Haneen Abdelrahman v The Mayor and Burgesses of the London Borough of Islington

For succession to a secure tenancy, a policy based on a closed family list may use a bright-line meaning of stepchild: a child of a spouse or civil partner from a previous relationship, rather than a child of an unmarried partner. The policy’s purpose is certainty and minimal investigation, so dictionary definitions and compassionate facts do not justify extending it to de facto step-relationships. In an Article 14 challenge to social-housing policy, the relevant question is whether differential treatment is justified. Where the ground is non-suspect and concerns welfare or social housing, review remains whether the rule is manifestly without reasonable foundation. An appellate court should not reassess proportionality unless the first-instance reasoning contains a flaw undermining its conclusion. Section 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998 cannot read down a non-legislative policy where no Convention breach is established.

Mr Seales held a secure tenancy under the Housing Act 1985. His partner, Ms Patel, was the biological mother of Ms Abdelrahman. They had an intimate relationship but had never married or entered into a civil partnership. Ms Abdelrahman lived with Mr Seales before his death and applied to succeed to the tenancy.

Islington refused the application under a policy allowing specified relatives, including stepchildren, to succeed after twelve months’ residence. The County Court interpreted stepchild as a child of a spouse by a previous marriage or civil partnership, found the policy proportionate under Articles 8 and 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights, and ordered possession.

The appeal concerned the meaning of stepchild, an unpleaded argument based on cohabitation, alleged discrimination, and whether the policy could be read down under section 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998.

1. Appeal dismissed. Lewison LJ gave the leading judgment, with which Nugee LJ and Elisabeth Laing LJ agreed. Ms Abdelrahman was not qualified to succeed under Islington’s policy on the case argued at trial.
2. The proposed argument that stepchild included the biological child of a person living with the tenant as if married or in a civil partnership was a new point. Applying Singh v Dass [2019] EWCA Civ 360, the court refused to entertain it because it required findings about the relationship and would have caused the trial to be conducted differently.
3. The statutory right under section 86A of the Housing Act 1985 did not apply. Section 113 was a guide to the policy, but the policy remained a unilateral administrative document. Its meaning was a question for the court and was not controlled by Islington’s concession. The policy was not to be interpreted as a statute or contract: Tesco Stores Ltd v Dundee City Council [2012] UKSC 13.
4. In context, stepchild meant the child of a married person or civil partner by a previous relationship, with the necessary adaptation for civil partnerships. The word was to be understood when the policy was issued, or at the latest when Mr Seales died, rather than by reference to a 2023 dictionary definition. The policy pursued a closed and readily ascertainable category of successors. A wider meaning would require qualitative investigation into relationships and undermine that purpose. The court relied on the reasoning in Sheffield CC v Wall [2010] EWCA Civ 922.
5. Articles 8 and 14 were engaged. The court was willing to assume that the unmarried status of the adults conferred a relevant status on Ms Abdelrahman. Marriage and civil partnership nevertheless confer a distinct legal status, and states retain a margin of appreciation to treat married and unmarried relationships differently. In the field of social housing and welfare, the applicable intensity of review was whether the policy was manifestly without reasonable foundation. Allocating scarce public housing according to housing need rather than relationship to a deceased tenant was a legitimate aim. Detailed case-specific evidence was unnecessary where the justification was apparent from the statutory and policy scheme.
6. The County Court’s proportionality assessment could be overturned only if it was wrong in the relevant sense. That required an identifiable flaw, such as a gap in logic, inconsistency, or failure to consider a material factor, which undermined the cogency of the conclusion. No such flaw was shown. Bright-line rules for allocating scarce social housing were permissible if not arbitrary or discriminatory.
7. Section 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998 did not apply. It concerns primary and subordinate legislation, not Islington’s policy, and there was no established Convention incompatibility requiring the policy to be read down.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): The appeal from the possession order was dismissed. The court upheld the interpretation of Islington’s policy and the finding that it was Convention-compliant.
• County Court at Central London: HHJ Bloom rejected the defence to possession, interpreted stepchild as referring to a child of a spouse by a previous marriage or civil partnership, found the policy proportionate, and made an order for possession. Permission to appeal was granted.