Jacob Meagher v The Chancellor, Masters and Scholars of the University of Cambridge & Ors

The court considered an appeal against a case management decision striking out claims brought against five individual university employees under section 110 of the Equality Act 2010 and striking particular contractual and tortious particulars which sought to rely on recommendations made by the University's Disability Resource Centre (the ADRC). The judge below had struck out the claims against the Individuals as an abuse of process under CPR 3.4(b) applying the "not worth the candle" principle derived from Jameel v Dow Jones and related authorities, on the basis that their continued joinder added cost and complexity but no substantive benefit because the institutional decisions underpinning the case would be actionable against the University under section 109. The High Court upheld that exercise of case management discretion as within the permitted range and not plainly wrong, but found error in the striking out of two pleaded particulars (paragraphs 69(3) and 70(3)) which relied on the ADRC's recommendations as a factual basis for parallel contractual and tortious duties and which did not improperly import the statutory reasonable adjustments duty into contract or tort.

Background and parties:

• The claimant, a PhD student at the University of Cambridge, alleged disability discrimination and victimisation under the Equality Act 2010, breach of contract and breach of duty of care arising from the conduct of his thesis viva and related processes. He sought damages, declarations and injunctive relief. Five named individuals (chairs/co-chairs and an OSCCA head) were joined as defendants alongside the University.

Procedural posture: This appeal challenges HHJ Duddridge's case management decision (heard 19–20 March 2024) to strike out the claims against the Individuals as an abuse of process and to refuse two particular pleadings (paragraphs 69(3) and 70(3)). The claimant appealed to the High Court.

Nature of application and issues before the court:

1. whether the strike-out of the claims against the Individuals was an abuse of process under CPR 3.4(b), applying the Jameel "not worth the candle" principle and proportionality in case management;
2. whether the judge below misapplied sections 109 and 110 of the Equality Act 2010 or otherwise misdirected on law in treating the application of Jameel-type reasoning to a multi-defendant discrimination case; and
3. whether paragraphs 69(3) and 70(3) of the Amended Particulars of Claim, which pleaded breach of contract and duty of care in respect of the University’s failure to follow ADRC recommendations for the viva, were properly struck out as impermissibly importing the statutory reasonable adjustments duty into contract or tort.

Court’s reasoning:

• The court reiterated the wide case management discretion conferred by the CPR and the narrow scope for appellate interference: error in law, procedural unfairness, reliance on irrelevant matters, failure to take into account relevant matters, or a decision plainly wrong.
• The court accepted that it was open in principle to apply proportionality and the Jameel line of authority to a discrimination claim in the County Court subject to CPR. The judge below did not misdirect in law in considering whether continuation against the Individuals was proportionate.
• The judge had correctly identified that the pleaded case targeted institutional committee decisions for which the University would be liable under section 109; the Individuals were sued principally because of their committee roles rather than for distinct personal acts of discrimination. Given that (i) injunctive relief would sensibly be directed at the University, (ii) damages would be paid by the University, and (iii) little, if any, additional substantive benefit would flow from separate proceedings against the Individuals, the judge was entitled to conclude that joinder of the Individuals added disproportionate cost and complexity and amounted to abuse of process in this rare case.
• However, the judge was wrong to strike paragraphs 69(3) and 70(3). Those particulars alleged that the University breached pleaded contractual and tortious duties by failing to implement ADRC recommendations. That pleaded factual basis is distinct from importing the statutory reasonable adjustments duty directly into contract or tort (which would offend the Smeaton principle). The particulars therefore should not have been struck out.

Disposition: the appeal was allowed in part: the strike-out of the Individuals was upheld, but the striking of paragraphs 69(3) and 70(3) was held to be erroneous and those particulars should be reinstated.

The appeal is allowed in part. The judge below was entitled to strike out the claims against the Second to Sixth Defendants as an abuse of process under CPR 3.4(b) because their joinder added disproportionate cost and complexity while providing no substantive additional benefit to the claimant; that case management exercise was not plainly wrong. However, the judge erred in striking out paragraphs 69(3) and 70(3) of the Amended Particulars of Claim: allegations that the University breached pleaded contractual and tortious duties by failing to implement ADRC recommendations do not impermissibly import the statutory duty to make reasonable adjustments into contract or tort and should be reinstated.

Appeal from a case management decision of HHJ Duddridge (heard 19–20 March 2024) striking out parts of the claimant's Amended Particulars of Claim. No neutral citation for the decision below is given in the judgment.