Haneen Abdelrahman v The Mayor and Burgesses of the London Borough of Islington

The Court of Appeal held that the appellant was not entitled to succeed to a secure tenancy granted to the deceased tenant because, on the proper interpretation of the respondent’s succession policy, the term "stepchild" is limited to a child of a spouse or civil partner (or their equivalent in the closed list derived from section 113 of the Housing Act 1985). The court rejected a broad dictionary-based definition advanced at trial and refused to admit a new argument on appeal that would have required fresh fact-finding about the deceased’s relationship with the appellant’s mother.

The court further held that, even if that narrower interpretation resulted in differential treatment engaging Articles 8 and 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights, the policy was a proportionate and objectively justified means of pursuing legitimate aims relating to allocation of scarce public housing. Section 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998 did not assist because the judge below had found no Convention breach and the policy is not primary or subordinate legislation.

Background and relief sought. The appellant sought to succeed to a secure tenancy following the death of the tenant, Mr Seales. She relied on Islington London Borough Council’s succession policy which referred to "step-children" and argued she fell within that term. The respondent refused succession and obtained possession; the county court judge (HHJ Bloom) made an order for possession but granted permission to appeal.

Facts and procedural posture. The tenancy began on 16 July 2015; the tenant died on 31 March 2021. The appellant is the biological daughter of Ms Patel, who had been in an intimate relationship with the deceased since 2011. The appellant moved into the rented property in 2018 and lived there until the tenant’s death. Islington refused succession on 17 March 2022 on the basis that the deceased and the appellant’s mother had never married or entered a civil partnership.

Issues before the court.

• What is the meaning of "stepchild" in Islington’s succession policy?
• If the policy were interpreted narrowly, did it unlawfully discriminate against the appellant under Articles 8 and 14 ECHR?
• Could the policy be read down under section 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998?

Court’s reasoning. The court treated the issue as one of document interpretation: the policy is not a statute and its meaning is a question for the court. The court rejected the wide, modern dictionary definition of "stepchild" relied on at trial as unduly open-ended and unsuitable for a policy intended to provide objective, easily verifiable rules for tenancy officers. The court adopted the contemporaneous ordinary meaning at the time the policy was issued or, at the latest, when the tenant died, and concluded the policy was designed to mirror the closed list approach of section 113 of the Housing Act 1985, thereby limiting "stepchild" to the child of a spouse or civil partner (or their legal equivalents).

The court refused to permit a new argument on appeal that would require findings about whether the deceased and the appellant’s mother were living "as if" married for the purposes of section 86A(5) because that argument had not been raised at trial and would have necessitated fresh evidence and a differently conducted trial (Singh v Dass). On the discrimination point, the court accepted that Articles 8 and 14 were engaged but concluded the policy pursued legitimate aims (allocation of scarce social housing and the desire to have clear, implementable rules) and was not "manifestly without reasonable foundation." The court applied the low-intensity review appropriate to welfare and housing allocation measures and endorsed the county court’s proportionality assessment. Finally, section 3 HRA did not assist because there was no Convention incompatibility found below and because section 3 applies to legislation, not a unilateral local authority policy.

Conclusion. The appeal was dismissed; the possession order stands.

Appeal dismissed. The court held that the term "stepchild" in Islington’s policy is limited to children of a spouse or civil partner (or their legal equivalents as in the closed list derived from section 113 of the Housing Act 1985). A new argument based on de facto relationships and section 86A(5) was not permitted on appeal because it would require additional evidence and different trial conduct. Any differential treatment engaging Articles 8 and 14 ECHR was objectively justified and proportionate in the context of allocating scarce public housing. Section 3 Human Rights Act 1998 did not assist because there was no established Convention incompatibility and the policy is not legislation.

Appeal from the County Court at Central London (HHJ Bloom, K04EC531). The county court ordered possession and granted permission to appeal; the Court of Appeal (this judgment) dismissed the appeal. Neutral citation of the Court of Appeal judgment: [2025] EWCA Civ 1038.