GW, R (on the application of) v Dudley Metropolitan Borough Council

This case concerned the meaning and application of "child in need" under section 17 Children Act 1989 for children in families with no recourse to public funds (NRPF), and whether the defendant local authority's April 2025 assessment of the claimant child was lawful. The judge reviewed the interplay between s.17 (a target duty to assess and, where appropriate, provide services), the position of Potential Victims of Trafficking (PVoTs) receiving Modern Slavery Victim Care Contract payments, and parallel homelessness and asylum support schemes (including s.122 IAA and s.61 NBA 2022).

The court rejected the claimant's principal challenges. First, the assessment did not unlawfully apply a "destitution" threshold to the s.17(10) test. Second, the assessment took a sufficiently forward-looking approach to the family's housing situation and did not unlawfully apply a homelessness threshold as a legal bar to s.17 support. Third, while part of the assessment (para.128) had unhelpful wording about repatriation, that wording was immaterial to the outcome and did not amount to an unlawful requirement that the family leave the United Kingdom; the assessment did not unlawfully pre-empt the NRM process or the protection in s.61 NBA. Finally, the cumulative irrationality challenge failed. Permission to appeal was refused and the claim was dismissed.

Background and parties: GW is a ten-year-old child represented by his mother RM as litigation friend. The family are Zimbabwean nationals who came to the United Kingdom in 2023 on RM's skilled care worker visa which carries a no recourse to public funds condition. RM was accepted by the National Referral Mechanism (NRM) on reasonable grounds as a Potential Victim of Trafficking; she receives limited weekly PVoT payments. The family have complex financial and housing difficulties and faced a notice seeking possession in March 2025. The defendant is Dudley Metropolitan Borough Council.

Nature of the claim and relief sought: This was a claim for judicial review of the local authority's April 9, 2025 section 17 Children Act assessment. The claimant sought quashing of that assessment on four grounds and consequential relief (interim relief had been sought earlier but not granted).

Procedural posture: Permission litigation was protracted. An earlier judicial review, issued October 2024, was withdrawn on terms requiring reassessment. The April 9, 2025 reassessment followed and additional grounds of challenge were issued on 14 April 2025. HHJ Rawlings and then HHJ Tindal dealt with permission applications; permission was granted on the additional grounds and the claim was expedited to a hearing on 9 July 2025. Judgment was handed down on 14 August 2025 ([2025] EWHC 2140 (Admin)).

Issues framed by the court:

• Ground 1: whether the authority applied an unlawful "destitution" threshold when deciding the child was not "in need" under s.17(10) CA;
• Ground 2: whether the assessment failed to take a forward-looking approach to housing risk, improperly treated the existence of a landlord defence as decisive, or wrongly treated homelessness thresholds from housing law as determinative of s.17 need;
• Ground 3: whether the authority wrongly relied on voluntary return to Zimbabwe as a basis to refuse s.17 support and thereby unlawfully interfered with RM's pending NRM/status and protection under s.61 NBA;
• Ground 4: irrationality (either cumulatively if other grounds succeeded or as a freestanding challenge).

Court's reasoning and conclusions:

• Statutory and guiding principles: the judge rehearsed the statutory test in s.17(10)-(11) CA and the established authorities that s.17 is a target duty to assess, not an absolute duty to provide all services; assessments require a holistic, forward-looking evaluation of welfare and alternative provision (including "Early Help") and must avoid imposing sharp-edged exclusions (for example equating s.17 need to destitution or to homelessness law thresholds). The court also summarised the limited scope of asylum support and the separate MSVCC support for PVoTs.
• Ground 1: the April assessment was a detailed, holistic professional judgment that considered family circumstances, health, schooling, existing support and finances. Reading the assessment fairly and practically, the judge concluded it did not err in law by applying a destitution threshold; the social worker had rejected the parents' assertion of destitution after analysis and provided some ongoing non-statutory assistance (food vouchers etc.).
• Ground 2: the assessment acknowledged the s.8 notice and analysed the risk of possession. The judge accepted the assessment was forward-looking at the date it was produced (9 April 2025) and was entitled to conclude that, at that time, the risk of imminent street homelessness requiring immediate s.17 accommodation had not crystallised. The assessment's references to a likely defence to possession were not legally decisive and did not amount to unlawfully importing homelessness thresholds from housing law into s.17.
• Ground 3: paragraphs of the assessment suggesting support to repatriate were poorly drafted (para.128) and should not have used language suggesting the family were "required" to accept repatriation. However, read as a whole the assessment did not unlawfully require the family to leave the UK or pre-empt the NRM or protections in s.61 NBA; the flawed paragraph was immaterial to the decision and would not have changed the outcome.
• Ground 4: the cumulative irrationality argument failed because the judge found no material errors in the assessment (save the regrettable but immaterial para.128) and social work judgments are entitled to respect; the assessment was neither procedurally unfair nor so unreasonable as to be Wednesbury irrational.

Outcome and costs: The claim was dismissed. Permission to appeal was refused. The judge made the otherwise agreed order including legal aid costs.

The claim is dismissed. The April 9, 2025 s.17 Children Act assessment was a lawful, holistic professional judgment. The authority did not apply an unlawful "destitution" or homelessness threshold to the statutory s.17(10) test; it adopted a sufficiently forward-looking approach to housing risk; and an unfortunate paragraph suggesting repatriation (para.128) was immaterial and did not amount to requiring the family to leave the United Kingdom or to pre-empt NRM protections. No ground of irrationality or other public law error was made out. Permission to appeal was refused.

Permission history and interlocutory steps are described in the judgment. The claimant obtained permission for the initial judicial review in October 2024; the parties agreed at a hearing before HHJ Worster on 10 December 2024 to withdraw that claim on condition of a reassessment by 9 January 2025. The reassessment was produced on 9 April 2025. Additional grounds were issued on 14 April 2025. HHJ Rawlings refused permission on an unlawful delay ground on 17 April 2025 as academic but made directions. After summary grounds of defence and a further permission hearing, HHJ Tindal granted permission on the additional grounds and expedited the claim to a substantive hearing on 9 July 2025. Judgment on the substantive claim was handed down by HHJ Tindal on 14 August 2025 ([2025] EWHC 2140 (Admin)).