Glasgow City Council v X (Scotland)

The Supreme Court considered the meaning of the phrase "taking into account the needs of the household" in article 4(b) of the Homeless Persons (Unsuitable Accommodation) (Scotland) Order 2014 and its interaction with the interim duty in section 29(1) of the Housing (Scotland) Act 1987. The court held that the interim duty requires local authorities to consider the accommodation needs of the applicant and each household member but does not require interim accommodation to meet all those needs in the way required of permanent accommodation under sections 31 and 32(5). The distinction between "taking into account" needs at the interim stage and "meeting" needs for permanent accommodation is decisive. Where the authority has taken those needs into account, the court's supervisory review is limited to rationality.

Applying this approach, the court concluded that Glasgow City Council had lawfully provided a four-apartment interim property in February 2021 despite an occupational-therapy report recommending five-apartment permanent accommodation; the authority had considered the household's needs and its decision fell within the range of reasonable decisions.

Background and parties:

• This was an appeal by a refugee applicant (the appellant) against the Inner House's decision rejecting a Lord Ordinary's order that the local authority (Glasgow City Council) was under an absolute duty to provide five-apartment temporary accommodation to meet the special needs of the appellant's son.
• The appellant and her husband, and four children (including a son with an autism diagnosis), were owed an interim duty by the respondent with effect from 4 February 2020. The respondent provided a four-apartment property as interim accommodation in February 2021. An occupational-therapy report dated 21 July 2021 recommended a five-apartment property to meet the son’s additional support needs.

Procedural history:

• The Lord Ordinary (Outer House) held the interim duty required a five-apartment property ([2022] CSOH 35; 2022 SLT 554). The Second Division of the Inner House reversed that decision ([2023] CSIH 7; 2023 SC 153). Leave to appeal to the Supreme Court was granted.

Nature of the claim and issues:

• The appellant sought to impugn the respondent's decision to secure the four-apartment interim accommodation as unsuitable. The central issue was the construction of article 4(b) of the 2014 Order and whether "taking into account the needs of the household" requires interim accommodation to meet all needs of the applicant and household members.

Court's reasoning and decision:

• The court applied established principles of statutory interpretation and read article 4(b) in the context of section 29 and the wider statutory scheme in Part II of the 1987 Act. It identified a clear legislative distinction between the interim duty under section 29 (which requires the authority to "secure" accommodation that is not unsuitable, article 4 applying "in all circumstances") and the permanent duty under section 31 (which requires permanent accommodation to "meet any special needs" under section 32(5)).
• That distinction reflects different statutory language: "taking into account" (a process obligation) at the interim stage versus an outcome duty to "meet" needs for permanent accommodation. The court rejected the appellant's argument that the 2020 amendment to article 4(b) was intended to equate the interim duty with the permanent duty.
• The court treated guidance and policy notes as secondary aids and held the statutory wording was clear; the guidance did not displace the statutory meaning. The court emphasised that the interim-stage decision is reviewable by reference to rationality: if the authority has taken the household’s needs into account and reached a decision within the range of reasonable responses, it will not be unlawful merely because some needs were not met.
• Applying those principles, the court found the respondent had considered the household's needs (including allocation enabling the son to have his own room by using the living room temporarily) and its decision was within the range of reasonable options. The appeal was dismissed.

Wider implications:

• The court stressed the practical realities of housing scarcity and the coherent operation of a two-stage statutory scheme, noting that different requirements at interim and permanent stages are sensible and workable.

Appeal dismissed. The court held that article 4(b) of the 2014 Order requires local authorities, when discharging the interim duty in section 29(1) of the Housing (Scotland) Act 1987, to take into account the accommodation needs of the applicant and each household member but does not require interim accommodation to meet all those needs as permanent accommodation must. Because the respondent had taken the household’s needs into account and its decision to provide four-apartment interim accommodation was within the range of reasonable decisions, the decision was lawful.

Lord Ordinary (Outer House) held interim duty required five-apartment accommodation: [2022] CSOH 35; 2022 SLT 554. Second Division, Inner House, reversed that decision: [2023] CSIH 7; 2023 SC 153. Leave to appeal to the Supreme Court granted; appeal dismissed by the Supreme Court [2025] UKSC 13.