Boys v Chaplin (Chaplin v Boys)

In an English action for a tort committed abroad, the majority upheld an award of English general damages despite the more limited damages available at the place of the wrong. Lord Upjohn treated the nature and heads of the remedy, including damages for pain, suffering and loss of amenity, as governed by the lex fori. Lord Denning MR reached the same result by applying the law with the most significant connection to the parties and the act.

The majority did not share a single rationale. Lord Justice Diplock dissented. He regarded recoverable heads of damage as substantive and governed by the lex loci delicti; only their monetary quantification was procedural.

The claimant and defendant were English servicemen normally resident and domiciled in England. While stationed in Malta, the claimant was seriously injured by the defendant's admitted negligent driving.

Under Maltese law, the claimant could recover only £53 for pecuniary loss. He could not recover for pain, suffering or loss of amenity. Milmo J applied English principles and awarded a total of £2,303.

The defendant appealed. The central issue was whether an English court could award the additional general damages for a foreign tort, or whether recovery was confined to the civil liability recognised by Maltese law.

1. Appeal dismissed by a majority of two to one. The majority upheld the English award, including general damages for physical injury. Lord Justice Diplock would have allowed the appeal and limited recovery to £53.

2. Lord Denning MR held that the governing law should be the proper law of the tort: the law of the country with which the parties and the act had the most significant connection. England was that country on these facts. Both parties were English servicemen normally based in England, their insurance was English, and the claimant was treated and sued in England. The governing law determined actionability, recoverable heads of damage and their measure. Quantification remained procedural and for the lex fori.

3. Lord Upjohn rejected a proper-law-of-tort doctrine. He treated Phillips v Eyre as establishing the applicable English rule for foreign torts and regarded Machado v Fontes as directly supporting recovery of English heads of damage. Even if the lex loci delicti governed substantive questions, the nature of the remedy, its heads and its assessment in an English action were governed by English law. Applying foreign damage rules would create impracticable distinctions and uncertainty.

4. Lord Justice Diplock, dissenting, construed Phillips v Eyre as requiring an underlying foreign civil liability. In negligence, recoverable heads of damage form part of the substantive character of that liability. The law of Malta therefore determined which consequences of the negligent act were actionable; English law could quantify, but could not compensate, a loss for which Maltese law created no civil liability.

5. The majority's common ground was the dismissal of the appeal and the maintenance of the English award. Their reasons differed materially. Leave to appeal to the House of Lords was granted, with a stay save for £500.

• Court of Appeal: By a two-to-one majority, dismissed the defendant's appeal and upheld the award of English damages.
• High Court: Milmo J held that English law governed the assessment of damages and awarded £2,303. The defendant appealed.