Dr Belinda Agoe & Anor v General Medical Council

An appeal from a professional disciplinary tribunal will succeed only where the tribunal’s decision was wrong or unjust because of a serious procedural or other irregularity. A tribunal considering alleged direct discrimination must apply the two-stage burden of proof under section 136 of the Equality Act 2010. The claimant must first establish facts from which discrimination could be inferred. Only then does the burden move to the respondent.

A comparator must have no material difference in the circumstances. A tribunal is not generally required to initiate its own investigation into an inadequately evidenced discrimination allegation where the parties have not requested an adjournment or further inquiry. Suspension may properly be imposed for misconduct sufficiently serious to protect the public and maintain confidence in the profession.

Two general practitioners appealed under section 40 of the Medical Act 1983 against MPTS decisions finding misconduct, impairment of fitness to practise and imposing suspensions of three months and two months respectively.

The appellants argued that the GMC proceedings were tainted by direct race discrimination because the GMC had not pursued another doctor, Dr Strommer, who had worked at the practice. They also challenged factual findings, reasoning, the disparity between the sanctions and the rejection of conditions of practice.

The appeal followed earlier interim and judicial review proceedings, including refusal of permission to challenge the MPTS abuse-of-process decision. The central issues were whether the appeal grounds could be re-litigated, whether the MPTS had applied the correct discrimination test and whether its factual and sanction decisions were legally flawed.

1. Res judicata. The court declined to determine whether issue estoppel, cause of action estoppel or abuse of process barred Grounds 1–5. The effect of Tomlinson and the interaction between earlier judicial review proceedings and a statutory appeal had not been fully argued. The grounds were therefore considered substantively.
2. Discrimination and procedural fairness. The MPTS was not required, without a request from the appellants, to initiate a further investigation into the GMC decision-makers’ knowledge of Dr Strommer’s race or into his ethnicity. The Tribunal had heard submissions over more than one day and was entitled to decide the application on the evidence before it. Its reasons were adequate.
3. Burden of proof. Section 136 of the Equality Act 2010 requires a claimant first to establish facts from which discrimination could be inferred. If that burden is discharged, the respondent must explain the treatment and satisfy the tribunal that race played no part. Although the MPTS could have stated the stages more clearly, it addressed both stages. Since the appellants could not establish that the GMC knew Dr Strommer’s race, the first stage failed.
4. Comparator. Dr Strommer was not an appropriate comparator under section 23(1) of the Equality Act 2010. There was no evidence that he knew of the caretaker change, defied a warning, obstructed Federated4Health or participated in the adverse evidence before the FTT. The MPTS was entitled to find that there was no reason to bring proceedings against him.
5. Facts and sanction. The MPTS was entitled to find that the appellants obstructed the new caretaker and delivered patient services, and its findings were not inconsistent or inadequately reasoned. Separate consideration of each sanction was proper. The different periods reflected the different allegations proved. Given the seriousness of the misconduct, suspension was within the permissible range and there was no basis for substituting conditions of practice.
6. The appeal was dismissed.

• High Court (Administrative Court): appeal under section 40 of the Medical Act 1983 dismissed.
• Medical Practitioners Tribunal Service: found misconduct and impairment of fitness to practise, imposing suspension for three months on the first appellant and two months on the second.
• Administrative Court: earlier interim suspension challenge refused in [2020] EWHC 39 (Admin). A later judicial review challenge to the abuse-of-process decision was refused permission on the papers and subsequently withdrawn.