Catherine Thiam v Richmond Housing Partnership

For discrimination arising from disability under section 15 of the Equality Act 2010, proportionality is assessed objectively and in the round. The court must consider the unfavourable treatment, the claimant’s disability, the circumstances addressed by the defendant, and the relevant legal and practical context.

The alleged discriminator’s state of mind about the causal connection between the disability and the conduct is not determinative. A social landlord is not ordinarily required to provide specialist intervention itself or to undertake speculative and expensive litigation in the Court of Protection before seeking possession. The assessment remains fact-sensitive and must recognise the landlord’s contractual role, resources, powers, and the likely effectiveness of proposed alternatives.

Richmond Housing Partnership obtained an order for possession against Catherine Thiam, an assured tenant, on rent arrears, anti-social behaviour, breaches of tenancy obligations, and the condition of the premises under the Housing Act 1988. The tenant accepted that the possession grounds were made out but argued that seeking possession constituted discrimination arising from disability under section 15 of the Equality Act 2010, and was disproportionate.

HHJ Luba KC rejected the defence and counterclaim. The appeal concerned whether the landlord’s failure to recognise the causal link initially, engage specialist hoarding services, or apply to the Court of Protection made possession disproportionate.

1. Appeal dismissed. The order for possession made by HHJ Luba KC on 19 March 2024 was upheld. The interim order preventing execution of that possession order was discharged.
2. Section 15(1)(b) of the Equality Act 2010 requires an objective assessment of whether the unfavourable treatment was a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim. The issue must be considered in the round, having regard to the nature of the treatment, the claimant’s disability, the conduct or state of affairs being addressed, the defendant’s acts and omissions, and the surrounding context.
3. The assessment must proceed on the assumption that the relevant conduct was connected with the disability. Whether the alleged discriminator recognised that connection when acting is a matter of process rather than substance and is not determinative of proportionality.
4. RHP’s legitimate aims included protecting the health and safety of neighbouring residents, preventing nuisance and vermin, maintaining its premises, and enforcing tenancy obligations. Its role was that of a social landlord, not a statutory social-services authority. Section 15(1)(b) did not require it to engage specialist hoarding services itself, particularly where it had referred the tenant to statutory agencies, had attempted other interventions, and specialist assistance depended on the tenant’s consent.
5. Nor did proportionality require RHP to make a speculative Court of Protection application. Capacity was not established, the appropriate order was uncertain, and the proposed litigation would have involved significant legal and expert costs beyond what could reasonably be expected of a landlord.
6. The court distinguished A Local Authority v X [2023] EWCOP 64. That case concerned temporary accommodation and removal of possessions as part of a best-interests decision, whereas the proposed application here would have been an application by a landlord for permission to enter premises and remove the tenant’s possessions.

• Central London County Court: HHJ Luba KC granted RHP possession on 19 March 2024, relying on Grounds 8, 12, 13 and 14 of Schedule 2 to the Housing Act 1988, and rejected the disability-discrimination defence and counterclaim.
• High Court (King’s Bench Division): The appeal was dismissed. The possession order was upheld and interim protection against execution was discharged.