Case details
Summary
A specific time-limit provision which permits an extension only where timely presentation was not reasonably practicable is a self-contained exception to a general power to extend time. The general power cannot be used to enlarge the grounds for relief and make the specific limitation otiose.
Where a prescribed period is expressed as beginning with the date of service, that date is included. A general computation provision using different language does not alter the established meaning of the specific rule.
Factual background
An inspector issued Petrofac with a prohibition notice under the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974. Petrofac lodged its Employment Tribunal appeal on 14 March 2019, believing that the 21-day period ran from the day after service on 21 February.
The Employment Judge held that the appeal was late but extended time under Rule 5 of the Employment Tribunals (Constitution and Rules of Procedure) Regulations 2013. The inspector appealed that extension. Petrofac cross-appealed the ruling that the appeal was out of time. The central issues were whether Rule 5 supplemented Rule 105(1)(b), and whether the day of service counted in the 21-day period.
Held
Appeal allowed and cross-appeal refused. The notice of appeal was out of time and the Employment Judge had no jurisdiction to extend time under Rule 5.
Rule 105(1)(b) is a specific and self-contained provision governing relief from the time limit in Rule 105(1)(a). It permits an extension only where it was not reasonably practicable to present the appeal in time. Rule 5 is a general power, but its application would make the restricted discretion in Rule 105(1)(b) redundant.
The applicable interpretative principle was that a later and specific provision ordinarily qualifies an earlier general provision. The specialist jurisdiction in Rule 105 therefore operates as an exception to Rule 5. The fairness obligation in Rule 2 did not alter that construction.
Petrofac accepted that timely presentation had been reasonably practicable. Accordingly, neither the solicitor’s error nor the misleading wording in the notes accompanying the prohibition notice was relevant to the only available ground for an extension.
Rule 105(1)(a) required an appeal before the end of 21 days beginning with service. Those words include the day of service. Rule 4(3), which uses different general wording for periods running from an event, did not govern this specific rule. The appeal lodged on 14 March 2019 against the notice dated 21 February 2019 was therefore late.
Appellate history
Employment Appeal Tribunal: allowed the inspector’s appeal and refused Petrofac’s cross-appeal; the prohibition-notice appeal was out of time.
Employment Tribunal: held that the appeal was late, but purported to extend time under Rule 5 of the Employment Tribunals (Constitution and Rules of Procedure) Regulations 2013.
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