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Antony Savva v Leather Inside Out (in liquidation) & Ors

[2025] EAT 96

Case details

Neutral citation
[2025] EAT 96
Court
Employment Appeal Tribunal
Judgment date
9 July 2025
Subjects
EmploymentProtected disclosures (whistleblowing)Practice and procedure (tribunal time limits and preliminary hearings)Data protection (subject access requests)Discrimination (Equality Act 2010)
Keywords
protected disclosureseries of similar actssection 48(3)(a) Employment Rights Act 1996time limitssubject access requestdeposit orderremissionreconsideration
Outcome
allowed in part

Case summary

The Employment Appeal Tribunal considered two appeals arising from a case involving multiple tribunal claims for unfair dismissal and detrimental treatment arising from alleged protected disclosures, and complaints about refusals to comply with subject access requests under the Data Protection Act 2018. The court applied the test in section 48(3)(a) Employment Rights Act 1996 for a "series of similar acts", with reference to Arthur v London Eastern Railway, and upheld most of the tribunal's substantive determinations on time limits but held that the tribunal erred in making a deposit order in respect of the pair of complaints about the first two subject access requests.

The EAT also found errors in the full merits decision: the tribunal had failed to determine one SAR-related complaint, and it had erred in its assessment of whether three specific claimed protected disclosures (numbers 3, 10 and 11) were made out and whether the refusals to comply with the first two SARs were detriments on grounds of protected disclosures. Those matters were quashed and remitted to a differently constituted tribunal for fresh determination.

Case abstract

Background and parties. The claimant worked for a charity from 3 June 2019 until the relationship was terminated by letter dated 30 November 2019. He issued three tribunal claims alleging principally detrimental treatment for having made protected disclosures, unfair dismissal for whistleblowing, and further complaints including discrimination and harassment. After a preliminary hearing before EJ Beyzade and a reconsideration, certain complaints were held in time and others dismissed as out of time; deposit orders were made in relation to some in‑time complaints. A full merits tribunal (Gidney tribunal) later dismissed all remaining complaints. The claimant appealed both the PH decision(s) and the merits decision.

(i) Nature of the applications/relief sought. The claimant sought declarations and remedies in respect of unfair dismissal for whistleblowing, claims of detrimental treatment on grounds of protected disclosures (including alleged refusals to comply with subject access requests), and discrimination/harassment under the Equality Act 2010. On appeal he sought to overturn the PH decisions on time and deposit orders and to overturn the tribunal findings on whether particular disclosures were protected and whether certain acts amounted to detriments.

(ii) Issues framed by the court. The EAT identified key issues: (a) whether the tribunal erred in its application of statutory time limits and the "series of similar acts" rule in section 48(3)(a) Employment Rights Act 1996; (b) whether the tribunal properly applied the tests for protected disclosures (including s43B(1) types) and the factual findings as to the disclosures said to be made; (c) whether refusals to comply with the first two SARs could properly be characterised as detriments on grounds of protected disclosures and whether the tribunal had jurisdiction/correct approach to exemptions under the Data Protection Act 2018; (d) procedural fairness and case‑management decisions including deposit orders, witness evidence and omissions to decide a complaint.

(iii) Reasoning and outcome in outline. On time issues the EAT accepted that the tribunal was entitled to determine some limitation matters at a PH and that its overall conclusions about late presentation were not perverse, applying the relevant authorities including Arthur and related EAT authorities. However, the EAT held that the PH tribunal erred in imposing a deposit order in respect of the two SAR‑related complaints because the tribunal had not properly engaged with the claimant's arguments about the applicability of the Data Protection Act exemptions and the relevance of the requests to the employment field. On the merits the EAT found that the Gidney tribunal had failed to determine one SAR complaint and had wrongly treated as finally resolved the questions whether disclosures 3, 10 and 11 were made out and whether the first two SAR refusals were motivated by the protected disclosures; those findings were quashed and remitted as further factual findings were necessary. The EAT directed that remission be to a different tribunal to decide those matters afresh.

Held

The appeals were allowed in part and dismissed in part. The EAT dismissed the appellant’s challenges on most time‑limit points but quashed the deposit order made in relation to the complaints about the first two subject access requests. The EAT quashed the tribunal’s determinations on whether protected disclosures 3, 10 and 11 were made out, and its conclusions about the refusals to comply with the first two SARs, and remitted those issues (and the undetermined complaint about the third SAR) to a differently constituted tribunal for fresh determination because all necessary facts had not been found and a single correct answer could not be stated on the existing record.

Appellate history

Three tribunal claims were presented in the London Central Employment Tribunal (first claim 17 November 2020; second claim 22 March 2021; third claim 5 October 2021). A case‑management PH took place on 18 October 2021 (EJ James); a further PH on 21 January 2022 (EJ Beyzade) produced the Beyzade decision (19 April 2022) and a Beyzade reconsideration decision (10 March 2023). A full merits hearing before EJ Gidney and two lay members took place in June 2023, with a reserved decision dismissing all complaints (6 October 2023) and a Gidney reconsideration refusal (3 January 2024). Appeals were brought to the Employment Appeal Tribunal, resulting in this judgment ([2025] EAT 96).

Cited cases

Legislation cited

  • Data Protection Act 2018: Section 53
  • Data Protection Act 2018: Schedule 2, Part 1, Paragraph 2
  • Employment Rights Act 1996: Section 111(2)(b)
  • Employment Rights Act 1996: section 23(1)(a)
  • Employment Rights Act 1996: Section 43B
  • Employment Rights Act 1996: Section 47B
  • Employment Rights Act 1996: Section 48(3)
  • Fraud Act 2006: Section 2