Farley v Westminster Bank

A non-charitable purpose trust must define purposes which a court of equity can execute. A gift fails for uncertainty where its terms permit the property to be used for purposes outside the legal meaning of charity.

When a will expressly specifies the trust's purpose, the office or character of the trustees cannot ordinarily restrict the purpose's natural meaning. The expression “parish work” is broader than strictly religious or charitable activity. A gift for parish work may therefore encompass legally non-charitable objects and is not saved merely because its trustees are a vicar and churchwardens.

A testatrix left equal shares of her residuary estate to four bodies. Two shares were given to the respective vicars and churchwardens of two churches “for parish work”. The representatives of those churches contended that the recipients' ecclesiastical offices confined the gifts to religious purposes which were charitable in law.

Luxmoore J held the two gifts invalid. The Court of Appeal affirmed that conclusion by a majority in [1938] 1 Ch 495, Clauson LJ dissenting. The central issue before the House of Lords was whether “for parish work” restricted the gifts to legally charitable purposes or permitted expenditure upon wider, non-charitable parish activities.

1. The appeal was dismissed unanimously. Lord Atkin, Lord Russell of Killowen and Lord Romer held that each gift to a vicar and churchwardens “for parish work” was void. The expression was too wide to confine expenditure to purposes which were charitable in the legal sense.

2. Per Lord Atkin, a purpose trust is too indefinite for judicial execution if the property may consistently with the will be applied to purposes other than strictly charitable purposes. He applied the principle expressed in Dunne v Byrne [1912] AC 407, including its reliance upon Baker v Sutton (1836) 1 Keen 224 and James v Allen (1817) 3 Mer 17.

3. Per Lord Atkin, the parenthetical words “for parish work” defined and enlarged the purposes for which the money could be used. Their ordinary meaning covered the full range of parish activities. Although some such activities were religious or charitable, others were merely conducive to the congregation's moral or spiritual welfare, benevolent, or generally useful. Those wider purposes did not satisfy the legal definition of charity.

4. Lord Russell agreed that the words could not be restricted to ecclesiastical or religious purposes in the strict sense. They extended to the varied activities connected with a parish church, including objects which were not legally charitable.

5. Per Lord Romer, the recipients' offices could not narrow the expressly stated purpose. The office of a trustee may assist in identifying a trust's purpose where no purpose is specified. Here, however, the will clearly specified “parish work”, which retained its ordinary and legally unrestricted meaning.

6. The costs of the appeal were ordered to be paid from the two failed bequests.

1. House of Lords: The House unanimously dismissed the appeal and affirmed that the two gifts were void. Costs were ordered to come from the failed bequests.

2. Court of Appeal: By a majority, the court affirmed the invalidity of the gifts in [1938] 1 Ch 495. The Master of the Rolls and Farwell J concluded that “parish work” could not be confined to legally charitable purposes; Clauson LJ dissented.

3. High Court: Luxmoore J held the two gifts invalid. No separate citation is stated in the judgment.