Muhammad Ibrahim v Ministry of Justice

The claimant, serving a discretionary life sentence, sought compliance orders under the Data Protection Act 2018 in respect of three probation or prison assessment reports (a parole custody report, a parole assessment/offender manager report and an OASys assessment) alleging 101 inaccuracies. The court applied Part 3 of the Act and in particular section 38 (the fourth data protection principle applicable to law enforcement processing), and the accompanying guidance (paragraph 187), to distinguish between personal data based on facts and data based on assessments or opinions. The judge held that the claimant was challenging the content of source material and the assessors' opinions rather than the fact that statements had been made or that the reports accurately recorded those statements. Because section 38 permits assessments and opinions to be identified as such and does not require retrospective alteration of historic source material, the claimant had no real prospect of success. The defendant's application to strike out and for summary judgment was upheld.

Background and parties:

• The claimant, aged 45, was convicted in 2004 and has remained in custody well beyond his tariff. The defendant is the Ministry of Justice (National Probation Service/Probation officers prepared the challenged reports).
• The reports in issue were prepared without the claimant's cooperation; the assessors relied on prison case notes, NDelius entries, psychological reports, previous OASys reports and other institutional records.

Nature of the claim and relief sought:

• The claimant issued a claim seeking a compliance order under the Data Protection Act 2018 to rectify or erase personal data in the defendant's records, implicitly relying on sections including 46, 47 and 167.

Issues framed by the court:

• Whether the contested material constituted inaccurate personal data requiring rectification or erasure under section 38 and Part 3 of the Act; and whether the claimant’s particulars disclosed a viable cause of action.
• Whether the claim should be struck out or disposed of on summary judgment under CPR 3.4 and 24.3 because it had no real prospect of success.

Court’s reasoning and conclusions:

• The court relied on the statutory distinction in section 38 between factual personal data and personal assessments, and on the guidance at paragraph 187 which explains that witness statements, expert opinions and similar material are protected as statements of what was said or expressed rather than as assertions of objective truth requiring retrospective correction.
• The claimant’s complaints attacked the content of source material and the assessors’ conclusions rather than asserting that the reports failed to record that particular statements or opinions had been made. That approach was incompatible with section 38 and the guidance.
• The court observed the practical and public-interest consequences of allowing rectification/erasure claims of this type: it would require redrafting of assessments to the claimant’s preferred interpretation, undermine the utility of probation reports for bodies such as the Parole Board, and impose an intolerable burden on the justice system. The claimant’s non-engagement with Probation was also relevant.
• For those reasons the defendant’s applications to strike out and for summary judgment succeeded; the claimant’s cross-applications fell away.

The court struck out the claim and, where necessary, entered summary judgment for the defendant. The rationale was that the claimant’s challenges attacked the content of source material and the assessors’ opinions rather than the fact that particular statements had been recorded; section 38 and the accompanying guidance protect assessments and witness statements from retrospective correction in the manner sought, so the claim had no real prospect of success.