Hopgood v Brown

An owner who, by conduct and with the necessary authority, represents that an unmarked boundary may safely be treated as lying along a proposed building line is estopped from later alleging an encroachment after the neighbour has built in reliance on that representation. The estoppel binds successors in title, who cannot acquire a better right than their predecessor.

A party who continues to enjoy the benefit of a reciprocal drainage arrangement cannot revoke the corresponding licence which permits the other party’s discharge. Repeated conveyancing descriptions and a referenced plan may also identify the same plot and straight boundaries despite an intervening physical encroachment.

Hopgood v Brown concerned adjoining building plots. Brown built a garage and boundary works with the assent of the company then owning the neighbouring plot. The works encroached on the land later conveyed through Lister to Hopgood.

The County Court held that the conveyances included the disputed strip but that the company, and therefore Hopgood, was estopped from asserting the true boundary. It awarded Hopgood one shilling for water discharged through a drain into a manhole on his land. Hopgood appealed. Brown cross-appealed against that award and the costs order.

The central issues were whether the conveyances identified the original straight-sided plot, whether estoppel bound a successor in title, and whether Hopgood could revoke one part of a reciprocal drainage arrangement while retaining its benefit.

1. The appeal was dismissed and the cross-appeal was allowed. Jenkins and Morris LJJ agreed with the County Court that the conveyances to Lister and then Hopgood conveyed the plot described in the 1932 conveyance. The repeated measurements and reference to the earlier plan identified a plot with straight side boundaries. The Master of the Rolls took a different view of construction, but agreed that estoppel defeated Hopgood’s claim.

2. There was a clear estoppel by representation. The company, through its authorised conduct, represented that Brown could build on the basis that the garage wall and fence marked the boundary. Brown acted on that representation and paid for the building works. The company could not thereafter allege that the works trespassed on its land. This was estoppel by representation, not merely estoppel by acquiescence; actual knowledge of the representor’s true right was not an essential additional requirement.

3. The estoppel bound Hopgood as successor in title. Applying the principle stated in Taylor v Needham, 2 Taunton 278, a person taking an estate under a deed is privy in estate and cannot obtain a better right than the predecessor from whom the estate derives.

4. The one-shilling award for the drainage claim was set aside. The drainage operated under reciprocal licences: Hopgood’s water continued to pass through a pipe beneath Brown’s land to the sewer, while Brown’s water entered the manhole on Hopgood’s land. Hopgood could not retain the benefit of one part of that arrangement while purporting to revoke the corresponding licence granted to Brown.

5. Brown was awarded one half of his County Court costs and his costs of the appeal and cross-appeal.

• Court of Appeal: Hopgood’s appeal was dismissed. Brown’s cross-appeal was allowed insofar as the one-shilling damages award was set aside and the costs order was varied.
• County Court: The court held that the disputed strip passed under the conveyances but that Hopgood was estopped from asserting the boundary against Brown. It awarded Hopgood one shilling for the drainage complaint and made no order as to costs.