C Raison v DF Capital Bank Ltd & Ors

The Employment Appeal Tribunal dismissed the claimant's appeal against the Employment Tribunal's ruling that an unfair dismissal complaint was out of time. The EAT held that section 207B(3) Employment Rights Act 1996 operates to "stop the clock" only for the part of an Early Conciliation (EC) period that would otherwise count towards the primary three-month limitation under section 111 ERA, and does not allow days of EC occurring before the effective date of termination (EDT) to be added on to the end of the limitation period. The court concluded this from the statutory wording and context, the statutory purpose of preventing disadvantage from EC, and earlier authority in Revenue and Customs Commissioners v Serra Garau [2017] ICR 1121. The EAT also upheld the Employment Tribunal's finding, applying the Dedman principle, that it was reasonably practicable for the claimant to have presented the claim within the primary time limit.

This was an appeal from the Manchester Employment Tribunal. The claimant had been employed from 26 September 2022 and her employment terminated with effect from 17 February 2023. She commenced Early Conciliation (EC) on 13 February 2023 (Day A) and received an EC certificate on 28 February 2023 (Day B). She presented an unfair dismissal claim (whistleblowing ground under section 103A ERA) on 30 May 2023.

The principal issue was statutory interpretation: whether section 207B(3) ERA extends the three-month primary limitation period by the number of days in the entire EC period (Day A to Day B) or only by those EC days that fall after the claimant's effective date of termination (EDT). If the former, the claim was in time; if the latter, the claim was three days late.

The EAT described the procedural history: the ET gave judgment (promulgated 28 December 2023; reasons 30 January 2024), permission to appeal was granted by HHJ James Tayler (order sealed 28 May 2024) and the EAT heard the appeal on 20 May 2025.

Issues framed and addressed by the court included:

• The proper construction and purpose of section 207B(3) ERA in the EC/time-limit framework (including interaction with section 18A Employment Tribunals Act 1996 and the ACAS certificate process).
• Whether the EAT was bound by, or should follow, the EAT decision in Revenue and Customs Commissioners v Serra Garau [2017] ICR 1121 and various Employment Tribunal decisions taking conflicting approaches.
• Whether the claimant could obtain an extension under section 111(2)(b) ERA on the basis that it was not reasonably practicable to present in time, applying the Dedman line of authority.

The court reasoned that the natural statutory exercise invoked by section 207B(3) is the calculation of when a time limit "expires" by reference to when limitation starts to run and the three-month period thereafter. Time before limitation starts (pre-EDT) does not 'count' for expiry calculations in any event, so section 207B(3) is concerned with excluding from the computation only that part of the EC period which would otherwise fall within the running limitation period. Extending the limitation by EC days occurring before limitation started would amount to giving a claimant a bonus that the statutory scheme does not plainly provide for; if Parliament intended such a change it would have said so in clear terms. The EAT therefore followed the legal reasoning of Serra Garau and the "stop the clock" analysis. On the reasonable practicability issue the ET had applied the correct principles (Dedman and its progeny) and permissibly concluded that the claimant, who had instructed solicitors and received advice, was bound by their conduct and the claim was reasonably practicable to present within the primary period.

Appeal dismissed. The EAT held that section 207B(3) ERA operates to exclude from calculation only that part of an EC period which would otherwise count towards the three-month limitation under section 111 ERA; it does not permit adding EC days that occurred before the effective date of termination to extend the limitation period. This interpretation follows from the statutory wording and purpose and is consistent with Revenue and Customs Commissioners v Serra Garau. The ET was also correct to find, applying the Dedman line of authority, that it was reasonably practicable for the claimant to present her claim within the primary time limit.

Appeal from Manchester Employment Tribunal (judgment promulgated 28 December 2023; Reasons 30 January 2024). Permission to appeal granted by HHJ James Tayler (order sealed 28 May 2024). Hearing before the Employment Appeal Tribunal 20 May 2025; EAT judgment handed down 17 June 2025. The EAT considered and applied the prior EAT decision in Revenue and Customs Commissioners v Serra Garau [2017] ICR 1121 in its reasoning.