Cerys Ashley v Benedict Cela Musa

The claimant brought an unfair prejudice petition under the Companies Act 2005, section 994 seeking a range of procedural orders including a three‑month stay, permission to amend pleadings, further disclosure and permission to adduce additional evidence. The judge refused the stay and any further adjournment, holding that the medical evidence produced was insufficient to justify vacating the trial and that proposed substantial amendments were extremely late and likely to prejudice the respondent and the court timetable. The court applied established principles on medical evidence for adjournments (Levy v Ellis‑Carr and subsequent authorities) and on late amendments (CIP Properties v Galliford Try and related authorities).

The judge considered the Equality Act 2010. He held that section 29 and the public sector equality duty in section 149 do not apply to the exercise of judicial functions (relying on R (Howard) v Official Receiver), but that section 15 (discrimination arising from disability) is not excluded. Applying section 15, he concluded that refusal of the stay was not treatment "because of" something arising from the petitioner’s disability and, in any event, would be a proportionate means of securing a fair trial.

The petitioner issued an unfair prejudice petition under the Companies Act 2005, section 994. The proceedings reached a pretrial stage with the trial listed shortly thereafter. The petitioner sought a three‑month stay so she could recover from disabilities (dyslexia, anxiety and depression), obtain pro bono assistance and to prepare formal applications to amend the petition, seek further disclosure and call an additional witness. She had previously been granted extensions and relief from sanction, and disclosure had been provided by the respondent in October 2024; witness evidence had been exchanged by February 2025. The petitioner gave email notice of an intention to apply to amend on 19 May but had not filed an N244 or supporting evidence when the matter was raised at the pretrial review.

Issues for decision: (i) whether to grant a stay or further adjournment; (ii) whether the medical evidence justified adjournment; (iii) whether the Equality Act 2010 required the court to grant accommodation; and (iv) how the court should approach very late proposed amendments. The judge reviewed authorities on medical evidence required for adjournments (notably Levy v Ellis‑Carr, endorsed in Forrester Ketley v Brent and Bruce v Wychavon), and on late amendments and prejudice (Quah v Goldman Sachs, Vilca v XSTRATA, CIP Properties v Galliford Try; approved in ABP Technology v Voyetra Turtle Beach).

On medical evidence the documents before the court were an educational psychologist report of 2008 and a GP letter of 11 November 2022; neither were sufficiently recent, particular or prognostic to satisfy the standard required to justify vacating the trial. On amendments the judge applied the principles that lateness, prejudice to the respondent and the need to respect fixed trial dates weigh heavily against permission to amend at a late stage. On the Equality Act the judge accepted that section 29 and section 149 do not apply to judicial functions (following R (Howard) v Official Receiver and the construction of Schedules 3 and 18) but considered section 15. He concluded that refusal of the adjournment was not because of something arising in consequence of the petitioner’s disability; even if it were, refusal was proportionate to the legitimate aim of ensuring a fair and timely trial. Result: the application for a stay and further adjournment was refused, but the petitioner was permitted to file formal applications if she wished, being warned they were unlikely to succeed.

The petitioner’s application for a three‑month stay and for any further adjournment was refused. The judge held that the medical and psychiatric evidence was insufficiently recent and particular to justify vacating the trial; that proposed substantial amendments were late and liable to prejudice the respondent and the court timetable; that section 29 and section 149 of the Equality Act 2010 do not apply to judicial functions; and that, while section 15 of the Equality Act 2010 may apply to judges, refusal of the stay was not treatment "because of" anything arising from the petitioner’s disability and, in any event, was a proportionate means of achieving the legitimate aim of a fair and timely trial. The petitioner was nevertheless permitted to file formal applications but was warned they were unlikely to succeed.