Steven Laidley v Metropolitan Housing Trust Ltd

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appellant's challenge to the trial judge's refusal to disclose the advice of an Equality Act assessor and to his use of that assessor. The court applied the governing framework in CPR 35.15 and section 63 of the County Courts Act 1984 together with the Equality Act 2010 (in particular section 114(7)), distinguishing between (a) an assessor who provides evidence (for which disclosure will ordinarily be required) and (b) an assessor who assists the judge in evaluating the evidence (for which disclosure is not normally required). The judge's factual findings and legal application on possession (Grounds 12 and 14, Schedule 2, Housing Act 1988) and on Equality Act issues (sections 6, 15, 19, 35 and the public sector equality duty in section 149) were unchallenged; no procedural unfairness or unjust result was shown.

Background and nature of the proceedings:

• The respondent, Metropolitan Housing Trust Limited, sought possession of the appellant's assured tenancy of a flat relying on Grounds 12 and 14 of Schedule 2 to the Housing Act 1988. The appellant defended the possession claim and counterclaimed for disability discrimination under the Equality Act 2010.
• The appellant is disabled for the purposes of the Equality Act 2010 and lacked capacity; the Official Solicitor acted as his litigation friend. An Equality Act assessor (appointed under section 114(7) EA10 and section 63 CCA84) sat with the trial judge.

Relief sought and issues:

• MHT sought a possession order. The appellant sought to resist possession and advanced a counterclaim under Part 4 of the Equality Act 2010 (including alleged breaches of sections 15, 19 and 35 and alleged failure to comply with the public sector equality duty in section 149).
• The appellant raised two principal procedural issues on appeal: (i) whether the judge was obliged to disclose the assessor's advice to the parties (arguing a breach of common law fairness and Article 6 ECHR); and (ii) whether the judge wrongly used the assessor by asking her about matters (such as proportionality and legitimate aim) that were said to be outside her competence.

Procedural posture:

• The matter was tried before HHJ Jan Luba KC who sat with an assessor, heard evidence over several days, received medical expert evidence and made detailed findings of fact and law. The judge made an order for possession. An initial appeal to Bacon J in the High Court dismissed the appellant's two grounds ([2024] EWHC 2611 (Ch)). The appellant then appealed to the Court of Appeal.

Court’s reasoning:

• The Court of Appeal endorsed the distinction drawn by Bacon J and by the trial judge: where an assessor performs an evidential function (court-appointed expert evidence) their material should normally be disclosed; where the assessor assists the judge in evaluating the evidence, disclosure is not normally required unless fairness demands it in the particular circumstances.
• The court applied CPR 35.15(1)–(4), section 63 CCA84 and section 114(7) EA10, and followed the approach in Ahmed v University of Oxford and related authorities. Nautical assessor authorities (Owners of Bow Spring v Owners of the Manzanillo II and Global Mariner) were treated as specific to assessors acting as court-appointed experts and distinguished from the present Equality Act assessor role.
• The trial judge had explicitly recorded that the assessor's role was to assist with evaluation and weight (not to provide undisclosed factual or expert evidence), the parties had been given prior opportunity to object to the assessor and had not done so, and there was no suggestion in the judgment that the assessor provided undisclosed evidence or opened a new line of inquiry that the parties had no opportunity to meet.

Conclusion: The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. The judge had a broad discretion in how to use the assessor; no procedural unfairness or unjustness resulting from non-disclosure was established.

The appeal was dismissed. The Court held that assessors appointed to assist the judge in evaluating evidence do not, as a matter of course, generate a duty to disclose their advice; disclosure is required where the assessor provides evidence or where their assistance gives rise to a new line of inquiry of which the parties had not had notice. The trial judge had not erred in refusing disclosure or in using the assessor in the manner recorded in his judgment and the appellant had not shown a procedural irregularity rendering the decision unjust.

First instance: HHJ Jan Luba KC (Chancery Division, Business and Property Courts) — trial judgment and order for possession (detailed findings; assessor sat with the judge). First appeal to the High Court: Bacon J dismissed the appellant's two grounds ([2024] EWHC 2611 (Ch)). Appeal to the Court of Appeal: [2025] EWCA Civ 448, appeal dismissed.