Janice Elizabeth Turner & Anor v Mark Gary Coates

Parallel civil contempt and criminal proceedings arising from the same facts are not inherently unjust. Civil contempt proceedings serve the distinct purpose of enforcing court orders and should ordinarily be dealt with promptly. A stay is discretionary and is justified only where proceeding would create a real risk of prejudice capable of causing injustice. Different outcomes in the two jurisdictions do not, without more, establish such prejudice. The usual safeguard is for the second sentencing court to take the earlier sentence fully into account. In sentencing for multiple civil contempts, the court may impose consecutive terms, subject to the totality principle. The structured approach in Lovett may be used beyond anti-social behaviour injunction cases, but is not mandatory.

The respondents obtained injunctions and financial orders against the appellant following a neighbour property-boundary dispute. The appellant was later found in contempt on 19 of 20 alleged breaches and committed to prison for 448 days by Her Honour Judge Venn in the County Court at Hastings on 17 September 2024.

Some conduct also formed part of subsequent criminal proceedings. The appellant was acquitted of harassment but convicted of criminal damage and sentenced to imprisonment, with the criminal sentencing judge taking the civil contempt sentence into account. He appealed, arguing that the civil proceedings should have been stayed pending the criminal trial and that the civil sentences should have run concurrently.

1. Appeal dismissed. The civil contempt jurisdiction is separate from the criminal jurisdiction, even where both arise from the same facts. A stay remains discretionary, but is warranted only where continuing would create a real risk of prejudice leading to injustice. The need for prompt enforcement of court orders meant that it was not unjust to determine the civil proceedings first. The later acquittals for harassment did not establish prejudice, since the two jurisdictions have different purposes, evidential settings and sentencing objectives. The proper safeguard was that the later criminal sentencing court should take the earlier civil sentence into account, as occurred here.
2. The appellant’s challenge also came too late in substance. The refusal to stay made on 12 August 2024 had not been relisted under CPR r23.11(2) or appealed, and there was no basis for treating the judge as obliged to revisit the issue at the substantive hearing.
3. There was no error in imposing consecutive terms. The judge was entitled to regard the breaches as distinct incidents, assign individual sentences, and then apply the totality principle. A single sentence assessed globally would also have been permissible. Either method was open, provided the overall sentence was just and proportionate.
4. The approach in Lovett v Wigan County Council [2022] EWCA Civ 1631, concerning culpability and harm, could be applied outside anti-social behaviour injunction cases, but need not be applied. Its particular sentence lengths were specific to that context.
5. The 448-day sentence was within the range reasonably open to the judge, bearing in mind the number and seriousness of the contempts, the second contempt application and the warning given on the earlier appeal.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): The appellant appealed the County Court at Hastings order of 17 September 2024 committing him for 448 days for contempt of court. The appeal was dismissed on both grounds.
• County Court at Hastings: Her Honour Judge Venn found 19 of 20 alleged breaches proved and imposed a total sentence of 448 days after applying the totality principle.