Gollins v Gollins

Matrimonial cruelty requires grave and weighty conduct which causes injury to life, limb or physical or mental health, or a reasonable apprehension of such injury. The court must assess the conduct and its probable consequences in the circumstances of the particular spouses and the whole marriage.

An intention to injure, malignity, or conduct “aimed at” the complaining spouse is not an essential ingredient. Intention and knowledge may nevertheless be highly relevant, and sometimes decisive. Persistent, inexcusable conduct known to be injuring the health of a spouse of normal health and temperament may amount to cruelty although motivated by selfishness rather than a desire to hurt.

The wife obtained an order from the Shropshire justices relieving her of the duty to cohabit with her husband. The justices treated his persistent refusal to obtain paid work, his debts and his failure to support the family as cruelty because he continued despite knowing that the resulting strain was seriously injuring her mental health.

The Divisional Court reversed the order, principally under Kaslefsky v Kaslefsky [1951] P. 38, because the conduct had not been “aimed at” the wife. The Court of Appeal restored the justices’ order by a majority. The husband appealed to the House of Lords.

The central issues were whether intention to injure or conduct “aimed at” a spouse was essential to matrimonial cruelty, whether the proved conduct could amount to cruelty, and whether the appellate courts should disturb the justices’ factual assessment.

By a majority of three to two, the appeal was dismissed.

1. Per Lord Reid, with Lord Evershed concurring, cruelty admits no comprehensive definition. Save in exceptional categories not arising here, relief requires actual or probable injury to life, limb or health. The tribunal must examine the respondent’s knowledge and responsibility, the conduct, its consequences, the spouses’ characters and vulnerabilities, and the marriage as a whole.

2. Per Lord Reid, Lord Evershed and Lord Pearce, intention to injure, malignity, and conduct “aimed at” the petitioner are not essential ingredients of cruelty. The “aimed at” rule in Kaslefsky v Kaslefsky [1951] P. 38 created artificial presumptions and could deny relief against selfish, obtuse or insensitive conduct. Eastland v Eastland [1954] P. 403, which followed that reasoning, was likewise erroneous on that point.

3. Per Lord Pearce, the ultimate inquiry is one of fact and degree. Reprehensible conduct or a departure from normal standards of conjugal kindness is cruelty where it causes injury to health or reasonable apprehension of it and, after allowance for temperament, circumstances and any excuse, a reasonable person would conclude that the complaining spouse ought not to endure it. Intention may sharpen the significance of conduct and decide a doubtful case, but it is not a universal criterion.

4. Per Lord Reid, the husband was fully responsible, knew that his persistent and inexcusable idleness and financial conduct were injuring a wife of normal health, and nevertheless continued from selfishness. The matters were clearly proved and went beyond the reasonable wear and tear of married life. They established persistent cruelty.

5. Per Lord Evershed and Lord Pearce, the justices saw and heard the parties. An appellate court working from abbreviated notes should exercise great caution before displacing their fact-sensitive conclusion. There was material upon which the justices could properly find cruelty.

6. Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest and Lord Hodson dissented on the application to the facts. Both accepted that cruelty requires serious conduct and injury or apprehended injury to health, but concluded that the husband’s financial failure and neglect could not properly be called cruel. They would have allowed the appeal.

1. House of Lords: By a majority of three to two, dismissed the husband’s appeal and upheld the Court of Appeal’s restoration of the justices’ order.
2. Court of Appeal: Willmer and Davies LJJ, Harman LJ dissenting, reversed the Divisional Court and restored the justices’ order.
3. High Court, Divisional Court: Sir Jocelyn Simon P and Cairns J reversed the justices, holding principally under Kaslefsky v Kaslefsky [1951] P. 38 and Eastland v Eastland [1954] P. 403 that the facts did not amount to cruelty.
4. Shropshire justices: Found persistent cruelty and ordered that the wife was no longer bound to cohabit with the husband.