Ingram v Little

In an oral transaction with an impostor, physical presence ordinarily indicates that the parties contracted with each other. That inference may be displaced where, objectively, the offer or acceptance was addressed only to a distinct person whose identity was material to the transaction and the impostor knew it.

A false name alone does not prevent a contract. However, where a seller agrees to accept credit only after verifying the identity and standing of a real person whom the rogue falsely claims to be, the rogue cannot accept an offer intended solely for that person. No contract is then formed, and no title passes to an innocent purchaser from the rogue.

The plaintiffs advertised a motor car for sale. They were prepared to sell for cash, but refused to accept the rogue's cheque until he claimed to be P. G. M. Hutchinson of Stanstead House, Caterham. One plaintiff checked that name and address in a telephone directory. Believing the rogue to be that real person, they accepted his cheque and delivered the car and its registration book.

The cheque was dishonoured. The rogue then sold the car to the defendant, whom Slade J found to have acted in good faith. Slade J held that no contract had been made with the rogue and gave the plaintiffs judgment for conversion. The defendant appealed. The plaintiffs cross-noticed against findings concerning the defendant's good faith and the rogue's identity.

The central issue was whether the transaction with the rogue was a voidable contract, capable of passing title to an innocent purchaser, or no contract at all because of mistake as to identity.

1. Appeal dismissed by a majority. Sellers and Pearce LJJ held that the plaintiffs made no contract with the rogue. Accordingly, he acquired no title and could not pass title to the defendant. The judgment for conversion was affirmed.

2. Objective formation of contract. Per Sellers LJ, the issue was not resolved merely because the rogue was physically present. The inquiry was whether the promise, objectively interpreted in its known context, was addressed to the rogue or only to the real P. G. M. Hutchinson whom he impersonated. Pearce LJ expressed the same point as a rebuttable prima facie inference that an oral offer is addressed to the person present.

3. Importance of the transaction and identity. A cash sale to a person physically present would ordinarily make identity immaterial and would produce, at most, a voidable contract. Here, however, the cash negotiations had ended. The plaintiffs agreed to take a cheque only after the rogue's asserted name and address had been verified. The evidence entitled Slade J to find that credit was extended solely to the real Hutchinson of Stanstead House, not to the person in the room.

4. Authorities. [1919] 2 KB 243 was not treated as deciding that an in-person transaction must always be made with the person present. The majority treated the question as fact-sensitive. The reasoning in [1878] 2 Appeal Cases 459 and 1863 1 Hurlstone & Coltman 803 supported the conclusion that an offer knowingly directed to another identity cannot be accepted by the impostor.

5. Devlin LJ dissented. He would have held that the ordinary presumption was not rebutted, so that the rogue made a valid but voidable contract and could pass title before rescission. The majority therefore dismissed the appeal with costs and granted leave to appeal to the House of Lords.

• Court of Appeal. The defendant's appeal was dismissed. The court affirmed the conclusion that the rogue had acquired no title. Leave to appeal to the House of Lords was granted.
• High Court (Slade J). Judgment for the plaintiffs for £720, the agreed value of the car, as damages for conversion. The citation is not stated in the judgment.