Chief Constable of Northamptonshire Police v Esengul Woodcock

The Court of Appeal reaffirmed that the common law generally imposes no tortious duty on the police to protect individuals from harm caused by third parties; exceptions (assumption of responsibility, creating or worsening danger, or control) remain tightly confined. The investigative duty under Article 3 ECHR arises only when there is an arguable allegation of ill‑treatment engaging Article 3, and public authorities are not liable for omissions amounting merely to a failure to confer a benefit.

The Court of Appeal heard two consolidated appeals about police liability for failing to protect persons from third‑party criminal conduct: an appeal by the Chief Constable of Northamptonshire against Ritchie J's decision that a duty to warn arose to the claimant Ms Woodcock; and appeals by five child victims (CJ, PJ, HD, PD and OB) against dismissal of claims arising from failures to investigate earlier evidence of indecent images linked to their abuser. The court summarised recent authority including [2024] UKSC 33 and considered whether duties in common law negligence or under Article 3 ECHR arose on the facts. The central issues were (1) whether a duty to warn can arise absent an express representation or clear assumption of responsibility; and (2) when the Article 3 investigative obligation is engaged in a sequence of investigative events.

Disposition: (1) Appeal in Ms Woodcock’s case allowed; Ritchie J’s decision that a duty to warn arose set aside and Judge Murdoch’s dismissal restored. (2) Appeals by CJ and others dismissed.

1. Governing principle. The court restated the established distinction between positive acts that make matters worse (which can give rise to liability) and omissions/failures to confer a benefit (which generally do not). It endorsed and applied the principles stated in [2024] UKSC 33 and earlier authorities that exceptions are narrowly confined (see paras (5)–(19) and (85)–(93) of the judgment).
2. Duty to warn (Woodcock).
   1. The court concluded Ritchie J erred in finding a duty to warn. Foreseeability alone does not create such a duty and the facts did not establish an assumption of responsibility, an interference that made matters worse, nor control sufficient to displace the omissions principle (see paras 120–127).
   2. The call‑handler’s words did not amount to an assurance creating reliance; there was no evidence the neighbour would have acted differently but for the police assurance, and Judge Murdoch’s finding that no such reliance or causal inference could be drawn was not open to be disturbed (paras 121–126).
   3. The court held it would be wrong to expand the recognised exceptions so as to undermine the general rule that the police do not owe individuals a duty to prevent third‑party criminality; to do so would cause uncertainty and inconsistency (paras 119–120).
3. Breach and causation (Woodcock).
   1. Because no duty arose, breach and causation need not be determined. The court observed, however, that had a duty existed the factual evidence could have supported liability for failing to telephone the claimant (paras 129–130).
   2. The court regarded Ritchie J’s remittal on causation as erroneous because no serious procedural irregularity was identified; it would not remit for additional evidence under CPR r52.21(3) (paras 130–133).
4. Negligence claims (CJ and others).
   1. The court held that the appellants’ negligence claims were barred by the same omission principle: DS Ellerby’s failings were omissions (failures to act or to advance the investigation) rather than positive acts that made matters worse, and there was no sound basis to treat them as creating a new duty of care (paras 134–136).
   2. The court rejected attempts to characterise the conduct as falling within the Tofaris/Steel exceptions (other than as considered and dismissed on their facts) and concluded the general rule applied (paras 134–136).
5. Article 3 investigatory duty (CJ and others).
   1. The court held that the Article 3 investigative obligation is engaged only where there is an arguable allegation or a real and immediate risk of ill‑treatment of the kind governed by Article 3. The duty was not engaged by the December 2012 discovery of relatively limited indecent images, which did not amount to Article 3 ill‑treatment or create a real and immediate risk to identified victims (paras 137–140).
   2. Accordingly, the investigative duty arose when contact offending was first reported in April 2015 and was not capable of being retroactively triggered by later events to render earlier conduct unlawful under Article 3; the judge below was therefore correct to treat the two investigative phases separately (paras 140–141).
6. Outcome, practical guidance and costs. The court restored Judge Murdoch’s dismissal in Ms Woodcock and dismissed the appeals of CJ and others. The judgment emphasised that the exceptions to the omissions principle are narrow and fact‑specific and cautioned against destabilising established authority (paras 142–143). No separate order as to costs is recorded in the reasons (not stated in the judgment).

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): this judgment allowed the Chief Constable's appeal in the Woodcock proceedings and dismissed the appeals by CJ and others ( [2025] EWCA Civ 13 ).
• High Court (King's Bench and Queen's Bench): appeals came from decisions of Ritchie J (King's Bench) in [2023] EWHC 1062 (KB) and of Martin Spencer J in [2022] EWHC 1661 (QB).