Mobile Telecommunications Company KSCP v HRH Prince Hussam Bin Saud Bin Abdulaziz Al Saud

The Court of Appeal refused permission to appeal against the dismissal of a bankruptcy petition because the petitioner had not proved that the respondent "had a place of residence" in England and Wales during the three-year Relevant Period (1 June 2019 to 1 June 2022) under section 265(2)(b)(i) of the Insolvency Act 1986. The court reviewed the statutory test and authorities, emphasising that a "place of residence" requires a degree of permanence, continuity or expectation of continuity and that mere entitlement to use a third party’s property, without more, is insufficient.

The judge at first instance was held to have made credible findings of fact that were fatal to the petitioner’s case: the respondent had moved his family home to Riyadh decades earlier; he did not keep possessions or keys at York House; he had not stayed there during the Relevant Period; he was unaware of Council Tax registration until 2019; and the so-called New London Properties were not a pool of residences available to him. Given those findings, any wider legal interpretation advanced by the petitioner would be unrealistically broad and contrary to authority such as Lakatamia Shipping v Su and re Nordenfelt.

Background and nature of the claim.

The petitioner, a Kuwaiti public company, sought bankruptcy orders against the respondent, a member of the Saudi royal family, to enforce a series of arbitral awards (total about US$885 million plus costs of about £3.3 million). The petition was presented on 1 June 2022 and relied upon jurisdiction under section 265(2)(b)(i) of the Insolvency Act 1986, alleging that the respondent "had a place of residence" in England and Wales during the three-year period ending on presentation of the petition (the Relevant Period).

Procedural history.

• Leave to enforce the awards was given on 31 January 2019 pursuant to the Arbitration Act 1996.
• A prior bankruptcy petition in 2020 (the 2020 Petition) was dismissed after the petition debt was paid; related interlocutory litigation and appeals produced decisions including [2022] EWHC 744 (Ch), [2023] EWHC 1144 (Ch) and [2024] EWHC 1724 (Ch).
• Permission to serve the 2022 petition out of the jurisdiction was granted and subsequently challenged; the jurisdictional issue proceeded to a full hearing before the High Court judge whose reserved judgment dismissed the petition on jurisdictional grounds ([2025] EWHC 85 (Ch)).
• The petitioner sought permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal; permission was refused and reasons were given on 30 May 2025.

Issues before the court.

1. Whether the petitioner had established on the balance of probabilities that the respondent "had a place of residence" in England and Wales during the Relevant Period for the purposes of section 265(2)(b)(i) of the Insolvency Act 1986.
2. How the statutory phrase "has had a place of residence" should be interpreted and what factual factors are legally relevant (for example intention, permanence, continuity, entitlement to use premises, and prior residence).
3. Whether specific factual findings of the judge (for example about Council Tax registration, the availability of the New London Properties, and the respondent’s visits and possession of keys) were open to challenge on appeal.

Court’s reasoning and conclusions.

The Court of Appeal accepted that the judge’s detailed legal analysis could be the subject of contrary argument but concluded that the judge’s primary findings of fact were decisive. Those findings included that the respondent had moved his settled home to Riyadh after completing his studies, did not intend to have a place of residence in England and Wales thereafter, had not occupied York House during the Relevant Period, did not keep possessions or keys there, had been unaware of Council Tax registration until late, and had no effective access to the New London Properties. The court held that these findings meant the respondent did not have the requisite "hold on the jurisdiction" to attract bankruptcy jurisdiction under section 265.

The court rejected the petitioner’s contention that an entitlement (licence or moral claim) to occupy a family-owned London property, even if unused during the Relevant Period and without the debtor’s intention to use it, would suffice. That expansive construction was held to be inconsistent with statutory language and authority (notably Lakatamia Shipping v Su and the approach in re Nordenfelt), and would trivialise the statutory test.

Relief sought and disposition. The petitioner sought permission to appeal the judge’s dismissal of the petition; permission was refused because there was no realistic prospect of success given the judge’s findings.

Permission to appeal was refused. The court held that, on the judge’s credible findings of fact, the petitioner had not established that the respondent "had a place of residence" in England and Wales during the Relevant Period for the purposes of section 265(2)(b)(i) of the Insolvency Act 1986. The petitioner’s broader legal argument — that entitlement to use a third party’s property, without more, suffices — was rejected as unrealistically wide and contrary to authority.

The petition arose after arbitral awards were enforced by leave granted on 31 January 2019. A prior bankruptcy petition in 2020 was dismissed; related interlocutory appeals and jurisdictional rulings were given in the High Court: [2022] EWHC 744 (Ch) (Roth J) (appeal dismissed on 31 March 2022), [2023] EWHC 1144 (Ch) (ICCJ Barber) (refusing set-aside of permission to serve), and [2024] EWHC 1724 (Ch) (Bacon J) (refusing permission to appeal after a rolled-up hearing). Chief Insolvency and Companies Court Judge Briggs gave a reserved judgment dismissing the 1 June 2022 petition ([2025] EWHC 85 (Ch)). The petitioner sought permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal; permission was refused by the Court of Appeal on 30 May 2025 ([2025] EWCA Civ 681).