Boardman v Sanderson (Keel and Block Third Party)

A driver remains responsible for the safe movement of a vehicle while following another person’s directions. When changing direction, the driver must take particular care to ensure that the altered course will not endanger anyone beside the vehicle.

Liability for psychiatric injury depends on reasonable foreseeability applied to the particular facts. A claimant need not witness the accident itself. A duty may extend to a close relative whom the defendant knows is nearby, within earshot and likely to encounter the immediate aftermath after hearing the injured person’s cries.

An eight-year-old boy was injured when the defendant reversed his car from a garage and changed direction, causing a front wheel to trap the boy’s foot. A garage proprietor was directing the manoeuvre, but concentrated on the opposite side of the vehicle. The boy’s father, who was paying the defendant’s garage account nearby, heard his son scream, immediately attended and later suffered shock.

Salmon J awarded the boy £1,250 and his father £75. He found the defendant negligent and discharged the garage proprietors from liability. The defendant appealed, contending that he was not negligent, that the third parties bore responsibility, and that the father could not recover because he had not witnessed the accident.

1. Appeal dismissed unanimously. Ormerod LJ delivered the leading judgment. Devlin LJ agreed, and Danckwerts LJ also agreed with the result and reasoning.

2. The defendant remained in charge of the car although the garage proprietor was directing its movement. The proprietor was concentrating on preventing a collision at the car’s offside. The defendant could not transfer his responsibility for the vehicle to a person attending to that limited part of the manoeuvre. The defendant concentrated on his right-hand side and failed to observe the child close to the nearside.

3. The child was injured as the car changed direction. That was a moment requiring extra care because a person beside the vehicle might assume that it would continue on its existing course. A driver must ensure that a change of course can be made safely. Although the negligence was not gross and the case was close to the borderline, the trial judge’s finding of liability should stand. The third parties therefore remained discharged.

4. The father’s claim for shock was governed by reasonable foreseeability. There was no absolute rule requiring him to have witnessed the accident. King v Phillips [1953] 1 All ER 617 was distinguishable because the mother there happened to be some distance away and her immediate presence was not reasonably foreseeable.

5. The defendant knew that the child was in the yard and that the father was nearby, within earshot. He could reasonably foresee that negligent injury to the child would cause the father to hear the child’s cries, attend immediately and encounter the distressing scene. Applying the fact-sensitive principle of reasonable foresight discussed in Hay or Bourhill v Young [1943] AC 92, the defendant owed a duty extending to the father in those circumstances. The father’s award of £75 was upheld.

1. Court of Appeal: The defendant’s appeal was dismissed unanimously. The findings of negligence, the awards to the child and his father, and the discharge of the third parties were upheld.

2. Newcastle Assizes: Salmon J gave judgment for the infant plaintiff for £1,250 and for his father for £75. He found the defendant negligent and discharged the garage proprietors from the proceedings.