Lowri Evans, R (on the application of) v Aneurin Bevan University Local Health Board & Ors

In judicial review, the court reviews the legality of the decision-making process and does not substitute its own assessment of the merits. A decision-maker need only obtain information that it is reasonable to obtain, judged in the context of the discretion and factual matrix.

Where several recommendations are considered together, the court must assess their substance and purpose. Recommendations addressing distinct problems may properly be considered separately, even if they overlap or are approved simultaneously.

Consultation is judged by substance and fairness. The information provided must permit intelligent consideration and response, but need not amount to disclosure required in litigation. Equality duties require rigorous consideration of relevant impacts, but not a precise mathematical analysis or exhaustive investigation.

The claimant sought judicial review of the decision of the NHS Wales Joint Commissioning Committee on 23 April 2024 approving the reorganisation of the Emergency Medical Retrieval and Transfer Service. The plan consolidated bases at Welshpool and Caernarfon into a single North Wales site, with related recommendations for continuity and a bespoke rural road-based service.

The challenge alleged irrationality, breach of the Tameside duty, inadequate regard to representations from Llais, failure to comply with consultation requirements, breach of the Equality Act 2010 duties, and reliance on an erroneous costing. The defendants disputed the grounds and relied alternatively on section 31 of the Senior Courts Act 1981.

1. Claim dismissed. The decision was not irrational and did not breach the Tameside duty. Recommendation 4 concerned a sufficiently distinct plan, primarily addressing broader first-responder concerns rather than the EMRTS problems of unmet need and under-utilisation. Its costs, scope and mitigating effect therefore did not have to be finalised before Recommendations 1 to 3 were approved.
2. The court cautioned against a minute textual examination of voluminous documents detached from the wider context. The JCC had a broad discretion and was entitled to proceed while Recommendation 4 remained under development.
3. The costing error concerning Option 4 was an objectively verifiable mistake of fact, but it was immaterial. Correcting the figures would still have left Option 4 ranked second, and Option 6 would not have been selected.
4. The defendants had fully and conscientiously considered Llais’s representations. The engagement process was, in substance, a consultation. Applying the Gunning principles, the information supplied was sufficient. Discarded options did not require the same detail as preferred options, and consultation did not require litigation-style disclosure.
5. The Equality Act 2010 duties were discharged. The Equality Impact Assessments identified potential adverse effects on protected groups and socio-economically disadvantaged communities. The decision-makers were entitled to balance those possible effects against the reduction in unmet need and were not required to undertake a precise mathematical or exhaustive investigation.
6. Alternatively, section 31 of the Senior Courts Act 1981 would have barred relief on the consultation grounds because it was highly likely that the outcome would not have been substantially different. The section 31 issue was not established for the equality ground.

First-instance judicial review proceedings. No earlier substantive decision is stated in the judgment.