Cam Askan v Trustees of St Asaph Conservative Club

The renewed application for permission to appeal was refused. The court applied the governing test for permission to appeal under CPR r.52.21(3) and the established appellate principles on review of findings of fact (as summarised in Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464). On the facts found at trial, the Club was entitled to paper title to part of the contested area (traced to the 1919 conveyance and consistent pre-registration conveyances) and, in the alternative, succeeded in proving adverse possession of the remaining unregistered areas by acts of possession starting in or about 1991 (wall, concrete plinth and air-conditioning units), so Limitation had expired prior to the claimant’s 2019 purchase. The Club also acquired a prescriptive right of way over the path by long use. The claimant’s causes of action for harassment, breaches of the Data Protection Act 2018 and nuisance were dismissed as inadequately pleaded or lacking merit in light of the ownership and the Club’s conduct. The renewal application failed because none of the grounds were reasonably arguable: there was no shown error of law, no factual finding plainly wrong, and no serious procedural irregularity rendering the decision unjust. The court also rejected allegations of actual or apparent bias as without foundation.

Background and parties

The claimant, a litigant in person, purchased the former bank premises in High Street, St Asaph in 2019 and asserted adverse possession and other tortious causes of action against the trustees of the St Asaph Conservative Club (the Club) in respect of a small adjoining parcel of land (the Contested Land) and a pedestrian path (the Path). The Club counterclaimed, seeking declarations of ownership, injunctions and an order recognising a right of way. The respondent did not appear to renew the application for permission to appeal.

Nature of the application

• The applicant orally renewed an application for permission to appeal the trial judge’s order of 7 February 2025 which: declared the Club owner of the Contested Land (in part by paper title and in part by adverse possession), declared a pedestrian right of way over the Path (subject to 48 hours’ notice except in emergency), granted injunctive relief restraining the claimant from entering or damaging the Contested Land and dismissed the claimant’s claims for harassment, nuisance and breach of the Data Protection Act 2018.

Issues framed by the court

• Whether the trial judge erred in law or was plainly wrong on material findings of fact: (a) ownership by paper title; (b) adverse possession; (c) acquisition of a prescriptive right of way; and (d) dismissal of the claimant’s tortious claims.
• Whether there was a serious procedural irregularity or bias justifying permission to appeal.

Key factual and documentary findings

• The judge traced the Club’s title to a 1919 conveyance describing a 216 square yard parcel; subsequent conveyances (1947, 1949, 1953, 1997) preserved that description and the 2004 registration was, on the balance of probabilities, a first registration showing the Club’s entitlement to the red area on the plan.
• Contemporaneous planning documentation and witness evidence supported a finding that a wall and air-conditioning units (on a concrete plinth) were installed in or about 1991; those acts evidenced factual possession and an intention to possess such that any challenge had become time-barred by 2003.
• The Path had been used for over 20 years prior to 2019 and the Club acquired a prescriptive right of way.
• The claimant’s Data Protection Act, harassment and nuisance claims were dismissed as inadequately pleaded and, in any event, unsustainable given the Club’s ownership/possession and the limited CCTV use over its own land.

Court’s reasoning on the renewal

• The court applied the permission-to-appeal test in CPR r.52.21(3): an appeal must be reasonably arguable by showing the lower court was wrong or the decision was unjust because of a serious procedural irregularity. On questions of fact the court applied the high threshold for upsetting trial findings (the “plainly wrong” test, as explained in Volpi).
• The trial judge’s careful document-based tracing of title, reliance on contemporaneous planning records and assessment of witness credibility were within the range of reasonable conclusions; alternative pieces of evidence cited by the claimant (Ordnance Survey mapping, Google Earth images, and an earlier planning drawing) did not displace the judge’s findings.
• Legal points were either correctly decided (e.g. distinction from the FTT decision in Openshaw on grounds of post-2002 Act statutory regime and trustee status) or were not arguable. Procedural complaints and allegations of bias or widespread institutional corruption were unsupported and abusive.

Outcome: the renewed application for permission to appeal was refused because no ground was reasonably arguable.

The renewed application for permission to appeal was refused (application dismissed). The court held that the trial judge’s findings of fact and law were within the range of reasonable conclusions: the Club had proven paper title to part of the Contested Land and, alternatively, adverse possession of the unregistered areas from around 1991; the Club had acquired a prescriptive right of way; and the claimant’s Data Protection, harassment and nuisance claims failed. There was no error of law, no plainly wrong factual finding, and no serious procedural irregularity or evidential basis for allegations of actual or apparent bias.

Permission to appeal was refused on the papers by Sir Peter Lane by Order dated 10 June 2025. The claimant orally renewed the application and the renewal hearing was heard on 22 July 2025 before Mr Justice Constable, who also refused permission in the judgment dated 25 July 2025.