Sonia Gould & Anor, R (on the application of) v Devon County Council

The claim was a judicial review challenge to a cabinet decision of Devon County Council to close the North Devon Link Service. The principal legal issues were whether the council had failed to take into account statutory duties (in particular sections 2, 3 and 5 of the Care Act 2014 and section 2B of the National Health Service Act 2006) or relevant policies (including the One Devon Integrated Care Strategy under section 116B of the Local Government and Public Involvement in Health Act 2007), and whether the Decision was irrational.

The court applied the CREEDNZ/Fewings tripartite framework for mandatory/forbidden/discretionary considerations and the test of obvious materiality for challenges to failures to take discretionary considerations into account. The claimant users had not proved that the Service in practice performed a crisis-prevention role or materially reduced suicide risk to the extent alleged; the defendant’s factual understanding of the Service was at least open to it. On that basis the statutory duties and policies invoked were not shown to be obviously material to the decision in the required sense, and the cabinet were not shown to have been required by statute to treat them as mandatory considerations. The Decision therefore was not unlawful or irrational in the ways alleged.

Accordingly the claim was dismissed.

The claimants, two long-standing users of the North Devon Link Service, sought judicial review of Devon County Council’s cabinet decision of 13 March 2024 to close three Link drop-in centres. They alleged (1) failure to take into account statutory duties under the Care Act 2014 (sections 2, 3 and 5) and section 2B of the National Health Service Act 2006, and failure to have regard to the One Devon Integrated Care Strategy (ICS) under section 116B of the Local Government and Public Involvement in Health Act 2007 and certain local suicide-prevention documents; and (2) irrationality of the Decision, including that it proceeded on a mistaken factual basis as to the role of the Service.

Procedural posture: first-instance judicial review in the Administrative Court (permission originally granted on multiple grounds; some claimants/grounds later discontinued).

Relief sought: interim injunctions to prevent implementation and final relief to quash the Decision.

Issues framed by the court:

• the approach to factual disputes in judicial review;
• whether the council misunderstood the Service’s role;
• whether the statutory duties were mandatory (CREEDNZ/Fewings category 1) or, alternatively, obviously material (category 3) considerations;
• the effect of R (DAT) v West Berkshire Council on whether members must be given express material about statutory duties;
• whether the council could be treated as having had regard to the alleged duties and policies; and
• whether the Decision was irrational and whether section 31(2A) Senior Courts Act 1981 precluded relief.

Court’s reasoning and findings:

• On primary facts the court applied the R(F) v Surrey approach to factual disputes in judicial review and concluded the claimants had not proved the Service in practice prevented crises or materially reduced the risk of self-harm or suicide; the defendant’s factual account of the Service (that it provided social, leisure and enabling support, not clinical or crisis services) was properly open to it.
• The court explained the applicable public law principles (CREEDNZ/Fewings categories and the obvious-materiality test for category 3). It held that DAT provides guidance about the level of explanation decision-makers must be given where statutory considerations are material, but does not convert broad target duties into always-mandatory considerations in every decision.
• The claimants were not permitted to expand their case at the hearing to allege that the council was exercising Care Act duties such that sections 2(2) and 5(2) became mandatory; their pleaded case was correctly read as asserting that the existence of those duties (and of the NHS Act duty) was an obviously material consideration or fell to be considered under the approach in DAT.
• On the facts as the court was entitled to accept, the Care Act duties and the NHS Act duty were not shown to be obviously material to the cabinet decision. The policies invoked (ICS, suicide-prevention plan, One Devon forward plan) were high-level and did not refer to the Link Service or similar drop-in provision, and so were not objectively relevant for the purposes of section 116B nor obviously material for rationality review.
• The court rejected the defendant’s submission that members were to be taken to have institutional knowledge sufficient to infer they had had regard to unreferenced duties or policies. Hollow was distinguishable on its facts. The defendant had not been shown to have failed to consider mandatory matters in substance.
• The Decision was therefore not irrational. The defendant’s conclusion to close the non-statutory Service, as part of county‑wide alignment and having regard to alternative community provision (including the Devon MHA), was within the range of rational choices. The court accordingly dismissed the claim. Section 31(2A) issues did not arise given dismissal.

The claim is dismissed. The court found that the claimants had not established that the council misunderstood the role of the Link Service; the statutory duties and policies relied on were not shown to be mandatory considerations for the Decision nor so obviously material that irrationality review required they be taken into account; and the Decision to close the non‑statutory Service was within the range of rational responses to the circumstances described in the Report.