Matthew Carter v The Chief Constable of Essex Police

A custody officer exercising the power under Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, section 54(4)(a), need only genuinely believe that a detainee may use clothing or personal effects to cause physical injury, damage property, interfere with evidence or assist escape. The belief need not be reasonable as an independent legal requirement, although its unreasonableness may bear on whether it was genuinely held. The power must be exercised case by case. Where the power is lawfully exercised, section 117 permits reasonable force if necessary. An appellate court may interfere with an evaluative decision where an identifiable flaw undermines its cogency, particularly where contemporaneous recordings substantially reduce the trial judge’s usual evidential advantage.

The appellant was arrested and taken to a police station. After he refused risk-assessment questions and resisted officers, his clothing was forcibly removed so that he could be placed in an anti-self-harm suit. He claimed assault and battery.

The trial recorder dismissed the claims concerning the custody desk and a later cell incident, but found the forcible removal of clothing unlawful and awarded £23,035. On appeal, Martin Spencer J held that genuine belief under section 54(4)(a) sufficed, that the belief and force were lawful, and that the damages appeared excessive: [2024] EWHC 126 (KB); [2024] 1 WLR 3848. The central issues on the second appeal were the construction of section 54(4)(a), the necessity and reasonableness of force, and damages.

1. Appeal dismissed. The court unanimously upheld the result reached by the appellate judge, although Lady Carr gave the principal judgment on statutory construction and Edis LJ dealt with force and quantum.
2. Section 54(4)(a) of Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 requires the custody officer actually to hold the specified belief. Parliament deliberately omitted an express requirement that the belief be reasonable. Reasonableness may assist in deciding whether the belief was genuinely held, but it is not a separate legal requirement. The power must be exercised directly and on a case-by-case basis.
3. The interference with bodily and psychological integrity, including under Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention, did not justify adding words to the statute through interpretation. Section 3 of Human Rights Act 1998 applies only where the ordinary meaning is incompatible with Convention rights. Code C and Annex A could not alter the meaning of section 54(4)(a). Paragraph 10 of Annex A concerned concealed articles. Paragraph 11 could, at most, apply so far as the context allowed, or in its spirit, to safety-related removal. It did not impose a reasonable-belief threshold.
4. The recorder had asked the wrong legal question and had materially misdirected himself on force. The decision to remove the clothing was lawful, and the use of force was necessary under section 117 of Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. Edis LJ held that the recorder’s evaluative conclusion was undermined by identifiable flaws, including failure to consider the full context, selective reliance on guidance and Annex A, irrelevant reasoning, contradictions and a frame-by-frame analysis of a fast-moving incident. The extensive CCTV footage also reduced the usual weight of the trial judge’s advantage.
5. The damages issue was academic because the claim failed. Edis LJ nevertheless agreed that the combined award for injury to feelings, psychiatric injury and aggravated damages was far too high, given that the unlawful episode had made only a material but very small contribution to mild-to-moderate stress symptoms.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division) — The second appeal was dismissed. The court upheld the appellate judge’s conclusions that the custody officer’s actual belief under section 54(4)(a) was sufficient and that the force used was lawful: [2025] EWCA Civ 367.
• High Court (King’s Bench Division) — Martin Spencer J allowed the relevant appeal on liability, holding that reasonable belief was not required and that the decision to remove the clothing and the force used were lawful: [2024] EWHC 126 (KB); [2024] 1 WLR 3848.
• County Court at Chelmsford — The recorder dismissed the claims concerning phases 1 and 3, found liability for the forcible removal of clothing in phase 2 and awarded £23,035.