Anna Christie v Mary Ward Legal Centre & Anor

This is a first‑instance professional negligence claim arising from possession/forfeiture proceedings brought by Southwark London Borough Council against the claimant. The court held that neither the instructed barrister (D2) nor the Mary Ward Legal Centre (D1) were negligent. Key legal themes were a barrister’s duty when advising on arguable points (including the distinction between error and negligence), a solicitor’s entitlement to rely on specialist counsel where appropriate, the law of forfeiture and waiver (including the distinction between demands/acceptance of rent and of service charges), causation in lost‑chance litigation and limitation.

Material grounds for the decision included:

• The decisive factual finding that the claimant had not produced the 2011–2013 “Rent Invoices” to her solicitors or counsel, so counsel had not seen the 2012 invoice which would have created a strong waiver defence.
• Counsel (Mr Dymond) gave competent, candid advice: he fairly identified that payments of pre‑existing service‑charge arrears and the factual matrix made waiver by acceptance unlikely, and advised sale or seeking an adjournment to permit sale; that advice was not negligent.
• The law distinguishes payment or demand of rent (which commonly effects waiver) from payment/demand of service charges; the 2012 rent demand, had it been available, would have been significant, but it was not disclosed to advisers.
• Several potential alternative relief routes (service‑charge loan, Employment and Support Allowance leverage, transfer to judicial review) were either inapplicable or practically bound to fail and so carried no compensable loss.
• Even if a negligent omission had occurred, causation failed because the lost arguments either had negligible prospects of success or were speculative nuisance claims; limitation also operates because actionable damage crystallised by the possession order on 28 June 2013.

Background and parties: The claimant (a litigant in person at trial) sued Mary Ward Legal Centre (D1) and Mr Andrew Dymond (D2), a barrister, for professional negligence arising from possession proceedings brought by Southwark LBC against the claimant as long leaseholder of Flat 28, Pallant House. Southwark sought forfeiture for unpaid service‑charge judgments. The claimant sold the flat on 30 July 2013 after a possession order was made on 28 June 2013 and alleges negligent advice caused her to lose an asset which has since increased in value.

Nature of the claim / relief sought: The claimant sought damages for loss resulting from alleged negligent advice and conduct by D1 and D2 in relation to the possession/forfeiture proceedings, including loss equal to the difference between the sale price and present market value, plus other consequential losses.

Procedural posture: The claim was issued 15 July 2019. There were extensive interlocutory steps and earlier appeals concerning summary judgment and limitation (including Christie (No.1) [2023] EWHC 1814 (KB) and Christie (No.2) [2023] EWHC 1994 (KB) (reported [2024] PNLR 2)). The trial took place in January 2025 before HHJ Tindal (sitting as a High Court judge).

Issues framed by the court:

• Alleged negligence of counsel: eligibility for a service‑charge loan under the SCLR; entitlement to ESA/Housing Benefit leverage; transfer to administrative court (judicial review); invalidity of notice of forfeiture; whether Southwark waived its right to forfeit (by accepting £20 weekly payments, by discontinuing earlier proceedings, or by issuing later rent demands/invoices).
• Alleged negligence of the Law Centre: whether D1 reasonably relied on counsel; whether D1 failed to advise the claimant about SCLR, ESA, or judicial review.
• Causation: whether the claimant would have run particular defences or relief applications and whether those had a real and substantial (not merely negligible) prospect of success.
• Limitation and valuation of loss.

Court’s reasoning and findings:

• Findings of fact: the claimant, while honest, was under severe stress and habitually left Southwark post unopened; on balance the court found she did not hand to D1 the 2011–2013 Rent Invoices and so neither D1 nor D2 saw them. Counsel candidly accepted that had he seen the 2012 rent demand he would have advanced a waiver defence.
• Standard of care: the court applied authorities on barristers’ professional duty (including distinction between error and negligence), and recognised solicitors may in appropriate circumstances rely on counsel’s specialist advice but must exercise independent judgment.
• Liability conclusions: Mr Dymond’s advice was not negligent — his analysis of waiver (acceptance/demand of rent versus service‑charge payments), relief against forfeiture principles (s.146 Law of Property Act 1925 and s.81 Housing Act 1996) and practical prospects for loans were legally sound and realistically assessed; Mary Ward Legal Centre was not negligent, having been entitled to rely on specialist counsel and having acted reasonably within its specialist housing/debt remit.
• Causation and limitation: alternative routes (loans, ESA leverage, judicial review) were bound to fail or only had negligible prospects, so no compensable loss was shown; the claimant’s actionable damage in relation to any lost defence crystallised by the possession order of 28 June 2013, so limitation applied to the claim issued in July 2019.
• Valuation: experts agreed the sale price in July 2013 was the market value; later increases in value fell outside the scope of the defendants’ duties or were too remote, so no recoverable uplift was awarded.

Result: the claim was dismissed in its entirety; the judge recorded that defendants’ advisers had given competent advice that enabled the claimant to protect the equity in her property and exonerated them of wrongdoing.

The claim is dismissed. The court found that neither Mr Dymond (D2) nor the Mary Ward Legal Centre (D1) were negligent. Central to that conclusion were findings that the claimant did not disclose the critical 2011–2013 Rent Invoices to her advisers (so counsel could not and did not rely on the 2012 rent demand that would have supported a waiver defence), that counsel’s legal advice (including on waiver, relief from forfeiture and practical prospects for loans) was competent and honest, and that the Law Centre was entitled to and properly relied on specialist counsel and acted within its professional duties. In addition, causation and limitation principles meant the claimant had not proved compensable loss in any event.

There were two interlocutory appeals before the trial: Christie v Mary Ward Legal Centre (No.1) [2023] EWHC 1814 (KB) concerning reliance on counsel and summary‑judgment issues, and Christie v Mary Ward Legal Centre (No.2) [2023] EWHC 1994 (KB) (reported [2024] PNLR 2) concerning limitation. The substantive negligence claim was then tried in the High Court (King’s Bench Division) resulting in this judgment of 17 February 2025.