Bratty v Attorney-General for Northern Ireland

Automatism requires unconscious and involuntary action. The defence must first identify evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer that the accused acted in that state. Whether sufficient evidence exists is a question of law for the judge.

Where the only suggested cause is a disease of the mind within the M’Naghten Rules, the issue is insanity. Rejected evidence of such a disease cannot, merely under a different name, support non-insane automatism. If a proper foundation for non-insane automatism is laid, however, the prosecution retains the ultimate burden. The jury must acquit if left in real doubt whether the act was voluntary.

The appellant was convicted at Downpatrick Assizes of murdering an eighteen-year-old woman whom he had strangled after driving her from Hillsborough. He admitted the acts but described a terrible feeling followed by a blackness. Medical evidence identified psychomotor epilepsy, a disease of the mind, as the only possible pathological explanation.

The trial judge left insanity to the jury, which rejected it, but declined to leave automatism or manslaughter. The Court of Criminal Appeal in Northern Ireland dismissed the appeal and certified two questions: whether automatism remained available after insanity had been rejected and, if so, whether the evidence required it to be left to the jury.

Appeal dismissed unanimously.

1. Per the Lord Chancellor, Lord Denning and Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest, a sane person may in principle obtain an unqualified acquittal where unconscious and involuntary action means that the conduct cannot properly be regarded as the person’s act. Insanity and automatism may therefore be advanced as alternatives. Such cases are likely to be rare.

2. Per the Lord Chancellor, with Lord Tucker and Lord Hodson agreeing, automatism cannot be left to the jury unless a proper evidential foundation has been established. The defence must identify evidence, whether arising from prosecution or defence witnesses, from which a jury could reasonably infer unconscious and involuntary action. Whether such evidence exists is a question of law for the judge. The principle in Mancini v Director of Public Prosecutions [1942] AC 1 applies to automatism as it does to other defences requiring an evidential foundation.

3. Per the Lord Chancellor, Lord Denning and Lord Morris, evidence rejected as insufficient to establish insanity does not by itself establish non-insane automatism. Where unconsciousness is attributed solely to a defect of reason arising from a disease of the mind, the proper issue is insanity under the M’Naghten Rules. Rejection of that sole alleged cause leaves no evidential basis for an alternative defence merely bearing the name automatism.

4. Per Lord Denning, an involuntary act means muscular action uncontrolled by the mind, such as a spasm or convulsion, or action performed without consciousness, as in concussion or sleepwalking. Later loss of memory, an irresistible impulse, or an unintended or unforeseen consequence does not by itself make an act involuntary. Automatism arising from a disease of the mind produces the special insanity verdict rather than an unqualified acquittal.

5. Per the Lord Chancellor, Lord Denning and Lord Morris, the prosecution retains the ultimate burden of proving voluntary action beyond reasonable doubt. It may initially rely upon the presumption of mental capacity. Once the judge finds evidence fit for the jury’s consideration, the jury must acquit if that evidence leaves a real doubt whether the act was voluntary. The Lord Chancellor acknowledged that this burden ruling was not strictly necessary to decide the appeal.

6. The only medical explanation advanced was psychomotor epilepsy, which the evidence treated as a disease of the mind. The remaining evidence, including the appellant’s account of blackness, memory difficulties, unusual characteristics and previous conduct, could not reasonably support non-insane automatism. The trial judge therefore correctly withheld that issue. The House also agreed that manslaughter was not an issue fit for the jury.

1. House of Lords: Dismissed the appeal unanimously and upheld the conviction.
2. Court of Criminal Appeal in Northern Ireland: Dismissed the appeal on 18 July 1961, certified two points of law of general public importance and granted leave to appeal.
3. Downpatrick Assizes: Convicted the appellant of murder on 4 May 1961 after the jury rejected insanity; the judge withheld automatism and manslaughter from the jury.