Antony Savva v Leather Inside Out (in liquidation) & Ors
[2025] EAT 96
Case details
Case summary
The Employment Appeal Tribunal considered two appeals arising from a case involving multiple tribunal claims for unfair dismissal and detrimental treatment arising from alleged protected disclosures, and complaints about refusals to comply with subject access requests under the Data Protection Act 2018. The court applied the test in section 48(3)(a) Employment Rights Act 1996 for a "series of similar acts", with reference to Arthur v London Eastern Railway, and upheld most of the tribunal's substantive determinations on time limits but held that the tribunal erred in making a deposit order in respect of the pair of complaints about the first two subject access requests.
The EAT also found errors in the full merits decision: the tribunal had failed to determine one SAR-related complaint, and it had erred in its assessment of whether three specific claimed protected disclosures (numbers 3, 10 and 11) were made out and whether the refusals to comply with the first two SARs were detriments on grounds of protected disclosures. Those matters were quashed and remitted to a differently constituted tribunal for fresh determination.
Case abstract
Background and parties. The claimant worked for a charity from 3 June 2019 until the relationship was terminated by letter dated 30 November 2019. He issued three tribunal claims alleging principally detrimental treatment for having made protected disclosures, unfair dismissal for whistleblowing, and further complaints including discrimination and harassment. After a preliminary hearing before EJ Beyzade and a reconsideration, certain complaints were held in time and others dismissed as out of time; deposit orders were made in relation to some in‑time complaints. A full merits tribunal (Gidney tribunal) later dismissed all remaining complaints. The claimant appealed both the PH decision(s) and the merits decision.
(i) Nature of the applications/relief sought. The claimant sought declarations and remedies in respect of unfair dismissal for whistleblowing, claims of detrimental treatment on grounds of protected disclosures (including alleged refusals to comply with subject access requests), and discrimination/harassment under the Equality Act 2010. On appeal he sought to overturn the PH decisions on time and deposit orders and to overturn the tribunal findings on whether particular disclosures were protected and whether certain acts amounted to detriments.
(ii) Issues framed by the court. The EAT identified key issues: (a) whether the tribunal erred in its application of statutory time limits and the "series of similar acts" rule in section 48(3)(a) Employment Rights Act 1996; (b) whether the tribunal properly applied the tests for protected disclosures (including s43B(1) types) and the factual findings as to the disclosures said to be made; (c) whether refusals to comply with the first two SARs could properly be characterised as detriments on grounds of protected disclosures and whether the tribunal had jurisdiction/correct approach to exemptions under the Data Protection Act 2018; (d) procedural fairness and case‑management decisions including deposit orders, witness evidence and omissions to decide a complaint.
(iii) Reasoning and outcome in outline. On time issues the EAT accepted that the tribunal was entitled to determine some limitation matters at a PH and that its overall conclusions about late presentation were not perverse, applying the relevant authorities including Arthur and related EAT authorities. However, the EAT held that the PH tribunal erred in imposing a deposit order in respect of the two SAR‑related complaints because the tribunal had not properly engaged with the claimant's arguments about the applicability of the Data Protection Act exemptions and the relevance of the requests to the employment field. On the merits the EAT found that the Gidney tribunal had failed to determine one SAR complaint and had wrongly treated as finally resolved the questions whether disclosures 3, 10 and 11 were made out and whether the first two SAR refusals were motivated by the protected disclosures; those findings were quashed and remitted as further factual findings were necessary. The EAT directed that remission be to a different tribunal to decide those matters afresh.
Held
Appellate history
Cited cases
- Tiplady v City of Bradford Metropolitan District Council, [2019] EWCA Civ 2180 negative
- North Glamorgan NHS Trust v Eszias, [2007] EWCA Civ 330 positive
- Woodward v Abbey National plc (No 1), [2006] EWCA Civ 822 unclear
- Arthur v London Eastern Railway Limited, [2006] EWCA Civ 1538 positive
- Walker v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, [2014] EWCA Civ 897 neutral
- Norbrook Laboratories (GB) Ltd v Shaw, [2014] ICR 540 (EAT) neutral
- Bear Scotland Ltd v Fulton (EAT), [2015] ICR 221 neutral
- Ittihadieh v 5-11 Cheyne Gardens RTM Co Ltd, [2017] EWCA Civ 121 neutral
- Kilraine v London Borough of Wandsworth, [2018] EWCA Civ 1436 neutral
- Chief Constable of the Police Service of Northern Ireland v Agnew, [2023] UKSC 22 neutral
- Royal Mail Group Ltd v Jhuti, UKEAT/0020/16 neutral
- Ibekwe v Sussex Partnership NHS Foundation Trust, UKEAT/0072/14 positive
- E v X, UKEAT/0079/20 neutral
Legislation cited
- Data Protection Act 2018: Section 53
- Data Protection Act 2018: Schedule 2, Part 1, Paragraph 2
- Employment Rights Act 1996: Section 111(2)(b)
- Employment Rights Act 1996: section 23(1)(a)
- Employment Rights Act 1996: Section 43B
- Employment Rights Act 1996: Section 47B
- Employment Rights Act 1996: Section 48(3)
- Fraud Act 2006: Section 2