Chief Constable of Northamptonshire Police v Esengul Woodcock

In negligence, the police generally owe no duty to protect an individual from criminal harm caused by a third party, or to warn of it, where their conduct is an omission that leaves the claimant no worse off than if they had done nothing. Foreseeability, knowledge of danger, professional status, attendance at the scene and ineffectual intervention do not suffice. A duty may arise through an assumption of responsibility, interference with another person’s protective action or another established exception. Under article 3, the investigative duty requires an arguable claim of actual ill-treatment, while the separate preventative duty requires a real and immediate risk. A generalised future risk is insufficient. The Northamptonshire appeal was allowed and the Wiltshire appeal dismissed.

Two unrelated appeals were heard together because both concerned alleged police liability for failing to prevent harm caused by criminal third parties.

• In Ms Woodcock’s claim, Judge Murdoch dismissed the negligence claim. Ritchie J allowed her appeal, found a duty to warn of an imminent attack and remitted causation: [2023] EWHC 1062 (KB).
• CJ, PJ, HD, PD and OB claimed negligence and breach of articles 3 and 8 arising from sexual offences committed by MP. Martin Spencer J dismissed all claims: [2022] EWHC 1661 (QB).

The central issues were whether the police owed a common-law duty to warn or protect against third-party criminal harm, and when the investigative and preventative obligations under article 3 arose.

1. Ms Woodcock’s appeal. The Court allowed the appeal, set aside Ritchie J’s decision and restored Judge Murdoch’s dismissal. The case fell within the established rules that negligence generally imposes no liability for omissions, that the police do not generally owe a duty to protect against criminal harm caused by a third party, and that foreseeability alone does not create a duty. It was not a novel case requiring a free-standing fair, just and reasonable assessment.
2. An assumption of responsibility normally requires a specific representation or promise to take particular action and ordinarily reliance. The police had made no promise to warn Ms Woodcock, pass on information from neighbours or respond within a particular period. The reasoning in Michael was not materially distinguishable merely because the present claim was framed as a duty to warn. The vulnerable-child qualification discussed in HXA did not assist an adult claimant on these facts.
3. The interference principle recognised in Tindall SC requires evidence that the police knew or ought to have known that another person intended to act protectively, and that the police conduct deflected that action. There was no such evidence concerning the neighbour. The police also had no special control over Guzelyurt. Their conduct therefore did not make matters worse than if they had done nothing.
4. If a duty to warn had existed, the court would have found breach because the police could reasonably have telephoned Ms Woodcock. However, those observations were unnecessary to the result. Ritchie J also erred in remitting causation. Under the Civil Procedure Rules 1998 r52.21(3)(b), a remittal based on injustice requires a serious procedural or other irregularity; a party’s failure to adduce evidence is not such an irregularity. The court nevertheless considered the inference that Ms Woodcock would have remained indoors if warned to be irresistible.
5. CJ and others’ appeal. The negligence appeal was dismissed. DS Ellerby’s failings were omissions, and none of the claimants would have been better off had he done nothing. The article 3 investigative duty arose only when contact sexual offending was reported in April 2015. The earlier investigation into indecent images did not engage article 3, and later information could not retrospectively transform it into an article 3 investigation. A generalised future risk did not establish a real and immediate risk. The police promptly arrested MP and linked the investigations within a reasonable time, so there was no breach of the article 3 duty.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division) — [2025] EWCA Civ 13: allowed the Chief Constable of Northamptonshire’s appeal, set aside the High Court decision and restored the dismissal of Ms Woodcock’s claim; dismissed the appeal by CJ and others.
• High Court (Ritchie J) — [2023] EWHC 1062 (KB): allowed Ms Woodcock’s appeal, found a duty to warn and remitted causation.
• High Court (Martin Spencer J) — [2022] EWHC 1661 (QB): dismissed the negligence and article 3 claims brought by CJ, PJ, HD, PD and OB.