Notting Hill Genesis v Omed Kakpur

An interim anti-social behaviour injunction may be continued where the statutory conditions are satisfied and the evidence establishes a real risk of repetition. The court must assess whether continuation is just and convenient, applying the balance of convenience and justice. Where Convention rights and significant personal circumstances are engaged, the court should apply strict necessity and proportionality. Restrictions must be tailored so that legitimate protection is secured while a clear channel of communication remains available. A power of arrest may extend to the whole injunction where the statutory conditions concerning threatened violence and significant risk of harm are both satisfied.

The claimant, a housing provider, sought continuation of an interim injunction made under the Anti-Social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014. The injunction restricted the defendant’s attendance at the claimant’s offices, his communications with the claimant and its staff, and threatening, intimidating, abusive or nuisance conduct. It included a power of arrest.

The defendant did not attend or obtain representation. The court considered evidence concerning his conduct, his personal circumstances and medical information, together with the claimant’s evidence of threats, abuse and their impact on staff. The issue was whether the interim injunction and power of arrest should lapse, be varied, or continue, and whether the matter should proceed to a final order.

1. Interim relief continued. The court declined to make a final order because the defendant’s circumstances and absence meant that fairness required the matter to remain at the interim stage. The order was continued for four months on its existing terms.
2. The statutory criteria for continuation under the Anti-Social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 were satisfied. The defendant had engaged in conduct causing, and likely to cause, harassment, alarm and distress, and in conduct capable of causing housing-related nuisance or annoyance. There was a very real risk of repetition despite his apology.
3. It was just and convenient to continue the injunction. The court applied the balance of convenience and justice, together with a strict test of necessity and proportionality because freedom of expression and the defendant’s circumstances were engaged. The restrictions were tailored and preserved clear, identifiable means for communicating with the landlord.
4. The power of arrest was properly continued for the whole injunction. Following the approach in Moat Housing Group South Ltd v Harris [2005] EWCA Civ 287, [2006] QB 606, the court treated the statutory limbs as cumulative in the without-notice context. Both were satisfied: the conduct included threatened violence, and there was a significant risk of harm to other persons. There was no basis for limiting the duration or scope of the power of arrest.
5. The case was to return after approximately three months, with liberty to apply enabling either party, particularly the defendant, to seek earlier variation or discharge.

This was a first-instance application. On 30 January 2025, DHCJ Richard Spearman KC made an interim injunction order, with a return date of 28 February 2025 and an expiry date of 3 March 2025. Fordham J continued the interim order for four months and declined to make a final order.