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Natasha Sivanandan v Capstone Foster Care Ltd & Ors

[2025] EWHC 1478 (KB)

Case details

Neutral citation
[2025] EWHC 1478 (KB)
Court
High Court
Judgment date
16 June 2025
Subjects
Equality Act 2010 (discrimination)Human Rights Act 1998Civil procedure (reopening appeals under CPR 52.30)Costs
Keywords
CPR 52.30reopening appealsArticle 6 ECHREquality Act 2010victimisationlay assessorsDentonprocedural fairnesscosts reductionlitigant in person
Outcome
dismissed

Case summary

The court refused the applicant's CPR 52.30 application to reopen a prior refusal of permission to appeal. CPR 52.30 requires exceptional circumstances, a powerful probability of a significant injustice, and no alternative effective remedy. The judge applied that test and concluded the threshold was not met.

The main contested points were application of the Human Rights Act 1998 (notably Article 6(1) and Article 14 of the ECHR), alleged errors in the trial judge's evaluation of evidence under the Equality Act 2010 (direct discrimination, victimisation and harassment), the non-appointment of lay assessors under section 114(7) of the Equality Act 2010, and a challenge to the High Court costs order. The judge found no procedural defect or error of law of the exceptional kind needed to reopen: a mistaken reference to the wrong Cornerstone authority did not undermine the central legal conclusion on Article 6; the so‑called ‘smoking‑gun’ email was considered and would not have altered the outcome; the lay‑assessors ground was out of time and the judge properly applied the Denton approach; and the costs complaint did not reveal the kind of fundamental unfairness required to reopen.

Case abstract

This is an application by the applicant, a litigant in person, to reopen a decision of Mr Justice Sheldon dated 11 July 2024 which refused permission to appeal orders made by His Honour Judge Saunders on 15 June 2022 and 6 October 2023. The underlying proceedings concerned the applicant's unsuccessful attempt to be approved as a foster carer and alleged breaches of the Equality Act 2010 (race and sex discrimination, victimisation and harassment), the Human Rights Act 1998 (Articles 6 and 14 ECHR), and a negligence claim which had been struck out on 15 June 2022.

The applicant sought to reopen on four principal grounds:

  • Human Rights Act (Article 6/Article 14): she argued that an Independent Fostering Agency (IFA) carries out public functions and that Article 6(1) and Article 14 therefore applied, relying on the High Court Cornerstone decision and ECtHR authorities.
  • Equality Act findings: she alleged the trial judge ignored key contemporaneous documents (notably an email of 21 March 2019) and made evaluative errors amounting to errors of law in rejecting direct discrimination and victimisation claims.
  • Lay assessors: she said the failure to appoint lay assessors under section 114(7) was contrary to prior case management agreement and unfair, and that the trial judge should have appointed them.
  • Costs order: she sought to reopen the costs order made after the permission hearing, arguing procedural unfairness and non‑compliance with costs rules.

The court considered the legal test for reopening under CPR 52.30 and Practice Direction 52A paragraph 7, emphasising the high and exceptional threshold illustrated by the authorities (including Taylor v Lawrence and Municipio De Mariana v BHP). On the Article 6 point the judge accepted that the applicant relied on the High Court Cornerstone decision but concluded that (a) any mis‑reference to a Court of Appeal report in the reasons did not undermine the central legal conclusion that Article 6 did not apply because domestic law does not recognise a correlative right to be appointed as a foster carer, and (b) the trial judge had in any event considered fairness of procedure.

On the Equality Act/evidence point the court accepted the applicant was correct that a referenced email had in fact been in the trial materials, but concluded the permission judge had considered its effect and correctly concluded even if it supported an inference of victimisation it would not have changed the outcome given the trial judge's factual findings. The lay‑assessors complaint was held to be out of time; the permission judge applied Denton and refused to extend time because the applicant had ample opportunities to raise the point earlier and there would be real prejudice to the respondents. On costs the permission judge had addressed the respondents' non‑compliance and applied a 30% reduction; that discretionary and summary assessment did not amount to the kind of fundamental procedural unfairness necessary to reopen.

The application was therefore refused: the circumstances were not exceptional, there was no powerful probability of a significant injustice, and there was no basis to conclude the integrity of the earlier proceedings had been critically undermined.

Held

The application to reopen the judge's decision of 11 July 2024 is refused. The court applied the strict CPR 52.30 test and concluded the applicant had not demonstrated exceptional circumstances, a powerful probability of significant injustice, or that the integrity of the earlier proceedings had been critically undermined. Errors identified (including an incorrect citation and omission in the permission judge's reasons) did not make it probable the outcome would have been different.

Appellate history

The trial judge (His Honour Judge Saunders) struck out the negligence claim on 15 June 2022 and dismissed the Equality Act and Human Rights Act claims after trial on 9 June 2023. Permission to appeal was refused by the trial judge on 6 October 2023. Mr Justice Sheldon refused extensions and permission on 11 July 2024. The present application to reopen that refusal was heard and determined by Mr Justice Sweeting on 16 June 2025 ([2025] EWHC 1478 (KB)).

Cited cases

Legislation cited

  • Civil Procedure Rules (CPR): Rule 52.30
  • Equality Act 2010: Section 114(7)
  • European Convention on Human Rights: Article 6
  • Human Rights Act 1998: Section 6(1)
  • Practice Direction 44 (PD44): Paragraph Not stated in the judgment.
  • Practice Direction 52A: Paragraph 7