Huda Ammori, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department

The claimant challenged the Home Secretary’s decision to add Palestine Action to Schedule 2 of the Terrorism Act 2000 under the power in s.3(3)(a). The court determined as a preliminary issue that the statutory route of applying for deproscription and (if refused) appealing to the Proscribed Organisations Appeal Commission was not a suitable alternative remedy in the circumstances, and accordingly did not bar judicial review. The judge granted permission to apply for judicial review only on (i) a proportionality challenge under Articles 10 and 11 ECHR (ground 2) and (ii) a challenge that the Home Secretary owed a duty to consult before proscribing (ground 8). Permission was refused on the other grounds (including improper purpose/ultra vires, insufficiency of nexus, failures of inquiry, relevance errors, alleged policy breach, and public sector equality duty failings). The court relied on the availability of closed material procedures under the Justice and Security Act 2013, the nature and immediacy of the detriment to freedom of expression and assembly, and the potential for disorder and inconsistent outcomes if criminal defendants were left to litigate proscription validity in separate criminal trials.

Background and parties: The claimant, a founder of Palestine Action, sought permission to judicially review the Home Secretary’s decision to proscribe Palestine Action by order adding it to Schedule 2 of the Terrorism Act 2000. The proscription was announced 23 June 2025, laid in draft and approved by both Houses in early July and made on 4 July 2025 (coming into force 5 July 2025). The claimant applied for interim relief and then for permission to bring judicial review proceedings. The Home Secretary resisted permission and raised as a preliminary point that the claimant had an alternative remedy by applying for deproscription and appealing to POAC.

Nature of the application and relief sought: The claimant sought permission to challenge the initial proscription decision (s.3(3)(a) TA 2000) on multiple grounds, including that the proscription was disproportionate under Articles 10 and 11 ECHR, was made for an improper purpose, lacked sufficient nexus to terrorism, involved failures of inquiry and consultation, breached the public sector equality duty, and involved other legal errors. The Home Secretary sought dismissal at the permission stage, including by arguing the availability of the deproscription/POAC route as an adequate alternative remedy.

Issues framed by the court:

• whether the deproscription/POAC route was a conveniently and effectively available alternative remedy sufficient to bar judicial review;
• whether the claimant’s grounds raised serious or arguable questions to be tried, notably proportionality under Articles 10 and 11 and failure to consult;
• the proper forum and procedures for resolving challenges to proscription, including the relevance of closed material procedures under the Justice and Security Act 2013 and differences with POAC.

Court’s reasoning — alternative remedy (preliminary issue): The judge applied the familiar test of whether the alternative remedy was "conveniently and effectively" available. He identified and cumulatively applied five factors: timing; the nature of the detriment caused by proscription (notably chilling effects on lawful political speech and protest); the risk of multiplicity and inconsistent outcomes if criminal defendants raised validity as a defence; the comparative suitability of forum and procedure (taking into account that the Justice and Security Act 2013 and CPR Part 82 enable a closed material procedure in the High Court and that intercept evidence can be admitted under Schedule 3 to the Investigatory Powers Act 2016); and whether allowing judicial review would render the statutory deproscription/POAC route otiose. The judge concluded that, on the facts of this case (including numerous criminal prosecutions and immediate chilling effects), the deproscription/POAC route was not a suitable alternative remedy and that judicial review remained appropriate.

Court’s reasoning — permission on the merits: The court considered each pleaded ground. It found that a proportionality challenge under Articles 10 and 11 (ground 2) raised a serious arguable issue requiring full hearing. The court also found it reasonably arguable that a duty to consult PA arose and that consultation could have been feasible (ground 8). Other grounds were rejected at the permission stage either as not reasonably arguable or as subsumed within the proportionality inquiry; the judge declined to follow prior authority (Kurdistan Workers’ Party) to the extent it suggested POAC should be the exclusive forum for proportionality disputes in all cases.

Procedural outcome: Permission was granted for grounds 2 and 8 and refused for the remainder; the court determined the preliminary alternative remedy issue in the claimant’s favour.

The court determined the preliminary issue in the claimant’s favour: the statutory deproscription route (application to the Home Secretary and, if refused, appeal to POAC) was not a suitable alternative remedy in the circumstances, so it did not bar judicial review. The court granted permission to apply for judicial review on two grounds only: (i) that the proscription may be a disproportionate interference with Articles 10 and 11 ECHR (ground 2) and (ii) that the Home Secretary may have been under a duty to consult PA before proscribing (ground 8). Permission was refused on all other grounds. The rationale rested on the immediacy and severity of the detriment to freedom of expression and assembly, the practical risks of inconsistent determinations in criminal proceedings, and the availability of closed material procedures in the High Court under the Justice and Security Act 2013.

Initial interim relief hearing and judgment refusing interim relief: [2025] EWHC 1708 (Admin). Application for permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal refused: [2025] EWCA Civ 848. The proscription order was laid and approved by Parliament in late June/early July 2025 and made on 4 July 2025 (coming into force 5 July 2025).