Huda Ammori, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department

The availability of a statutory deproscription application and appeal to POAC does not automatically make judicial review of the initial proscription decision unsuitable. The question is whether the alternative remedy is conveniently and effectively available in the circumstances, having regard to timing, interim detriment, possible criminal proceedings, forum and procedure, and the continuing role of the statutory scheme. Where delay would cause irremediable interference with freedom of expression and protest, and could produce conflicting criminal-court decisions, judicial review may be appropriate. The Terrorism Act 2000 does not oust judicial review of an initial decision under section 3(3)(a). An organisation may be proscribed for conduct falling within the statutory definition of terrorism even if it does not advocate violence against persons. Arguments concerning the proportionality of proscription belong primarily under Articles 10 and 11 of the ECHR.

The claimant, a founder of Palestine Action, challenged the Home Secretary’s decision to add the organisation to Schedule 2 to the Terrorism Act 2000. The challenge was brought before the court determined permission to apply for judicial review. The Secretary of State argued as a preliminary issue that the claimant had an adequate alternative remedy: an application for deproscription followed, if necessary, by an appeal to POAC.

The court considered the statutory distinction between the initial decision to proscribe and a later decision refusing deproscription. It also considered the practical effects of delay, the possibility of criminal defendants challenging the order, and the procedural differences between POAC and the High Court. The central issues were whether the alternative remedy was suitable and which grounds of challenge were reasonably arguable.

1. Alternative remedy. The preliminary issue was determined in the claimant’s favour. The suitability of an alternative remedy depends on whether it is conveniently and effectively available, assessed in the statutory and factual context. Relevant considerations were timing, the nature of the interim detriment, the possibility of challenges in criminal proceedings, forum and procedure, and whether judicial review would make the deproscription scheme ineffective.
2. An application to deproscribe followed by a POAC appeal could not adequately address the likely delay. The resulting interference with freedom of expression and protest could not be repaired retrospectively. Criminal defendants might also challenge the validity of the proscription order by way of defence, creating a strong public interest in an authoritative and early determination and a risk of conflicting decisions.
3. The Terrorism Act 2000 distinguishes the initial decision to proscribe under section 3(3)(a) from a later decision on deproscription under section 3(3)(b). Section 5 provides an appeal to POAC against refusal to deproscribe, but the Act does not purport to oust judicial review of the initial proscription decision.
4. The procedural advantages identified in Kurdistan Workers’ Party had largely diminished because the Justice and Security Act 2013 and CPR Part 82 provide a closed material procedure in the High Court, while the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 permits intercept evidence in relevant proceedings. The judge regarded the earlier decision as clearly wrong in material respects and declined to follow it.
5. Permission was granted on grounds 2 and 8. Ground 2, alleging disproportionate interference with Articles 10 and 11 of the ECHR, was reasonably arguable. A duty to consult was also reasonably arguable. Permission was refused on the remaining grounds, including improper purpose, error concerning the statutory definition of terrorism, failure to gather sufficient information, irrelevant considerations, failure to apply policy and breach of the public sector equality duty.

The judgment records earlier interlocutory decisions in the same proceedings:

• High Court (Administrative Court): interim relief was refused after the court held that the claim raised at least one serious issue to be tried: [2025] EWHC 1708 (Admin).
• Court of Appeal: permission to appeal against the interim relief decision was refused: [2025] EWCA Civ 848.

This judgment determined the preliminary alternative-remedy issue and permission to apply for judicial review.