Muhammad Ibrahim v Ministry of Justice

Under Part 3 of the Data Protection Act 2018, the accuracy principle applies differently to factual data and personal assessments. For witness statements, intelligence reports, expert opinions and probation assessments, accuracy concerns the fact that the statement or opinion was made and whether it is accurately recorded. It does not ordinarily permit litigation about the truth of the underlying account or the reasonableness of the assessment. Historic data need not be erased merely because it is old. The Act is not an appropriate mechanism for compelling the wholesale redrafting of law-enforcement assessments to reflect an individual’s preferred interpretation of disputed matters. A claim founded on that misconception may be struck out or summarily determined where it discloses no reasonable grounds and has no real prospect of success.

The claimant, a prisoner serving a discretionary life sentence, brought a claim against the Ministry of Justice under Part 3 of the Data Protection Act 2018. He alleged 101 inaccuracies in post-tariff parole reports and an OASys assessment prepared by probation officers. He sought rectification or erasure of the disputed data.

The defendant applied under rules 3.4(2) and 24.3 of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998 to strike out the claim or obtain summary judgment. The central issue was whether the alleged inaccuracies concerned inaccurate recording of personal data, or instead disagreement with the underlying source material and the officers’ assessments.

1. The defendant’s application was upheld. The claim was struck out and, so far as necessary, summary judgment was entered for the defendant. The claimant’s cross-applications fell away.

2. Section 38 of the Data Protection Act 2018 requires law-enforcement personal data to be accurate and, where necessary, kept up to date. It also recognises the distinction between data based on facts and data based on personal assessments.

3. Where data consists of witness statements, intelligence reports, expert opinions or previous probation reports, the accuracy requirement ordinarily applies to the fact that the statement was made or the opinion expressed, and to the accuracy with which it is recorded. It does not provide a route to challenge the truth of the underlying account or the merits of the opinion. The claimant’s complaints concerned the substance of source material and the reasonableness of conclusions, rather than inaccurate transcription or misstatement of the authors’ views.

4. The duty to keep data up to date does not require the erasure of historic data. Historic probation material may remain relevant to assessing progress or lack of progress.

5. Rectification or erasure orders could not properly be used to require wholesale redrafting of probation reports and OASys assessments according to disputed factual interpretations or the claimant’s preferred range of permissible opinion. That would undermine the assessment process and its usefulness to the Parole Board. The Act was not intended or apt to enable challenges to extensive bodies of evidence and allied material generated by law-enforcement processes.

6. The requirements for strike-out and summary judgment were satisfied: the statement of case disclosed no reasonable grounds, and the claimant had no real prospect of succeeding. The court therefore did not need to determine the subsidiary arguments concerning abuse or alleged injustice arising from inaccuracies said to have been caused by the claimant.