S (Wardship: Removal to Ghana), Re

In wardship, the court must make an independent determination of the child’s future welfare, giving it paramount consideration under the Children Act 1989. Parental views may be evidence relevant to welfare, but parental responsibility supplies no competing principle that limits intervention to cases where parents acted unlawfully or wrongly.

A final welfare decision is premature where necessary care options have not been investigated. The court, which has parental responsibility for its ward, must obtain further evidence needed for the child’s interests. A welfare evaluation must fairly balance the risks of return against the child’s wishes, feelings, and actual or prospective harm if the present arrangement continues.

S, aged 14, was taken from England to Ghana by his parents in March 2024 and left there with relatives to attend school. He began wardship proceedings seeking an order requiring his return to the United Kingdom.

Hayden J found that S had been at risk from gang culture and criminal activity in England. He accepted that the parents had deceived S and that he was distressed, but refused the application and discharged the wardship: [2025] EWHC 439 (Fam).

S appealed. The central issues were whether the judge had conducted an independent welfare evaluation, adequately considered S’s wishes and the effects of continued residence in Ghana, and been entitled to determine the application without a viable care plan for England.

1. Appeal allowed. The wardship was reinstated and the matter remitted to the Family Division for a rehearing before a different judge.

2. In wardship, the court’s central task is to determine the ward’s future care arrangements by affording paramount consideration to welfare under section 1(1) of the Children Act 1989. The parents’ views may be relevant evidence, but they cannot create a parallel principle requiring the court to defer unless the parents exceeded the lawful ambit of parental responsibility. The judge’s close audit of the parents’ decision risked viewing welfare through their perspective rather than conducting an entirely independent evaluation.

3. The final decision was premature. There was no firm or viable plan for S’s care in England, although further investigation of the father’s proposal, the aunt’s possible care, or a welfare report under section 7 remained available. In wardship the court has parental responsibility for its ward and a positive duty to obtain evidence or information needed in the ward’s interests. Determining the application without it made refusal almost inevitable.

4. The welfare balance was materially one-sided. The judge fully evaluated the risk of harm if S returned to England, but did not sufficiently identify or weigh S’s strongly held wishes, his emotional distress, and actual or prospective harm from having been taken to Ghana and required to remain there. A conclusion that return would cause greater harm could be sound only after a sufficient evaluation of the countervailing harm of continued enforced residence in Ghana.

5. The court also clarified that Gillick competence, as a legal doctrine, concerns a young person’s ability to give valid consent to medical treatment: Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech AHA [1986] AC 115 (HL). In a non-medical welfare decision it is a convenient indication of maturity. It may increase the weight given to wishes and feelings under section 1(3)(a), but it does not impose a rule that clear and compelling reasons are required to override them.

6. The findings concerning S’s life in England were upheld. The rehearing judge may reach the same substantive outcome after proper investigation and a balanced welfare evaluation.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Allowed S’s appeal, reinstated the wardship, and remitted the case for rehearing before a different Family Division judge: [2025] EWCA Civ 1011.
• High Court (Family Division): Hayden J refused S’s application for an order requiring his return from Ghana and discharged the wardship: [2025] EWHC 439 (Fam).