Chanel Limited v Charlotte Skeens

On an application for interim injunctive relief, the court applied the American Cyanamid principles. A serious question to be tried, likely irreparable harm, and a balance of convenience favouring protection of confidential information and reputation justified relief.

Where publication engages freedom of expression, Human Rights Act 1998, section 12(3) requires sufficient assurance that publication should not be allowed. The required likelihood may be lower where disclosure would have extremely serious consequences.

Existing court undertakings, particularly those given with legal advice and supported by a penal notice, carry substantial weight. A mandatory order removing online material may be granted where leaving it available would materially increase the risk of harm.

Chanel Limited applied for interim injunctions against Charlotte Skeens. The application followed a Consent Order and New Settlement Agreement under which Ms Skeens undertook not to disclose confidential information or make derogatory statements concerning Chanel.

Chanel alleged that a TikTok video published shortly afterwards breached those undertakings. Ms Skeens raised issues concerning her capacity to enter the settlement and contended that the video contained protected disclosures under the Employment Rights Act 1996.

The court considered prohibitory and mandatory relief, confidentiality of hearing papers, and service by email. The central issues were whether interim relief was justified, whether the proposed disclosures were protected, and whether the injunction was compatible with freedom of expression.

1. Interim relief. The stay imposed by the Consent Order was lifted to permit enforcement proceedings. Applying American Cyanamid Co v Ethicon Ltd, the court found a serious question to be tried concerning breach of the undertakings. The issues of capacity and protected disclosure required determination at trial.
2. Damages would not be an adequate remedy for Chanel because continued publication of confidential information and derogatory statements could cause serious and difficult-to-quantify harm to its reputation, brand and business. Chanel’s cross-undertaking in damages was capable of performance, whereas Ms Skeens’s financial position was uncertain.
3. The balance of convenience favoured Chanel. The restriction was confined to the allegedly prohibited material and did not prevent general social-media activity or earning a living. The prior undertakings and the need to uphold court orders carried significant weight.
4. The court was not persuaded, at the interim stage, that the TikTok constituted protected disclosure. Under sections 43G and 43G(2) of the Employment Rights Act 1996, there was insufficient evidence of a reasonable belief in the substantial truth of the broad allegations, and the evidence suggested possible personal gain. The relevant gateway conditions and the reasonableness of using public social media were also unresolved or unsatisfied.
5. Section 43H required an exceptionally serious failure and reasonableness in making the disclosure to the recipient. The allegations did not, at this stage, meet that threshold, particularly because other channels existed.
6. Under section 12(3) of the Human Rights Act 1998, the court was satisfied that Chanel was likely to establish at trial that publication should not be allowed. Following ABC v Telegraph Media Group Ltd, a lower degree of likelihood could suffice where the consequences of disclosure were extremely serious.
7. The court granted prohibitory relief and ordered removal of the TikTok. Its rapidly increasing audience meant that leaving it online would exacerbate potential harm. The temporary removal was not irreversible, and the risk of injustice to Chanel outweighed the interim risk to Ms Skeens.
8. Limited redactions to protect confidential information in the hearing papers were justified and proportionate. Service of the application, evidence and resulting order by email was permitted in the circumstances, applying the principle stated in MBR Acres Ltd v Maher.