X & Anor (Children: Adoption Order: Setting Aside), Re

A validly made adoption order cannot be set aside at first instance through an originating exercise of the High Court’s inherent jurisdiction, whether the application rests on welfare, adoption breakdown, identity, or a subsequent change of circumstances. The statutory scheme in the Adoption and Children Act 2002 treats adoption as a permanent transfer of parental status.

A challenge to such an order must ordinarily proceed by appeal, including an application for an extension of time. Welfare may be relevant to that appellate decision. Prompt procedural errors may in appropriate cases be corrected under the Family Procedure Rules, but those powers do not create a free-standing jurisdiction to revoke adoption orders. Earlier first-instance authorities recognising such a welfare-based jurisdiction should not be followed.

The adoptive mother applied to revoke 2013 adoption orders concerning two teenage children. The application was supported by the children and their birth mother following the breakdown of the adoptive placement and their return to the birth family.

Lieven J held that the court had no jurisdiction to revoke a valid adoption order solely on welfare grounds, although she found that revocation would be in Y’s best interests. The adoptive mother appealed from [2024] EWHC 1059 (Fam). The central issue was whether a court has jurisdiction, other than on appeal, to set aside a validly made adoption order.

1. Appeal dismissed. There is no originating jurisdiction at first instance to set aside a validly made adoption order. The court rejected the asserted inherent jurisdiction, including where revocation is sought because adoption has broken down or because welfare, personal identity, or family reality favours revocation.

2. The structure of the Adoption and Children Act 2002 confirms that result. Adoption permanently transfers parental status, extinguishes the former legal relationship, and treats the adopted person in law as born to the adopter. Parliament made limited provision for change following legitimation or a further adoption, but provided no general power of revocation.

3. Re B (Adoption: Jurisdiction to Set Aside) was binding and required strict refusal of challenges other than by appeal. The appellate route, including an appeal out of time, contains an important filter. The child’s welfare may be relevant when deciding whether to extend time, but it does not create a first-instance welfare jurisdiction.

4. A court may promptly correct a failure to serve or an accidental procedural error under the Family Procedure Rules where their requirements are met. Those procedural powers are not an exercise of an originating inherent jurisdiction. There may also be highly specific circumstances in which an appeal is impracticable, but they do not establish a general revocation jurisdiction.

5. The statements in Re W, Re O, and AX v BX recognising an inherent jurisdiction to revoke adoption orders were incorrect and should not be followed. PK v Mr and Mrs K and AX v BX, in which orders were revoked for welfare reasons, were wrongly decided. Any alteration of adoption’s intended lifelong finality is for Parliament.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Dismissed the adoptive mother’s appeal and held that no first-instance inherent jurisdiction exists to revoke a valid adoption order on welfare grounds: [2025] EWCA Civ 2 .
• High Court, Family Division: Lieven J refused the application, holding that the court lacked jurisdiction to revoke the adoption orders solely on welfare grounds: [2024] EWHC 1059 (Fam) .