Darwall and another v Dartmoor National Park Authority

This appeal concerned the construction of section 10(1) of the Dartmoor Commons Act 1985 and whether that provision confers on the public a right to pitch tents or otherwise make camp overnight on the Dartmoor Commons. The court held that the words "on foot and on horseback" describe the means by which access must be gained and do not limit the forms of "open-air recreation" that may be pursued once access has been obtained; camping falls within the ordinary meaning of "open-air recreation" and so is within the right created by section 10(1), subject to compliance with the Act and any rules, regulations or byelaws in force.

The court reached this conclusion by reference to the wording of section 10(1) read in its statutory context, including the National Parks and Access to the Countryside Act 1949 (notably sections 5, 59 and 60, and Schedule 2) and other provisions of the 1985 Act (for example sections 10(3), 10(4), 10(11), 11, 13 and 14). External aids relied on by the appellants (Hansard and Hobhouse reports) did not assist; the Pepper v Hart gateway was inapplicable because the provision was not ambiguous. The court also rejected reliance on subordinate byelaws as an interpretive aid, given the timing and provenance of those byelaws. The court observed procedural shortcomings in the first-instance declaration because the Attorney General had not been joined, but dismissed the appeal on the merits.

Background and parties. The appellants, farmers, landowners and commoners owning land at Blachford Manor on Dartmoor, sought a declaration that section 10(1) of the Dartmoor Commons Act 1985 does not confer on the public a right to camp on the Commons. The respondent is the Dartmoor National Park Authority (DNPA). The Open Spaces Society intervened in written observations.

Procedural history. The Chancellor of the High Court granted the appellants the declaration they sought: [2023] EWHC 35 (Ch); that decision was reversed by the Court of Appeal: [2023] EWCA Civ 927. The appellants appealed to the Supreme Court, which heard the appeal on 8 October 2024 and gave judgment on 21 May 2025.

Nature of the claim and relief sought. The appellants sought a declaratory judgment that section 10(1) of the 1985 Act does not grant the public a right to pitch tents or otherwise make camp overnight on the Dartmoor Commons; in other words they sought confirmation that camping remains trespass without landowner consent.

Issues framed by the court. (i) The primary issue was the proper construction of section 10(1) of the 1985 Act: whether the phrase "on foot and on horseback" limits the forms of open-air recreation protected (so excluding camping) or merely describes how access must be gained, with "open-air recreation" being wide enough to include camping. (ii) Secondary interpretive issues included the relevance of the 1949 Act context, prior statutory material (including the Law of Property Act 1925), Hansard and other external aids, the role of subordinate byelaws as an aid to construction, and whether the principle of legality required a restrictive reading. (iii) A procedural point was whether a declaration binding the public could properly be made without the Attorney General being joined to represent the public interest.

Reasoning and conclusion. The court applied normal principles of statutory interpretation: ascertain the meaning of the words in their context and having regard to purpose. Focusing first on the language of section 10(1), the court concluded that camping falls within the ordinary meaning of "open-air recreation" and that the words "on foot and on horseback" indicate how access must be gained rather than restricting the activities that may be pursued after access is obtained. That view was reinforced by the legislative context: the 1949 Act (sections 5, 59 and 60 and Schedule 2) shows the concept of open-air recreation is wide; provisions of the 1985 Act (including powers to make byelaws, to post notices under section 10(4), to consult recreational bodies under section 10(11) and the powers in sections 11, 13 and 14) are consistent only if "recreation" is given a wide meaning. Historical material such as section 193 of the Law of Property Act 1925 and the absence of an express exclusion of camping in the 1985 Act further supported this understanding.

The court rejected the appellants' attempts to rely on Hansard under Pepper v Hart because the statutory language was not ambiguous and concluded that the broader proposition of using parliamentary materials as background did not alter the ordinary meaning in this case. The byelaws made in 1989 were not treated as an interpretive aid because they were neither contemporaneous with the 1985 Act nor produced by the same governmental author. The principle of legality did not require a different construction because the statutory language was clear and the Act provided public regulatory mechanisms (byelaws, notices, wardens and enforcement powers) in return for the restrictions on owners' rights.

Procedural comment. The court noted that a declaration purporting to bind the public should normally include the Attorney General as a party to represent the public interest; the first-instance declaration had been made without the Attorney General and that was a procedural shortcoming, though it did not alter the substantive outcome here.

Disposition. The Supreme Court dismissed the appellants' appeal and upheld the Court of Appeal’s construction that section 10(1) permits camping on the Commons when access is gained on foot or on horseback and when applicable statutory rules or byelaws are complied with.

This was an appeal against the Court of Appeal’s decision. The appeal is dismissed. The Supreme Court held that section 10(1) of the Dartmoor Commons Act 1985 confers on members of the public a right of access to the Commons on foot and on horseback for the purpose of open-air recreation and that camping falls within the ordinary meaning of "open-air recreation". The words "on foot and on horseback" describe the means of access and do not restrict the kinds of recreation that may be pursued after access has been obtained. The right is subject to the 1985 Act and to compliance with any rules, regulations or byelaws; external aids relied upon by the appellants (Hansard, Hobhouse reports and the 1989 byelaws) did not justify a different construction, and the principle of legality did not require a restrictive reading. The court observed that a declaration purporting to bind the public ideally should have involved joinder of the Attorney General, but that procedural point did not alter the substantive dismissal of the appeal.

First instance: Chancellor (Chancery Division) granted the appellants a declaration: [2023] EWHC 35 (Ch); Court of Appeal reversed that decision: [2023] EWCA Civ 927; appeal to the Supreme Court: [2025] UKSC 20 (appeal dismissed).