Notting Hill Genesis v Omed Kakpur

The court continued an interim anti-social behaviour injunction made under the Anti-Social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014. The judge found that the defendant had engaged in conduct causing harassment, alarm or distress and housing-related nuisance, including abusive and threatening communications and spitting at premises, and that there was a real risk of recurrence. The court was satisfied that the statutory tests in s.1 and s.2 of the 2014 Act were met and that continuation of the s.7 interim injunction, including the s.4 power of arrest, was necessary and proportionate having regard to human rights (Human Rights Act 1998 s.12) and equality considerations (Equality Act 2010).

The judge accepted service had been properly effected, noted evidence from the defendant’s GP about his vulnerability and lack of fitness to attend court, and recorded that the defendant should be given an opportunity to obtain legal aid. For these reasons the judge declined to make a final two-year order and instead continued the interim order in its existing terms for four months, with liberty to apply and an expectation of a return hearing around three months.

This was a first-instance High Court hearing to consider continuation of an interim injunction made without notice on 30 January 2025 by DHCJ Richard Spearman KC under s.7 of the Anti-Social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014. The claimant, a housing provider, sought continuation (and had sought a two-year final injunction) to prevent the defendant from harassing, intimidating or causing nuisance to its staff and from attending the landlord’s offices. The defendant did not attend and was unrepresented; the court was satisfied he had been served.

The court reviewed witness evidence from the claimant (including the CEO and an assistant director) documenting a pattern of abusive and threatening communications (including explicit threats and references to killing), repeated calls, texts and voicemails, and incidents of spitting at the landlord’s offices. The defendant’s GP provided reports and emails describing trauma and vulnerability and stating that the defendant was not medically fit to attend court. The claimant confirmed it had provided a clear statement in its application about the defendant’s entitlement to seek legal aid and that it would provide contact details of legal aid firms.

The issues were (i) whether the statutory threshold for an injunction under the 2014 Act (s.1 and s.2) remained satisfied, (ii) whether the s.4 power of arrest should continue and, if so, whether it should be limited, (iii) whether the order should be made final or allowed to lapse, and (iv) whether procedural safeguards (service, legal aid opportunity, s.12 Human Rights Act consideration, equality and capacity issues) had been observed.

The judge concluded that the statutory criteria were satisfied on the evidence and that continuation of the interim order was necessary and proportionate in light of the real risk of harm and the severe impact on staff. The judge applied a strict necessity and proportionality assessment given the engagement of Convention rights, took account of the defendant’s vulnerability and legal aid needs, and followed authority on treating the s.4(1)(a)/(b) limbs conjunctively in the without-notice context. The judge therefore continued the interim order, unchanged, for four months, retained the power of arrest for the whole injunction, included liberty to apply and directed that the matter be listed for a hearing after about three months to allow the defendant time to obtain representation or to advance material.

The court continued the interim injunction made under s.7 of the Anti-Social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 for a period of four months and retained the s.4 power of arrest in respect of the whole order. The judge held that the statutory tests in s.1 and s.2 were satisfied by evidence of harassment, threats and housing-related nuisance and that continuation was necessary and proportionate given the risk of recurrence, the impact on staff and the need to protect safety. The judge declined to make a final two-year order because of the defendant’s vulnerability and lack of representation, instead preserving the defendant’s rights by granting liberty to apply and affording time to seek legal aid.