National Anti-Vivisection Society v Inland Revenue Comrs

A purpose is charitable only if it is for the public benefit. The court must determine that question objectively from the evidence. It may weigh the purpose’s benefits against the disadvantages that would result from its achievement. A donor’s benevolent intention cannot establish public benefit where the purpose would be gravely injurious to the community.

A trust whose main purpose is to procure a change in the law is political rather than charitable. The court cannot adjudge a proposed alteration of the law to be for the public benefit. Legislative activity which is merely subsidiary to a dominant charitable purpose may stand differently.

The Society claimed exemption from income tax on its investment income under section 37 of the Income Tax Act 1918, contending that it was established for charitable purposes only. Its principal object was the total abolition of experiments on living animals, including repeal of the Cruelty to Animals Act 1876 and enactment of a prohibition.

The Special Commissioners considered themselves bound by In re Foveaux [1895] 2 Ch 501 to allow the claim. They nevertheless found that abolition would seriously impede medical and scientific progress, and that any assumed moral benefit was far outweighed by injury to public health. Macnaghten J reversed their decision. The Court of Appeal affirmed by a majority, Lord Greene MR dissenting.

The issues were whether the Society’s leading purpose was political and whether the court could consider evidence that achievement of its object would be gravely injurious to the public.

1. Appeal dismissed with costs by a majority. Viscount Simon adopted Lord Simonds’s reasoning. Lord Wright and Lord Normand also concluded that the Society was not established for charitable purposes only. Lord Porter dissented.

2. Per Lord Simonds, with Viscount Simon, Lord Wright and Lord Normand agreeing in substance, public benefit is an overriding requirement of charitable status. A purpose falling broadly within a recognised charitable category may initially be presumed beneficial, particularly within the first three divisions of Lord Macnaghten’s classification. That presumption yields where the evidence shows that achievement of the purpose would greatly disadvantage the public.

3. The court must form its own judgment on public benefit from the evidence. The founder’s sincere belief and benevolent intention are not decisive. The inquiry considers the purpose as a whole and may weigh moral or educational advantages against injury to medical science, research and public health. The Commissioners’ findings established that the Society’s assumed moral benefit was far outweighed by the grave public injury which abolition of vivisection would cause.

4. Per Lord Simonds and Lord Wright, In re Foveaux [1895] 2 Ch 501 was wrongly decided and overruled. Chitty J had wrongly treated the societies’ intention to benefit the community as sufficient while declining to decide whether their success would benefit it. The correct principle was stated in In re Hummeltenberg [1923] 1 Ch 237: the court determines public benefit upon the evidence before it.

5. There was an independent ground for rejecting the claim. Per Lord Simonds, Lord Wright and Lord Normand, a leading purpose of the Society was to secure compulsory abolition through legislation. A trust directed to changing the law is political and is not charitable because the court cannot determine that the proposed change would benefit the public. Legislation which is merely ancillary to a dominant charitable purpose does not necessarily have that effect, but the Commissioners’ findings showed that legislative change was central here.

6. Lord Porter dissented. He regarded the prevention of animal suffering as the Society’s primary purpose and legislation merely as a means. He also considered that, once the object fell within an established charitable class, a tribunal should not withdraw charitable status by balancing conflicting evidence about its advantages and disadvantages.

1. House of Lords: The Society’s appeal was dismissed with costs by a majority, affirming the Court of Appeal.

2. Court of Appeal: The judgment of Macnaghten J was affirmed by a majority comprising Mackinnon and Tucker LJJ. Lord Greene MR dissented.

3. High Court: Macnaghten J allowed the Revenue’s appeal and held that the Society was not established for charitable purposes only.

4. Special Commissioners: The Society’s claim to exemption under section 37 of the Income Tax Act 1918 was allowed because the Commissioners considered themselves bound by In re Foveaux [1895] 2 Ch 501.