Anna Christie v Mary Ward Legal Centre & Anor

A barrister’s duty is governed by the ordinary professional negligence standard. The barrister is not required to advance every point requested by a client, or to advise on every theoretical claim. Liability arises only where no reasonably competent practitioner, exercising ordinary care, would have omitted the advice or argument.

A solicitor may rely on specialist counsel’s advice, but must exercise independent judgment. The extent of permissible reliance depends on the solicitor’s own expertise and the subject matter.

Forfeiture waiver rules distinguish rent from service charges. A demand for rent accruing after the relevant breach ordinarily waives forfeiture, whereas service-charge demands require an objective assessment of whether the conduct unequivocally recognises the lease’s continuance.

The claimant alleged professional negligence against a law centre and barrister arising from possession proceedings brought by Southwark London Borough Council for non-payment of service charges. She contended that the defendants should have advanced waiver, relief-from-forfeiture, service-charge loan, benefits and public-law arguments, and should have prevented the sale of her leasehold flat.

The claimant sold the flat after a possession order, preserving the sale proceeds but losing the property. The claim also raised causation, limitation and valuation issues. The court tried the allegations against both defendants and considered whether the defendants’ advice and conduct fell below the applicable professional standards.

1. Claim dismissed. The court found that neither defendant was negligent.
2. A barrister’s duty is assessed by whether no reasonably competent barrister practising in the relevant field, acting with ordinary care, would have failed to give the advice or plead the point. A mere error of judgment is insufficient. The duty may extend to closely related relief-from-forfeiture issues, even where the instructions principally concern a defence.
3. A barrister is not bound by the client’s wishes and must not advance a contention which the barrister does not consider properly arguable. The proposed judicial-review, benefits and service-charge-loan arguments were hopeless or had only negligible prospects. The waiver arguments based on the weekly payments and discontinuance were also properly rejected or, at most, had negligible prospects.
4. The 2012 rent invoice would have afforded a complete waiver defence because it demanded rent accruing after the relevant breach. However, the court found that neither defendant had received it or knew of it. The barrister was not negligent in failing to investigate rent demands because he was not put on enquiry, the claimant had not disclosed them, and Southwark’s evidence stated that no rent had been demanded.
5. The solicitor-reliance principle is not mechanical. A solicitor may ordinarily rely on properly obtained specialist advice, but must exercise independent judgment. The law centre specialised in debt, housing and vulnerable clients but lacked significant technical experience of lease forfeiture. It was entitled to rely on the barrister’s advice about forfeiture and waiver, while independently discharging its duties on the other issues.
6. On causation, a claimant must prove on the balance of probabilities that she would have pursued the omitted claim or defence, and then show that it had a real and substantial, rather than negligible, prospect of success. The proposed arguments failed that threshold. The court also held, alternatively, that loss of a viable defence would have constituted actionable damage when the possession order was made, making the claim out of time.
7. Any valuation claim would have failed. The flat was sold at market value, later market appreciation was outside the scope of the defendants’ duties, and the claimant’s decision not to purchase an alternative property broke the causal chain or made the loss too remote. Permission to appeal the ruling on quantum evidence was refused.

The judgment records earlier interlocutory decisions in the same litigation, including Christie v Mary Ward Legal Centre (No.1) and Christie v Mary Ward Legal Centre (No.2). Those decisions were not the subject of the present merits determination.