Barnard v National Dock Labour Board

Where a statutory scheme entrusts disciplinary powers to a named board, those powers are judicial or quasi-judicial. They cannot be delegated unless the scheme expressly permits delegation or the power is necessarily implied. Practical difficulty and confidence in an official are insufficient. A suspension imposed without jurisdiction is a nullity. An appeal cannot validate it, and certiorari is not necessarily the exclusive remedy. The court may grant a declaration or injunction where necessary to prevent injustice, although such relief should be granted sparingly.

Registered dock workers challenged seven-day suspensions imposed after they refused orders to work specified hours unloading bulk sugar. Mr Justice McNair held that the orders were lawful and reasonable and that the Port Manager could act as the Local Board's agent under the Dock Workers (Regulation of Employment) Order 1947. On appeal, the workers accepted the finding concerning the orders and abandoned the appeal against Silvertown Services Ltd. The remaining issues were whether the Local Board could delegate its disciplinary powers, whether the workers' appeals waived or validated the defects, and whether declaratory relief was available despite the statutory appeal procedure.

The Court of Appeal unanimously allowed the appeal against the National Dock Labour Board and declared the purported suspensions unlawful. The appeal against Silvertown Services Ltd was dismissed with costs, and the cross-appeal was dismissed.

1. Delegation. Singleton LJ, Denning LJ and Romer LJ held that the disciplinary powers under Clauses 15 and 16 of the Dock Workers (Regulation of Employment) Order 1947 were judicial or quasi-judicial, not merely administrative. The Local Board had to consider reports, investigate alleged misconduct and decide whether to impose penalties. Judicial functions cannot be delegated without express authority or necessary implication. The scheme contained no such power. Its express provision for delegating registration duties supported that conclusion. The practical volume of cases did not alter the result; the Board could use a quorum.
2. Nullity and appeal. The Port Manager had no jurisdiction to suspend the workers because the Local Board had made no decision. The notices were therefore nullities. The appeal tribunal could not turn a nullity into an effective suspension, and Clause 19 presupposed a valid notice based on a Local Board decision. The workers' appeals did not amount to waiver or ratification, particularly since they lacked knowledge of the Port Manager's want of authority. The appeal tribunal had no original power to impose a suspension and could not create jurisdiction by an erroneous legal decision.
3. Relief. The court accepted that statutory tribunals should not ordinarily be disturbed and that declaratory relief is discretionary. Nevertheless, the courts could grant a declaration or injunction where a statutory body or official acted without jurisdiction. Certiorari was not an adequate remedy here because the workers could not discover the relevant facts in time. The declaration was accordingly appropriate.

• Court of Appeal: Appeal allowed against the judgment for the National Dock Labour Board; the purported suspensions were declared unlawful. The appeal against Silvertown Services Ltd was dismissed with costs, and the cross-appeal was dismissed.
• High Court: Mr Justice McNair decided the preliminary jurisdiction point in favour of the workers on 7 July and later gave judgment for both defendants. He held that the work orders were lawful and reasonable and that the Port Manager had authority to impose the suspensions.