East Herts District Council v Patrick Joseph Flynn & Ors

Under section 187B of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990, the court has an original and discretionary jurisdiction to grant an injunction restraining an actual or apprehended breach of planning control. The question is whether an injunction is necessary or expedient and whether it is just, convenient, proportionate and commensurate in all the circumstances. The court must balance the public interest in enforcing planning control against private interests, including the needs and best interests of affected children. Those interests are important but not determinative. An injunction may be appropriate where conventional enforcement measures have proved ineffective or would not provide an appropriate remedy. The court may grant both prohibitory and mandatory relief and should allow a reasonable period for compliance where that assists affected occupiers to secure alternative accommodation.

The claimant local planning authority brought a Part 8 claim under section 187B of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 concerning unauthorised residential caravan use, caravans, vehicles and hardstanding on land in the Green Belt and a conservation area. An enforcement notice had been issued in 2020, and appeals against the planning refusals and the notice had been dismissed in 2022. The notice remained wholly unimplemented after its extended compliance date.

The parties agreed the terms of a proposed final injunction. The court nevertheless had to decide whether it should exercise its discretion to grant the order, taking account of the continuing breach, the ineffectiveness or inappropriateness of alternative enforcement methods, the family’s accommodation and schooling needs, and the proportionality of the proposed timetable. Proceedings against the fourth defendant were discontinued.

1. Jurisdiction and discretion. The court granted a final injunction with prohibitory and mandatory elements. Section 187B of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 confers an original, not supervisory, jurisdiction. The power is discretionary: the court must decide whether an injunction should be granted and, if so, on what terms. The relevant question is whether the remedy is necessary or expedient, just and convenient, proportionate and commensurate in all the circumstances, applying the principles in South Buckinghamshire District Council v Porter & Others [2003] 2 A.C. 558 and Ipswich Borough Council v Fairview Hotels (Ipswich) Limited [2022] EWHC 2868 (KB).
2. Assessment of the breach and alternatives. The breaches were clear, longstanding and knowingly continued despite the enforcement notice, the dismissal of the appeals and assistance offered by the claimant. Conventional measures had not resolved the breach. The claimant had good and sufficient reasons not to use statutory self-help or prosecution: removal by the authority would involve considerable public expenditure, while prosecution would not remove the offending materials. Nothing short of an injunction would provide effective restraint.
3. Balancing and proportionality. The court could not revisit the merits of the planning decisions, but had to balance the public interest in enforcing planning policy against the defendants’ private interests. The residential use harmed the area’s intrinsic character and appearance. The children’s needs and the family’s accommodation needs were important countervailing considerations, but were not determinative. Applying ZH v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] UKSC 4 and Stevens v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government [2013] EWHC 792 (Admin), the best interests of the children were a primary consideration within a broader balancing exercise.
4. Terms and costs. The court extended the compliance period by nine months, allowing six months to remove the static home and other paraphernalia and a further three months to remove the hardstanding. The order was proportionate and commensurate. The fourth defendant was removed from the proceedings without a costs order. The first and second defendants were ordered to pay the claimant’s costs of £16,609 within 14 days.

First-instance Part 8 claim. No prior appellate decision is stated in the judgment.