Christie v Leachinsky (Leachinsky v Christie)

A constable who arrests without a warrant on reasonable suspicion of felony must ordinarily tell the arrested person the true ground of arrest. The information need not use technical language, but it must convey in substance the alleged act or crime. A legally insufficient ground cannot be given while a valid suspicion remains undisclosed.

Express notification is unnecessary where the circumstances already make the general nature of the allegation known. It may be postponed where resistance, flight or an urgent need to secure a potentially violent person makes immediate explanation impracticable. The ground must then be given at the first reasonable opportunity. Failure renders the arrest and detention false imprisonment. A later judicial remand is an independent act which ends the arresting officers’ liability for continued detention.

Christie v Leachinsky (Leachinsky v Christie) concerned two periods of detention. Police officers arrested Leachinsky without a warrant at his warehouse and stated that the charge was unlawful possession under the Liverpool Corporation Act, 1921. They knew his name and residence, so the Act gave them no power to arrest. Although they reasonably suspected theft or felonious receiving, they did not disclose that suspicion.

After a remand in custody, the statutory charge was withdrawn and the magistrate discharged Leachinsky. Christie then directed him from the dock to the cells, where he was held until Leicester police arrived to arrest him for larceny. Stable J rejected liability for both periods. The Court of Appeal, reported at [1946] KB 124, held both detentions actionable. The central questions were whether an undisclosed reasonable suspicion could justify the first arrest and whether the known suspicion of larceny justified the second detention.

1. Disposition. The House unanimously dismissed the appeal concerning the first imprisonment and allowed it concerning the second. Viscount Simon delivered the leading speech. Lord Simonds and Lord du Parcq delivered concurring speeches. Lord Thankerton and Lord Macmillan concurred in the opinions expressed.
2. Statutory power. Per Viscount Simon and Lord du Parcq, section 507(1) of the Liverpool Corporation Act, 1921 did not create an offence until a person brought before a court failed satisfactorily to account for possession. Section 513 permitted arrest without warrant only where the person’s name and residence were unknown and could not be ascertained. The officers knew both. The statutory charge therefore provided no lawful basis for the first arrest.
3. Common-law power. Per Lord du Parcq, consistently with Viscount Simon and Lord Simonds, a constable may arrest without warrant upon reasonable suspicion that a felony has been committed and that the arrested person is guilty. That power may exist even if no felony was in fact committed. Its exercise remains subject to the arrested person’s right to know why liberty is being restrained.
4. Communication of the ground. Per Viscount Simon, Lord Simonds and Lord du Parcq, the true ground must ordinarily be communicated at the time of arrest or at the earliest reasonable opportunity. The arrested person must know in substance the alleged act or crime. Technical precision is unnecessary. Notification may be unnecessary where the circumstances already convey the allegation, or temporarily impracticable because of resistance, flight or an urgent need to secure a potentially violent person.
5. First imprisonment. The officers stated only the invalid statutory ground and allowed Leachinsky to believe that he was suspected of a different type of offence. Their private suspicion of theft or felonious receiving could not retrospectively justify the arrest. The arrest and ensuing detention were false imprisonment. The officers’ liability for continued detention ended when the magistrate independently ordered the remand.
6. Second imprisonment. The later detention was lawful. Christie reasonably suspected larceny, and Leachinsky knew the felony for which he was being held pending the arrival of the Leicester police. The case therefore fell within the qualification that express notification is unnecessary where the arrested person already knows the general nature of the allegation.
7. Detention at court. Per Viscount Simon and Lord du Parcq, the second detention did not become actionable merely because Leachinsky was directed from the dock to the cells. He could lawfully have been arrested immediately outside. Although an arrest in court may be undesirable and may sometimes constitute contempt, the circumstances disclosed no further claim in false imprisonment. Damages were consequently confined to the first arrest and detention.

• House of Lords: Unanimously dismissed the police officers’ appeal concerning the first imprisonment and allowed their appeal concerning the second. The Court of Appeal’s order was modified so that damages related only to the first arrest and detention.
• Court of Appeal: In Christie v Leachinsky [1946] KB 124, held that the first arrest was unlawful because the true ground had not been disclosed. By majority, it also held the second detention actionable.
• High Court: Stable J found that the officers reasonably suspected felony and treated that suspicion as a complete defence to the first imprisonment. He also rejected liability for the second detention.