Gray v Mulberry Co (Design) Ltd

A philosophical belief must satisfy the Grainger criteria, including a sufficient level of cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance. The threshold must not be set too high, but the fourth criterion properly focuses on the belief’s manifestation. An act motivated by a belief is not necessarily an expression of it.

Indirect discrimination under section 19 of the Equality Act 2010 requires group disadvantage. The provision, criterion or practice need not disadvantage every member of the group, but a sole adherent who cannot prove disadvantage to others sharing the belief cannot succeed. A requirement reasonably confined to protecting an employer’s intellectual property may be proportionate.

The claimant, a writer and film-maker employed by a design company, was dismissed after refusing to sign a copyright agreement as a condition of continued employment. She said that she believed in the statutory, human or moral right to own the copyright and moral rights in her own creative works.

The Employment Tribunal rejected claims of direct and indirect discrimination on grounds of philosophical belief. It found that the asserted belief did not satisfy the fourth Grainger criterion. Alternatively, it found no group disadvantage and held that the agreement was justified by the employer’s legitimate aim of protecting its intellectual property.

The claimant appealed on the belief, group-disadvantage and justification issues.

1. Appeal dismissed. The Tribunal was entitled to find that the claimant’s asserted belief did not attain the required cogency and cohesion for protection under section 10(2) of the Equality Act 2010.

2. The Grainger criteria remain appropriate guidance. Removing the word “similar” from the former statutory definition did not lower the threshold for philosophical beliefs. A philosophical belief need not resemble a religious belief in content, but it must meet the same threshold of cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance. The threshold is modest and must not be applied so strictly as to exclude minority beliefs.

3. The fourth criterion requires attention to manifestation. Conduct merely motivated by a belief does not necessarily manifest it. The relevant act or omission must directly express the belief and be intimately linked to it. The claimant had not expressed her belief to the employer. Her refusal to sign the agreement conveyed commercial concern about retaining control of her private work, not a manifestation of a philosophical belief. The Tribunal’s conclusion was therefore open to it.

4. A claim of indirect discrimination requires proof that persons sharing the protected characteristic are, or would be, put at a particular disadvantage. It is unnecessary to prove disadvantage to every member of the group. But the statutory group-disadvantage requirement cannot be read down for claims concerning religion or belief. There was no evidence of any other holder of the claimant’s belief or of disadvantage to such a person. The indirect-discrimination claim therefore failed.

5. The Tribunal’s alternative justification conclusion was also correct. Requiring signature of the amended agreement, on pain of dismissal, was a proportionate means of protecting the employer’s intellectual property. The amended agreement was confined to works connected with the employer’s business or arising from the employment, and went no further than necessary.

• Employment Appeal Tribunal: dismissed the claimant’s appeal.
• Employment Tribunal, Bristol: dismissed the claimant’s direct and indirect religion-or-belief discrimination claims. Its decision is not separately cited in the judgment.