The question whether the Part 7 claim should continue was left for a formal application by the defendant.