Catherine Thiam v Richmond Housing Partnership

The appeal concerned a possession order made by HHJ Luba KC in respect of a residential assured tenancy under the Housing Act 1988, relying on Schedule 2 grounds including Ground 8 (rent arrears), Ground 14 (anti-social behaviour) and Ground 13 (deterioration of the premises). The key legal question was whether the landlord's decision to seek possession amounted to unlawful 'discrimination arising from disability' within the meaning of section 15 of the Equality Act 2010 and, if so, whether the treatment was justified as a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim under section 15(1)(b).

The High Court dismissed the appeal. The court concluded that the Judge below had properly found the statutory grounds for possession proven and had correctly carried out an objective proportionality assessment under section 15(1)(b). The Judge’s conclusion that the social landlord had taken reasonable and proportionate steps — including multi-agency engagement and attempts to secure statutory support, and that specialist interventions or a Court of Protection application were not steps the landlord was obliged or reasonably able to take — was upheld.

Background and facts:

• The respondent landlord (Richmond Housing Partnership) sought possession of 5 Chaucer Avenue by an application first made on 21 October 2020. The tenancy was an assured tenancy under the Housing Act 1988. The landlord relied on multiple Schedule 2 grounds, including rent arrears and the condition of the property, which the judge found to be extremely poor as a result of hoarding and neglect.
• The tenant was found on medical evidence to be disabled within the meaning of the Equality Act 2010 (diagnoses discussed included delusional disorder and likely simple schizophrenia with associated hoarding disorder). The tenant did not dispute the factual grounds for possession at the hearing below.

Procedural posture and relief sought:

• This was an appeal against the order for possession made on 19 March 2024 by HHJ Luba KC at Central London County Court. The tenant, represented by the Official Solicitor as litigation friend, advanced a counterclaim and relied on section 7(4) of the Housing Act 1988 and section 15 of the Equality Act 2010, contending that the possession claim was discriminatory arising from disability and was not justified.

Issues framed by the court:

1. Whether the statutory grounds for possession (Schedule 2 Grounds 8, 12, 13 and 14) were made out.
2. Whether the landlord’s decision to seek possession constituted "discrimination arising from disability" under section 15 of the Equality Act 2010, and if so whether the decision was justified as a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim under section 15(1)(b).
3. Whether the landlord ought to have taken additional steps before issuing possession proceedings, specifically (a) engaging specialist hoarding services and (b) applying to the Court of Protection for orders enabling removal of possessions.

Court’s reasoning and decision:

• The judge below and the High Court found the Schedule 2 grounds proven, including that the premises were in an appalling condition such that Ground 13 was satisfied.
• The court accepted that the hoarding and related conduct arose in consequence of the tenant’s disability, so the justification limb of section 15 was decisive. The proportionality inquiry under section 15(1)(b) is objective and requires consideration of the landlord’s actions in context, including the landlord’s contractual position and limited powers compared with statutory agencies.
• The High Court held that the landlord had engaged reasonably and extensively with statutory agencies, attempted injunction and other lesser measures, and could not reasonably be expected to procure or finance specialist hoarding services or undertake speculative and costly Court of Protection litigation. The likely futility of specialist intervention without the tenant's consent or treatment reduced the weight of the suggestion that the landlord should have done more. An application to the Court of Protection by the landlord would have been speculative, resource-intensive and beyond what could reasonably be expected of a social landlord. On the facts the decision to seek possession was proportionate to legitimate aims such as protecting the health and safety of neighbours and ensuring the property was maintained.

The court therefore dismissed the appeal and discharged a prior interim order that had prevented execution of the possession order.

This was an appeal against a first-instance possession order. The appeal is dismissed. The court held that the lower court had correctly found the statutory Schedule 2 grounds for possession established and had properly applied section 15(1)(b) of the Equality Act 2010: the landlord had acted proportionately in context, having taken reasonable steps to engage statutory agencies and having no obligation or realistic ability to fund or compel specialist hoarding services or to pursue speculative Court of Protection proceedings. Accordingly the discrimination defence failed and the possession order stands; a prior interim restraint preventing execution of the possession order is discharged.

The possession claim was heard in Central London County Court where HHJ Luba KC made an order for possession on 19 March 2024. An interim order by Sir Stephen Stewart sealed on 29 July 2024 temporarily prevented execution of that possession order. The tenant appealed to the High Court (King’s Bench Division); the appeal was heard on 4 April 2025 and the judgment dismissing the appeal was handed down on 16 April 2025 ([2025] EWHC 933 (KB)).